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Of Public Interest
Volume 4, Number 3
February, 2002
Market Compatibility as a Standard for Public Policy
Richard E. Wagner
Differences in opinion about what constitutes good public policy abound.
Given this abundance, it is good to find useful ways of distinguishing between
wheat and chaff. One useful distinction was first articulated in the middle of
the last century, mostly by German economists and lawyers. They suggested that
policy measures should be compatible with the legal framework that governs a
market economy. In English, this Germanic idea goes by the name "order policy",
to refer to the idea that public policy should support an orderly market
economy, instead of undermining it. Most of the scholarship in order policy
remains untranslated into English.
Before illustrating the significance of the guidance that order policy
provides, it is necessary to address what is meant by the legal framework of a
market economy. What we call a market economy refers to an arrangement whereby
economic relationships among people are governed, among other things, by the
legal principles of private property and freedom of contract. Order policy seeks
to distinguish between those policy measures that are consistent with and
supportive of these legal principles and those that are not.
Policy measures that clash with the governing framework of a market economy
are a source of harm in many ways. Consider one simple policy measure that
clashes with the legal framework of a market economy: rent control. With rent
control, rents are no longer established through agreements between owners and
tenants. Where a market price might have been, say, $500 per month, a rent
control might limit the price to $400. Just think of what happens when this kind
of policy measure is created. When faced with the lower price, tenants will want
more and larger housing than before. On the other side of the market, owners
will be less willing to supply rental housing than before because they now earn
a lower return on their investment.
At the very start, the rent control measure generates a conflict among
potential tenants that would not otherwise exist. Tenants want more housing than
owners are willing to provide, so some tenants lose out to other tenants. Within
a market economy, this conflict among tenants is resolved through an increase in
price that simultaneously increases the amount of housing that owners are
willing to supply and reduces the amount of housing that tenants seek to lease.
In the presence of rent control, however, the resolution of the conflict
takes a somewhat different path. To be sure, imposing rent control does not
ensure obedience. Rent control produces more tenants who want units than there
are units available. Tenants who might otherwise go without will often seek to
improve their standing in the competition for units by paying prices above the
controlled limit.
These higher payments might take the form of a contracted price that is
higher than what the rent control allows. But there are obvious dangers,
particularly to owners, from entering into contracts of this form
because of the possible criminal penalties they would face. More likely are
of many other possible ways of indirectly increasing the price. Here are just a
few of the possibilities to illustrate the point: a pool and sauna that were
provided without charge could now be made subject to a separate charge; a fee
could be charged for what was formerly free parking; damage deposits could be
greatly increased and the interest paid on that deposit at some below-market
rate; and there is always plenty of scope for an under-the-table payment, what
in some places is referred to as "key money."
To be sure, people who sponsor rent control are aware of these kinds of
responses that their measures set in motion, and they seek to close off these
escape routes as well. But look at what happens in the process. By seeking to
prevent ordinary contractual relationships among consenting adults, government
engages in espionage and deception against its own citizens. Entrapment becomes
a mode of government operation, where public officials pretend to be tenants in
the hope of eliciting offers that violate the rent control. Market relationships
stimulate openness and trust within a society, but rent control and all other
policy measures that are not market compatible promote distrust and suspicion
within a society.
Does this extended example mean that there is no alternative to utterly free
markets when it comes to public policy? Not at all, it means only that any
policy enacted should be compatible with the central principles of a market
economy. In this vein, a system of tax deductibility or tax credits would pass
muster because these measures would not prohibit people from operating within
the framework of private property and freedom of contract.
Richard E. Wagner is Senior Fellow at the Public Interest Institute and
Holbert Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University.
Permission to
reprint or copy in whole or part is granted, provided a version of this
credit line is used: "Reprinted by permission from OF PUBLIC
INTEREST, a publication of Public Interest Institute."
The views expressed in this publication
are those of the author and not necessarily those of Public Interest Institute. They are brought to you in the interest of a
better-informed citizenry.
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Public Interest Institute at Iowa Wesleyan College
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