State Constitutions

MISSOURI

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Article I
BILL OF RIGHTS

Source of political power--origin, basis and aim of government.

Section 1. That all political power is vested in and derived from the people; that all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 1.

Promotion of general welfare--natural rights of persons--equality under the law--purpose of government.

Section 2. That all constitutional government is intended to promote the general welfare of the people; that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law; that to give security to these things is the principal office of government, and that when government does not confer this security, it fails in its chief design.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 4.

(1952) Evidence as to discrimination in the provision of school facilities for white and Negro children reviewed and held not to show such discrimination as is forbidden by state and federal constitutional provisions. State ex rel. Hobby v. Disman (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 137.

(1952) Equal protection provision does not require change of venue or right to disqualify judge in a criminal contempt case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 159.

(1955) Section 556.285 which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.

(1960) Act providing for the licensing of persons engaging in the business of selling checks, drafts and money orders but excluding persons the major portion of whose business consisted of sale of merchandise, held to be arbitrary and a special law and therefore void under the federal and state constitutional provisions. Petit v. Field (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 106.

(1962) Act prohibiting discriminatory practices in the sale of milk and prohibiting its sale at less than cost held not violative of the equal rights and due process provisions of the constitution. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 735.

(1962) Statute dividing state into congressional districts upheld against charge that because of the unequal apportionment the influence of individual's vote was not equal to that of voters in other districts, thus depriving him of equal protection of laws. Preisler v. Hearnes (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 552.

(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation of plaintiff's right to equal rights and opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty and property without due process of law. GEM Stores Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.

(1964) Where taxable property lying within the boundaries of a county library district was incorporated by annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax supported free public library, held that the property was subject to the taxing power of both districts and such interpretation did not violate Article X, § 3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of Missouri Constitution, St. Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 71.

(1964) Picketing of funeral home which was in part for the purpose of preventing owners from personally doing any embalming in their own business was for an unlawful purpose. Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 (Mo.), 376 S.W.2d 230.

(1964) Validity of city ordinance requiring licensing of television and radio servicemen upheld against charges that it violated due process and equal protection clauses of state and federal constitutions and the "special law" prohibition of the state constitution. McClellan v. Kansas City (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 500.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1974) Held that classification of marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative of equal protection or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 585.

(1978) Provision that all persons shall have "the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry" does not prohibit inclusion of compulsory union membership provision in collective bargaining agreement. Independent Stave Company v. Higdon (Mo.), 572 S.W.2d 424.

(1990) Where retirement benefits from private nongovernmental employment were subject to income tax and retirement benefits from governmental employment was exempt, tax scheme did not violate principles of equal protection, the legislature's classification of governmental and nongovernmental employees' retirement benefits has a rational basis. Schnorbus v. Director of Revenue, 790 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. en banc).

(1994) Section 36.150, RSMo, does not violate constitution, where state had legitimate interest in maintaining public confidence in impartial civil service by prohibiting merit employees from being candidates for any partisan political office. Asher v. Lombardi, 877 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. en banc).

Powers of the people over internal affairs, constitution and form of government.

Section 3. That the people of this state have the inherent, sole and exclusive right to regulate the internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and happiness, provided such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 2.

Independence of Missouri--submission of certain amendments to Constitution of the United States.

Section 4. That Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States; that all proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States qualifying or affecting the individual liberties of the people or which in any wise may impair the right of local self-government belonging to the people of this state, should be submitted to conventions of the people.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 3.

Religious freedom--liberty of conscience and belief--limitations.

Section 5. That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of conscience; that no person shall, on account of his religious persuasion or belief, be rendered ineligible to any public office or trust or profit in this state, be disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror, or be molested in his person or estate; but this section shall not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of others.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 5.

(1953) Evidence reviewed and held to establish that schools taught by nuns of religious order were not in fact free public schools and therefore not entitled to support from public funds. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121, 260 S.W.2d 573.

