|
Of Public Interest
Volume 3, Number 5
April, 2001
Tax Competition: A Bogus Excuse for Governmental Collusion
by Richard E. Wagner
What goes around comes around, so people say. The United States was founded
partly on a rebellion against high taxes. It still has tax rates that, while now
quite high and rising are still lower than a number of European nations. Now the
United States, through its Treasury Department, is playing a leading role in
trying to raise taxes throughout the world. Truly, what goes around comes
around.
Over the past several years, our Treasury Department through its
participation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
has repeatedly decried what it calls "harmful tax competition." OECD’s
proposed antidote is to form a tax cartel to raise the level of taxes throughout
the world, and particularly in places where they are now low. Interestingly
enough, the Director of Fiscal Affairs of the International Monetary Fund has
also issued reports speculating in a positive vein about whether the time has
come for the creation of a World Tax Organization. The point of a World Tax
Organization, or of any of the measures advanced by the OECD, would be to
restrict the ability of competition among governments to generate lower taxes.
The argument that competition among governments is harmful is a fine
illustration of how a logically valid argument can nonetheless be wrong.
"John is a baby. All babies cry a lot. Therefore, John cries a lot."
Logically speaking, this argument is valid. It may, however, be wrong. John
might not cry a lot, even though he is a baby. If the premise "all babies
cry a lot" is granted, the rest follows as a matter of logic. A valid
argument derived from a false premise can lead to nonsense. To say that many
babies cry a lot, or even that most of them do, does not mean that all of them
do.
The OECD argument about harmful tax competition is similar: "Competition
keeps taxes low. Low taxes prevent governments from supplying vital public
needs. Therefore, competition prevents governments from supplying vital public
needs." The OECD’s argument follows logically from a false premise. The
false premise is that low taxes prevent governments from supplying vital public
needs.
Think of what it means to claim that low taxes prevent a government from
supplying vital public needs. This describes a situation where taxpayers would
actually support a proposal to increase taxes to supply those services. After
all, taxes are imposed to provide public services. While no one like to pay
taxes, if there is widespread agreement that additional public services would be
particularly valuable, there would be little opposition to proposals to increase
taxes to provide those services. There would be a general clamor for higher
taxation.
Such a clamor does not currently exist. All we see are some people supporting
higher taxes and larger government, and mostly because other people would pay
those taxes. This is a case of tax eaters seeking to soak taxpayers. Our
Treasury Department and the bloated welfare states of the OECD nations are on
the side of the tax eaters. For instance, over 90 percent of the federal income
tax is now
paid by but 50 percent of the taxpayers, which means that a majority of
taxpayers is nearly free of income tax. It is when taxes get heavy, when they
are used to finance unproductive and even counterproductive programs, and when
they are used simply to redistribute wealth from citizens in general to the
politically favored, that taxes evoke strong opposition. What keeps taxes from
becoming even higher than they might otherwise be is the ability of people and
capital to flee to friendlier, lower tax places.
We generally regard competition as a good thing. It is competition among
producers for the favor of consumers that brings us new and improved products
and low prices. The belief that competition is good provides the foundation for
the public support of our various pieces of anti-monopoly legislation. If
competition among businesses is good for consumers, is not competition among
governments likewise good for taxpayers? Similarly, if collusion among
businesses is bad for consumers, is not collusion among governments bad for
taxpayers?
It is easy enough to see what the OECD is concerned about. The European
nations have the highest tax rates in the world. The increasing mobility of
capital and commerce that is coming to characterize our world has put
increasingly intense pressure on these high-tax nations. Unemployment rates are
high in Europe, economic growth is low. A competitive response to this situation
would be to lower taxes and reduce government. A monopoly response is to seek to
restrict competition to keep taxes high. The OECD is seeking to establish a tax
cartel to keep tax rates higher than competition would otherwise allow them to
be. Our government should not participate in any such effort. Indeed, it should
seek to dissolve this tax cartel.
Richard E. Wagner is Senior Fellow at the Public Interest Institute and
Holbert Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University.
Permission to
reprint or copy in whole or part is granted, provided a version of this
credit line is used: "Reprinted by permission from OF PUBLIC
INTEREST, a publication of Public Interest Institute."
The views expressed in this publication
are those of the author and not necessarily those of Public Interest Institute. They are brought to you in the interest of a
better-informed citizenry.
A Publication of:
Public Interest Institute at Iowa Wesleyan College
600 North Jackson Street
Mt. Pleasant, Iowa 52641-1328
Phone: 319-385-3462 Fax: 319-385-3799
E-Mail: public.interest.institute@limitedgovernment.org Web Site:
www.limitedgovernment.org
|