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Of Public Interest
Volume 3, Number 6
May, 2001
Tax Rebates or Rate Reduction? Politics vs. Economics
by Richard E. Wagner
While a consensus seems to exist that some federal tax cut is a good thing,
that consensus dissolves quickly when specific cuts are considered. President
Bush proposes to cut federal taxes by $1.6 trillion over the next ten years.
About one-third of this reduction would be accomplished through a reduction in
marginal tax rates. In place of the three upper brackets that now range from 28
to 39.6 percent, there would be two brackets of 28 and 33 percent. To be sure,
only $300 billion of that cut is projected to occur within the next five years.
At an average of $60 billion per year, the amount of President Bush’s proposed
reduction is about the same as the proposal advanced by Senator Joseph Lieberman
to provide a $300 rebate to nearly everyone.
Despite their similar totals, there are strong differences in the economic
and political implications of these alternative approaches to tax reduction.
What is most significant economically about any tax is its marginal rate.
This is the tax that is applied to the last dollar of income. Decisions to work,
to save, and to invest are governed by the returns that people can expect to
receive from their activities. The lower the marginal rate of tax, the higher
the return that people can expect to receive from their economic activities.
People will thus undertake more of those activities, and will undertake them
more intensively. It is through these incentives, moreover, that taxes
influence, for good or for bad, the extent of economic prosperity within a
nation.
High marginal rates of tax are particularly harmful to economic incentives.
If the marginal rate of tax is 50 percent, each $100 of added earnings brings
only $50 to the person who does the earning. Should that marginal rate be
reduced to 40 percent, each added $100 would bring $60. This is a quite large,
20 percent increase in the return to such income-earning activity. As marginal
tax rates fall, the potential return from tax reduction falls as well. A
reduction in the marginal tax rate from 20 percent to 10 percent would increase
the return from $100 of added earnings from $80 to $90. This 12.5 percent
increase in economic return is still significant, but it is weaker than a
similar reduction applied to a higher marginal rate of tax.
What does all this have to do with the tax cut proposals offered by President
Bush and Senator Lieberman? A great deal. A tax rebate does nothing to affect
economic incentives, and so does nothing to promote the national prosperity. Tax
rebates are mostly saved, in one form or another. There is nothing about a tax
rebate that encourages people to expand their economic activities. Someone who
faces a 28 percent marginal tax rate before the rebate still faces a 28 percent
rate after the rebate.
In contrast, President Bush’s reduction in marginal tax rates would
increase the return that people get from their economic activities. A reduction
in the 28 percent rate to 25 percent increases the return on
$100 worth of activity from $72 to $75. This is a 4 percent increase in the
rate of return. The economic incentive is even stronger for the reduction in the
top rate from 39.6 percent to 33 percent. In this case, the return on earning
and additional $100 rises from $60.40 to $67. This is an 11 percent increase in
the strength of economic incentive.
Here we have two different ways of reducing taxes by roughly the same total
amount. Tax rebates do nothing for economic incentive. Reductions in tax rates
strengthen economic incentives, and strengthen them significantly. The general
prosperity is clearly promoted by permanent reductions in tax rates. It is not
promoted by temporary tax rebates.
Why, then, is so little play given to rate reduction? Even the Bush plan
applies less than one-third of its tax cut to rate reduction. The answer perhaps
lies in the natural reluctance of politicians to turn loose of tax revenues. A
reduction in tax rates will take a good deal of political energy to reverse. Tax
rebates and other forms of tax reduction are far easier to reverse. A rebate
this year can relatively easily be stopped next year. It can also easily be
pared back through restrictions on eligibility.
The natural instincts of most of the political animals who parade around
Washington seem to be to treat reductions in tax rates as something to be
avoided. A rebate or related form of reduction is less threatening than a
reduction in tax rates. Someone who is concerned with the economic prosperity of
the nation, however, would reverse this ordering of priority: reductions in
marginal tax rates are clearly superior to rebates and related forms of tax
reduction.
Richard E. Wagner is Senior Fellow at the Public Interest Institute and
Holbert Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University.
Permission to
reprint or copy in whole or part is granted, provided a version of this
credit line is used: "Reprinted by permission from OF PUBLIC
INTEREST, a publication of Public Interest Institute."
The views expressed in this publication
are those of the author and not necessarily those of Public Interest Institute. They are brought to you in the interest of a
better-informed citizenry.
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