(1973) Payment of taxes by parent who sends his children to religiously oriented schools does not interfere with his constitutional right to select such a school for his children. McDonough v. Aylward (Mo.), 500 S.W.2d 721.

(1976) Denial to members of a religious society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an area zoned single family residential was not a denial of their constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.

Practice and support of religion not compulsory--contracts therefore enforceable.

Section 6. That no person can be compelled to erect, support or attend any place or system of worship, or to maintain or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion; but if any person shall voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall be held to the performance of the same.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 6.

(1974) Held, that portion of § 170.051 requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to teachers in private schools violates Art. I, § 6, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits the "support" of any "teacher of any sect". The provision requiring textbooks to be provided to pupils attending private schools violates Art. IX, § 8, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits payment from a public fund in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose. Paster v. Tussey (Mo.), 512 S.W.2d 97.

Public aid for religious purposes--preferences and discriminations on religious grounds.

Section 7. That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 7.

(1961) Where property acquired by land clearance for redevelopment authority of city was conveyed to university controlled by religious denomination pursuant to a plan adopted by the city in slum clearance project, and where the only bid received was from the university, there was no subsidy of religion from public funds in the absence of showing of fraud or arbitrary action. Kintzele v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 695.

(1973) The provisions of the state constitution not withstanding, educationally deprived children attending nonpublic schools are entitled to receive allocation of federal funds for programs of special services comparable in quality, scope and opportunity to children in public schools. Barrera v. Wheeler (CA Mo.), 475 F.2d 1388.

(1978) Held, that no judicial officer may determine child custody, based on approval or disapproval of the beliefs, doctrines or tenets of the religion of either parent or their interpretation thereof. Waits v. Waits (Mo.), 567 S.W.2d 326.

Freedom of speech--evidence of truth in defamation actions--province of jury.

Section 8. That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech, no matter by what means communicated: that every person shall be free to say, write or publish, or otherwise communicate whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that liberty; and that in all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth thereof may be given in evidence; and in suits and prosecutions for libel the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the facts.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 14.

(1951) Where employees at election under federal law had rejected union as their representative, picketing of employer for purpose of coercing employer to recognize such union was unlawful and consequently not within protection of free speech provisions. Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 362 Mo. 375, 241 S.W.2d 886.

(1952) Picketing, for the purpose of coercing employer to sign contract recognizing as exclusive collective bargaining agent a labor organization of which only small minority of employees of such employer were members, was for an unlawful purpose under federal statute and therefore could be restrained without violating free speech guarantees of constitution. Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 166.

(1955) Petition in libel action is subject to motion to dismiss but the function of the court is limited to a determination of whether the alleged libelous matter set forth in petition is capable of defamatory meaning. Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180, 280 S.W.2d 47.

(1955) Where evidence disclosed no reasonable objective of peaceful picketing other than to cause the employer to violate its employees' rights by coercing them into union membership it was unlawful and would be enjoined. Bellerive Country Club v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492.

(1956) Where one union was certified by federal authorities as bargaining representative of employees, another union, its officers and a newspaper publisher, who circulated pamphlets stating that members of the second union were not employed by the employer and urging the public not to purchase the employer's products for the purpose of preventing the sale of such products were engaging in an unlawful boycott and such circulation may be enjoined. Adams Dairy, Inc. v. Burke (Mo.), 293 S.W.2d 281.

(1960) Statutes providing for seizure of obscene matter held not to violate free speech and press privileges and immunities or due process provisions of state or federal constitutions. In re Search Warrant of Property at 5 West 12th Street v. Marcus (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 119.

(1961) City ordinance denouncing the offense of selling, attempting to sell, or possessing with the intent to sell, obscene literature held unconstitutional because it did not require proof of knowledge of the person so possessing or selling such matter as an element of the offense. City of St. Louis v. Williams (Mo.), 343 S.W.2d 16. Reversed, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1708. (See also Mo. L. Rev., Vol. XXVI, p. 501 for note.)

