|
Of Public Interest
Volume 1, Number 1
August 1999
Restraining Government to Protect the
Public:
Why Constitutional Tax Limits are Good for Iowans
by Donald P. Racheter and Richard E. Wagner
There is perhaps no doctrine so destructive to democratic
discourse as that of the "general will," expounded in 1762 by Jean Jacques
Rousseau in The Social Contract. He argued that while individuals may hold
differing and conflicting private opinions, the outcomes of a legislative
assembly will reflect the general will.
A legislature can thus do no wrong, because its enactments will
reflect this general will. Should anyone dispute what the general will means,
the truth will be revealed by a vote of the legislature, in Rousseau’s
formulation.
Constitutional controls over government have no place in this
formulation because they would thwart the general will. Whatever a legislature
enacts is presumed automatically to be just and proper.
This doctrine of the supremacy of legislative authority, while
rejected resoundingly by our Founders, has maintained a presence in our
political discourse to this day. For instance, it was present on this page on 19
March, when Robert Mannheimer argued against constitutional tax limits in Iowa
on the grounds that those limits would "seriously limit [legislators’] right to
govern as they deem wise and in the best interests of all our citizens." For Mr.
Mannheimer, as for Rousseau, there is no higher authority than what the
legislature asserts.
In sharp contrast, the American founding was a strong rejection
of any notion of a general will and its presumption that the legislature was the
highest authority. Within the Constitutional Republic that the Founders
established, individual citizens, not legislators, were the highest authorities.
Government was not a source of rights, but simply an instrument
for preserving and protecting people’s prior, God-given rights. And as Jefferson
put it, despotism of 179 [the legislators] is as bad as the despotism of one
[the king]; thus all governments need to be limited.
The Founders gave up the ability of "good government" to do
"wonderful things" in order to prevent "bad government" from doing "terrible
things." Human history tells us the Founders were on to something, and that they
did an usually good job of creating a government that has not oppressed its
people as badly as most do.
That U.S. Constitution, like ours in Iowa, is full of limits on
the government in general, and the legislature in particular. Iowans will be
standing with the Founders if they vote YES on June 29th to include some
additional limitations, not anticipated by our Iowa constitution drafters, but
made necessary by the weaknesses of politicians in the face of pressures from
organized special interests.
As did our Founders, we believe that the power to tax, as
governmental powers generally, represents a kind of Faustian bargain that can
bring a mix of good and evil upon us. (For a much fuller exposition of this
point, we refer readers to our just-published book LIMITING LEVIATHAN
[Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999] rhenning@e-elgar.com)
From a purely individual point of view, the best tax is surely
one that someone else pays. Whenever taxes are approved through some form of
majority rule, the ever- present temptation is for politically dominant groups
to lower their taxes by imposing higher taxes on others. The rallying cry "no
taxation without representation" goes back to Magna Carta, and meant literally
no taxation without the consent of the person being taxed.
The idea here is that it is fine for people to tax themselves.
Presumably, they would do this only to advance projects of common value. It is
not fine, however, for some people to approve taxes for others to pay. Yet it is
precisely the shifting of taxes from those who are politically influential onto
those who are not, that illustrates the perennial problem of democracy. Simple
majority rule makes this easy to accomplish.
Our Founders had no truck with any claim that legislative
authority should be unbounded. To the contrary, they severely limited the powers
of government through an enumeration of powers, together with a reservation to
the people of what was not enumerated. Legislatures were given powers to tax and
spend, but those powers were also subject to constitutional limits to restrict
the scope for doing such things as imposing taxes on others.
The proposed constitutional tax amendments before the Iowa
people likewise do not challenge the ability of the legislature to tax and
spend, but do limit more fully than before the ability of those who are
politically dominant to shift taxes onto others, and also make it slightly more
difficult to raise taxes on everyone.
Dr. Donald P. Racheter is President of Public Interest Institute and
Professor of Political Science at Central College, Pella, IA and Dr. Richard E.
Wagner is Public Interest Institute Academic Advisory Board Chairman and Holbert
L. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University.
Permission to
reprint or copy in whole or part is granted, provided a version of this
credit line is used: "Reprinted by permission from OF PUBLIC
INTEREST, a publication of Public Interest Institute."
The views expressed in this publication
are those of the author and not necessarily those of Public Interest Institute. They are brought to you in the interest of a
better-informed citizenry.
A Publication of:
Public Interest Institute at Iowa Wesleyan College
600 North Jackson Street
Mt. Pleasant, Iowa 52641-1328
Phone: 319-385-3462 Fax: 319-385-3799
E-Mail: public.interest.institute@limitedgovernment.org Web Site:
www.limitedgovernment.org
| 