(1964) It is proper for the court to instruct the jury to the general effect that even though the court has instructed them on the question of libel or no libel the constitution gives them the right to determine the law and the facts on that issue. Dyer v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co. (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 570.

(1969) Public employer could not lay off or reduce pay of municipal employees to intimidate them for joining labor organization. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool (Mo.), 441 S.W.2d 35.

Rights of peaceable assembly and petition.

Section 9. That the people have the right peaceably to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances by petition or remonstrance.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 29.

Due process of law.

Section 10. That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 30.

In General

(1951) Provisions of 1875 constitution requiring unanimous consent of stockholders for issuance of preferred stock did not create vested right in stockholder so that action of corporation created before adoption of corporation code in 1943 and before adoption of 1945 constitution, which accepted corporation code under § 351.025, in issuing preferred stock on vote of three-fourths of stockholders, was not violative of due process provisions of constitution. Midland Truck Lines v. Atwood, 362 Mo. 397, 241 S.W.2d 903.

(1952) Consent of the state to be sued cannot be implied from this section. Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247 S.W.2d 832.

(1953) Earnings tax imposed by city of St. Louis under statutory authority held not violative of the due process and uniform tax provisions of the constitution. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377.

(1953) Since constitutional guarantees of sections 10 and 22, Article I of the Constitution are for protection against governmental action, and not applicable to acts of individuals as between themselves, contention that labor union's action denied such rights to one of its members does not raise a constitutional question so as to give supreme court jurisdiction of cause. Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, etc. (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 337.

(1954) Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, § 99.300 et seq.) does not contravene this provision of the Constitution. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.

(1957) The Uniform Support of Dependents' Law is not violative of the due process or retrospective law provisions of the constitution. Ivey v. Ayers (Mo.), 301 S.W.2d 790.

(1958) Where on review court of appeals set aside suspension of real estate dealer's license for violation of specific statutory provisions but remanded case to commission for the assessment of penalty for violation of another provision, further notice and hearing were unnecessary before penalty was assessed either under due process requirement or under administrative procedure law. Dittmeier v. Missouri Real Estate Comm. (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 1; Cert. den. 358 U.S. 941, 79 S.Ct. 347.

(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will executed in 1927 and where remainder vested in 1955 and such ruling did not render acts passed subsequent to testator's death and prior to vesting of remainder which qualified adopted daughter as lineal descendant violative of §§ 10 and 13 of Art. I of the Constitution. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.

(1959) Juvenile Code 1957 sustained against contention that it is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to make unascertainable the standards of conduct required and is thereby violative of the due process provision of the constitution. Minor Children of F.B. v. Caruthers (A.), 323 S.W.2d 397.

(1959) Exclusion of work done for levee and drainage districts from operation of Prevailing Wage Act held not unreasonable classification or special law. City of Joplin v. Industrial Comm. (Mo.), 329 S.W.2d 687.

(1960) Where bridge over railroad right-of-way was constructed under agreement between land developer and railroad, then accepted as part of a county road and finally included within a city, the Public Service Commission could order its reconstruction and apportion the costs thereof between the railroad and city without taking property without due process. State ex rel. C.B. & Q. RR Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 54.

(1960) Since liquor business does not stand on same plane as other commercial activities and is not lawful except as authorized by statute, statute which does not require a hearing before refusal to renew license for liquor business held valid. Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 20.

(1961) Proceedings under habitual criminal law in prosecution for homicide committed prior to effective date of amendment of the law did not result in violation of constitutional provision against ex post facto laws, nor deny defendant due process and equal protection of laws, or unconstitutionally deny him right to trial by jury on fact question of previous conviction, sentence and discharge there from. State v. Chamineak (Mo.), 343 S.W.2d 153.

(1961) Provision of use tax law exempting use of merchandise not readily obtainable in Missouri held void for indefiniteness and uncertainty. Missouri Pacific RR Co. v. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52.

(1961) The striking of the defendant's pleadings in a divorce action because of his failure to pay alimony pendente lite and suit money held to be denial of due process of law. Richman v. Richman (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 733.

(1961) Ordinance adopted by county operating under a constitutional charter which required the fluoridation of the water supply to be used throughout the county held not violative of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution or this due process provision. Readey v. St. Louis County Water Company (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 622.

(1962) City zoning ordinance adopted under §§ 89.010 to 89.140 held valid as against contention that it constituted an unwarranted delegation of legislative discretion to an administrative board without sufficient standards or guides. Porporis v. City of Warson Woods (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 605.

(1962) Ordinance of the City of St. Louis which required any real estate agent when placing a "For Sale" sign on any real estate to indicate on the sign the zoning area in which the property was located held valid. City of St. Louis v. Green (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 606.

(1963) Provision excepting "provisions or other articles of immediate necessity" from Sunday sales prohibition held to render the statute so vague and indefinite that it is incapable of rational enforcement and therefore void. Harvey v. Priest (Mo.), 366 S.W.2d 324.

(1963) Proviso of § 155.050 providing for apportionment of assessed valuation of aircraft of airlines to city owning and operating an airport outside its corporate limits in which airlines had arrivals and departures, and city's attempted levy of tangible personal property taxes on such apportioned valuation were invalid and void as violation of due process clauses of state and federal constitutions. American Airlines, Inc. v. City of St.Louis (Mo.), 368 S.W.2d 161.

(1963) Refusal to rezone vacant tract classified as residential to commercial was unreasonable and arbitrary and infringed plaintiff's rights under due process clause where maintenance of residential zoning bore no substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals or general welfare and where property was three times more valuable as commercial property and was not suited to residential development in view of adjacent commercial development and traffic conditions. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights (Mo.), 372 S.W.2d 833.

(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation of plaintiffs' right to equal rights and opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty of property without due process of law. GEM Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.

(1964) Where taxable property lying within the boundaries of a county library district was incorporated by annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax supported free public library, held that the property was subject to the taxing power of both districts and such interpretation did not violate Article X, § 3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of the Missouri Constitution. St. Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 71.

(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday Sales Act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution, and in violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.

(1964) Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from Public Service Commission's order directing railroad to cancel tariff item on theory of issue requiring construction of due process clause of constitution where actual question was whether or not the commission exceeded its statutory authority. State ex rel. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 459.

(1966) Fact that same agency, State Board of Registration for Healing Arts, both prosecuted and decided the case does not by itself deprive appellant of right of due process of law. Rose v. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts (Mo.), 397 S.W.2d 570.

(1966) When the legislative body of a city chooses to delegate to itself the discretionary power to enforce its special permit regulation, it acts administratively in passing on applications for such permits and is thus enforcing the legislation previously enacted; and such discretion must be circumscribed by sufficient standards to require it to be reasonably, not arbitrarily, exercised. State v. City of Winchester (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 47.

(1972) City ordinance which prohibited minors, with certain exceptions, entering premises where liquor was sold by the drink except those premises where sales of prepared meals and food totaled 50% of the gross income during the three calendar months upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably classified licensed establishments on a basis that had no relation to any evil sought to be controlled. Waldrop v. Burge (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 537.

(1972) The right of a party-litigant to depose witnesses is an absolute right and act of trial court in divorce action in quashing defendant's deposition subpoenas because he was delinquent in paying pendente lite allowances was error as it deprived him of that right and substantially limited the range of his defense. Norkunas v. Norkunas (A.), 480 S.W.2d 92.

(1973) Ordinance making registered owner liable for improper parking of vehicle does not result in failure of due process. City of Kansas City v. Herty Corp. (Mo.), 499 S.W.2d 449.

(1974) Held that classification of marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative of equal protection or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 585.

(1976) Delay between commission of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon and defendant's arrest thereon or filing of information did not abridge defendant's right to speedy trial, nor did it violate his right of due process since no prejudice was demonstrated by the delay. State v. Odzark (A.), 532 S.W.2d 45.

(1976) Issuance of a repossessed title by director of revenue pursuant to § 301.215, to secured creditor who had repossessed automobile by self help under power granted in security agreement did not constitute significant participation by state such as to come within legal definition of "state action", thus due process was not involved and statute was not unconstitutional. Smith v. Spradling (Mo.), 532 S.W.2d 202.

(2001) Statute of limitations in real property inverse condemnation cases cannot be shorter than that required for entity with power of eminent domain to obtain a prescriptive easement on the property, which is ten years. Shade v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 69 S.W.3d 503 (Mo.App. W.D.).

Police Power

(1952) Zoning ordinance prohibiting construction of residences on tracts of not less than three acres and forbidding institutional use except by special permit, where same is necessary to conform to general zoning plan, is not invalid. Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771.

(1952) Procedure under § 375.560 taking over insurance company by superintendent because of cessation of business held not violative of due process provision of constitution. Leggett v. Gen. Indem. Exch., 363 Mo. 273, 250 S.W.2d 710.

(1954) Order of state Public Service Commission that railroad company contribute to installation of and maintain flashing light signal at grade crossing found hazardous by such commission does not deprive company of property without due process. State ex rel. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Public Service Comm. (Mo.), 273 S.W.2d 334.

(1957) City ordinance prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquors by wholesaler when retailer was delinquent in his accounts to any wholesaler held not violative of due process. Passler v. Johnson (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 903.

(1958) Contention that statute providing for apportionment of costs of construction, maintenance and operation of crossing was violative of the due process clauses of the state and federal constitution held without merit. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Conrad (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 871.

(1958) Zoning of area as local business district and restricting use of owner's property as supper club was not violation of this section as classification was reasonable when considered as part of comprehensive zoning plan of the city and when, in the district itself, there were thirty-five residences and only three or four nonconforming uses. Downing v. City of Joplin (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 81.

(1959) City ordinance regulating the installation and repair of warm air furnaces held not to leave board with uncontrolled discretion as to licensing or to deny due process. Ross v. City of Kansas City (Mo.), 328 S.W.2d 610.

Notice

(1953) Where notice of organization of drainage district to holder of easement required by §§ 242.020 and 242.030 was not given, the notice and opportunity for hearing on commissioner's report afforded by § 242.270 was ineffectual to comply with due process of law. Farmers Drainage Dist. v. Sinclair Refining Co. (Mo.), 225 S.W.2d 745.

(1954) Act authorizing hospitalization of mentally ill person (Laws 1953, p. 647) on application of third person and certification of two physicians and also authorizing officer to take such person into custody and to deliver him to hospital without notice and opportunity to be heard denies due process. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72.

(1954) Insofar as paragraph 3 of § 537.020 provides for proceedings against personal representative of deceased nonresident without adequate notice to him it denies due process. Harris v. Bates (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 763.

(1957) Service of process by publication in class proceedings to escheat unclaimed excess insurance premiums in registry of court met statutory requirements and did not violate due process by not specifically advising defendants to file answer. State v. Goodbar (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 525.

(1957) Where after a number of continuance cases was peremptorily set for trial on specified date, and plaintiff's attorney withdrew before that date, due process required that other attorneys could appear for plaintiff on the date peremptorily set without agreeing to immediate trial. Dismissal for failure to prosecute in such circumstances held improper. Magerstadt v. LaForge (Mo.), 303 S.W.2d 130.

(1958) The provision of § 506.210 authorizing service upon the executor or administrator of a deceased nonresident does not violate the due process provisions of the state or federal constitutions. Brooks v. National Bank of Topeka, 251 F.2d 37.

(1958) Section 506.210, amended in 1955, held not violative of due process provisions in conferring jurisdiction on Missouri courts over administrators and executors of estates of nonresidents. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross (Mo.), 314 S.W.2d 889.

(1979) Notice of foreclosure authorized by municipal land reutilization law through publication, and a letter to last known property owner of record is not violative of due process. Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis v. Parcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens (Mo.), 585 S.W.2d 486.

Judicial Proceedings

(1956) Prohibition in the Supreme Court is governed by the general law on the subject rather than by the civil code. Where writ was directed to judge of multiple judge circuit who made order which would result in excess of jurisdiction it bound all judges of such circuit and afforded due process. State ex rel. Siegel v. Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73.

(1959) Where attorney who was retained by defendant in criminal case subsequently became prosecuting attorney, and as such opposed continuance of case sought by defendant and prepared instructions in case tried by assistant, the conviction of defendant would be set aside as prejudicial. State v. Burns (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 736.

Criminal Prosecutions

(1952) Due process does not require change of venue or right to disqualify judge in a criminal contempt case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 159.

(1953) Where defendant of low-level intelligence confessed guilt under circumstances indicating that confession was coerced by inspired fear, a promise of protection and daily interrogation over long period of detention, use of confession in his trial was violative of due process clause of constitution. State v. Bradford (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 584.

(1955) Section 556.285, which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.

(1955) Supreme Court Rule No. 27.26 is similar to § 2255, 28 U.S.C.A., and, in accordance with judicial construction of that section, a motion alleging that individual was convicted by perjured testimony knowingly procured by the prosecution, stated facts showing denial of due process and, therefore, sufficient to require hearing. State v. Eaton (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 63.

(1960) In prosecution for rape where defendant entered into an agreement approved by the court by which he was to be relieved of being tried on two other rape charges by accepting the decision of his counsel not to appeal from his conviction on the charge tried, he had no valid claim of lack of due process or equal protection of the laws. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 668.

(1961) Where search warrants for obscene matter were in the language of the statute, specified no publications and left to the individual judgment of the police officer the selection of what he regarded as obscene publications, they failed to provide due process and were invalid. Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, etc., 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Refusal by court to require production of police report and statement made to warrant officer by police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not guilty held not to deprive him of due process of law nor equal protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1966) As there is no constitutional requirement that there be a transcript of the testimony in a preliminary hearing, nor even a constitutional requirement that a preliminary hearing be held, defendant had no constitutional right to have a transcript of preliminary hearing. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1966) Defendant in criminal case has no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1967) Court's compelling defendant of limited education to go on trial for felony without counsel immediately upon the withdrawal without notice of his employed counsel resulted in a denial of due process of law. State v. Martin (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 215.

(1967) If one confession statement or admission is simply part of one continuous process in which several confessions are obtained, all are invalid. State v. Linder (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 412.

(1971) Where police station identification, following warning, occurred within 45 minutes after purse snatching and on-scene identification, following warning, and nothing took place at police station that had not already occurred at on-scene identification, the in-court identification could not be found to have been tainted by illegal extrajudicial identification at police station. State v. Grayson (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 891.

(1972) There was no denial of due process based on alleged unfairness of one-to-one confrontation between accused and identifying witness shortly after commission of crime where identification was not used at trial; nor was there denial of due process based on police station lineups without the suspect being informed that their purpose was possible identification or that he was entitled to have counsel present or without obtaining a waiver of his right to counsel when lineups occurred shortly after crime and long before information was filed. Robinson v. State (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 492.

(1973) Defendant denied due process when sole prosecution witness had answered in effect that he had received no inducement to testify when in fact murder charge against him had been dismissed immediately prior to trial. State v. McClain (Mo.), 498 S.W.2d 798.

Regulation

(1967) The Public Service Commission is without power to order a telephone company to provide services in an area in which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to provide service because such compulsion would be tantamount to an appropriation of the telephone company's property to a public service to which it has not dedicated such property, a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.

(1967) Attempt by public service commission to order a telephone company to provide services in an area which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to serve is tantamount to an appropriation of private property for public use without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.

Personal Rights

(1968) Held that use of jury forms with variance in type, size, and style for guilty form and not guilty form did not constitute a comment on the evidence or a denial of due process or equal protection. State v. Dennison (Mo.), 428 S.W.2d 573.

Imprisonment for debt.

Section 11. That no person shall be imprisoned for debt, except for nonpayment of fines and penalties imposed by law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 16.

(1951) Section 462.430, authorizing attachment for contempt for failure to surrender assets to estate, held not unconstitutional as against contention it authorizes imprisonment for debt. Zeitinger v. Mitchell (Mo.), 244 S.W.2d 91.

(1976) Held that imprisonment for contempt is proper remedy for failure to comply with court order for maintenance and child support when person disobeying order has intentionally placed himself in a position which made compliance impossible. State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt overruling Coughlin v. Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866). State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 567.

Habeas corpus.

Section 12. That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 26.

Ex post facto laws--impairment of contracts--irrevocable privileges.

Section 13. That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be enacted.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art II, § 15.

(1953) Relation between Public School Retirement System of St. Louis and its members is contractual and § 169.515 of 1953 Act (H.B. 164) which required transfer of certain funds thereof to special fund to be used in making contributions to Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance System for certain members thereof, held invalid as impairing the obligations of contract. Dictum: Section 169.510 of 1953 Act also void for same reason. State ex rel. Phillip v. Public School Retirement System, 364 Mo. 395, 262 S.W.2d 569.

(1955) Section 556.285 which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against challenge based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.

(1956) Where attorney's contract with insurance superintendent contemplated his payment out of funds recovered by litigation contrary to statute for payment of such compensation, a statute authorizing escheat of such recovered funds was, therefore, not violative of obligation of contract. Jacobs v. Leggett (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d 825.

(1956) Provision authorizing pledge of on-street parking meter receipts for payment of revenue bonds issued to enable city to acquire off-street parking facilities held constitutional. Petition of City of Liberty (Mo.), 296 S.W.2d 117.

(1958) Where definition of "habitual violator of traffic laws" authorizing suspension of driver's license was changed so as to include one convicted four times in two years rather than those convicted five times in one year, it applied to one convicted three times before the change was made and one time thereafter, and was not retrospective in violation of the constitution. Barbieri v. Morris (Mo.), 315 S.W.2d 711.

(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will executed in 1927 and where remainder which qualified adopted daughter as lineal descendant violative of §§ 10 and 13 of Art. I of the Constitution. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.

(1960) Provision of 1959 act authorizing the judge of the court to fix the punishment rather than a jury, upon establishment of prior offenses, held not to violate provision of Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws. State v. Morton (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 858.

(1961) Proceedings under habitual criminal law in prosecution for homicide committed prior to effective date of amendment of the law did not result in violation of constitutional provision against ex post facto laws, nor deny defendant, due process and equal protection of laws, unconstitutionally deny him right to trial by jury on fact question of previous convictions, sentence and discharge there from. State v. Chamineak (Mo.), 343 S.W.2d 153.

(1961) The rule of immunity of charities from suits for torts held not to be an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities for the reason that the grant of privileges prohibited are those granted to individuals and not to charities as a class. Schulte v. Missionaries of LaSalette Corp. of Mo. (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 636.

(1961) Fact that habitual criminal act was amended in 1959 would not make it inapplicable to an act committed prior to the effective date of that act or make it an ex post facto law within the meaning of the constitution. State v. Donnell (Mo.), 351 S.W.2d 775.

(1962) Increase of benefits to previously retired members of State Employees Retirement System held void as an impairment of contract as to members not yet retired and as being retrospective as it affects retired members. State v. Missouri State Employees Retirement System (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 571.

(1971) Mandamus lay, under subsection 3 of § 206.120, to compel county court judges to dissolve a hospital district established in 1963 where no successful election on proposition to borrow money for any purpose had been conducted in the district within five years from its establishment although action was begun less than five years after the effective date of subsection 3 of § 206.120. State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 854.

(1986) Application of §§ 610.100 to 610.120, RSMo, to records kept before September 28, 1973, does not violate ban on ex post facto or retroactive law. Martin v. Schmalz, 713 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.App. 1986).

(1993) Where § 370.362, RSMo, may impair contractual obligations of parties and is retrospective in operation, statute does not violate this constitution's or federal constitution's contract clause because it has significant and legitimate public purpose to remedy broad general, social or economic problem and enactment of section was proper exercise of inherent police power of state. Educational Employees Credit Union v. Mutual Guaranty Corporation, 821 F.Supp. 1294 (E.D. Mo.).

(1993) Expiration of statutes of limitation for tort actions created vested right in favor of defendants to be free from suit; therefore, to extent that § 537.046, RSMo, authorizes causes of action that would have been barred under statutes of limitation in effect prior to effective date of § 537.600, RSMo, statute contravenes constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. en banc).

Open courts--certain remedies--justice without sale, denial or delay.

Section 14. That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II § 10.

(1954) This section is not applicable to authorize action against charitable institution for tort of its servant even though liability insurance is carried by the institution. Kreuger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S.W.2d 311.

(1956) Where service of summons was had in the state on president of defendant, a foreign corporation which was not doing business in this state, the court had no right to assume jurisdiction over the defendant, and the constitutional provision had no application. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co. (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d 88.

(1958) Validity of doctrine of forum non conveniens discussed and held not to apply to tort action brought by resident of Wyandotte County, Kansas, against resident of Johnson County, Kansas, in Kansas City, Missouri, since there was no clear showing of inconvenience of forum nor that the ends of justice required it. Loftus v. Lee (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 654.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1979) Held, chapter 538 violates Art. I, § 14 of the constitution of Missouri and must be held invalid for that reason. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children v. Gaertner (Mo.), 583 S.W.2d 107.

(1993) Criminal prosecution for statements made in civil pleading does not violate constitution. Right of access to courts does not include right to make death threats in pleadings. Alexander v. State, 864 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. App. W.D.).

(2000) Provisions of Missouri's dram shop law (section 537.053, RSMo) that impose liability only upon conviction of sale of liquor to a person under age or to an obviously intoxicated person are an unconstitutional violation of the state's open courts provision, because access to the courts is conditioned upon a prosecutor's decision to bring the case. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo.banc).

Unreasonable search and seizure prohibited--contents and basis of warrants.

Section 15. That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by written oath or affirmation.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 11.

(1951) Application for and acceptance of license as transporter of intoxicating liquor under § 311.420 constitutes waiver of right to object to inspection of cargo by enforcement officers. State v. Ward, 361 Mo. 1236, 239 S.W.2d 313.

(1952) Where there was no evidence that defendants had committed crime, that officers had any suspicion that they had committed felony nor that officers had warrants for arrest of defendants, their arrest was illegal and subsequent search of defendant's automobile in which two guns were found was an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by § 15, Art. I of the constitution. State v. Cuezze (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 373.

(1952) Whether relevant and competent evidence was obtained by unlawful search or seizure will not be determined unless defendant previously moved for suppression of such evidence or possibly where he was surprised by its introduction. State v. O'Brien (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 357.

(1953) Where incriminating letter which was strongly corroborative of state witness' testimony was found in unlawful search of appellant's house its admission in evidence over objection and after motion to suppress held error and not harmless as merely cumulative. State v. Clark (Mo.), 259 S.W.2d 813.

(1953) If party to action for forfeiture does not establish that he is the owner of or has an interest in seized whiskey he cannot question the legality of the search and seizure. State v. Rodgers, 364 Mo. 247, S.W.2d 736.

(1953) Subpoena issued by court at request of prosecuting attorney, requiring production of records before grand jury and returnable at time grand jury was not in session and at time when matters affected by such records were not under grand jury investigation, was void both under the statutes and constitution of this state. State ex rel. Burke v. Scott, 364 Mo. 420, 263 S.W.2d 614.

(1954) Where police officers heard shots and saw defendant place unidentified object in his pocket and then flee, their search of him after overtaking him and finding loaded revolver from which one shot had been fired in his pocket was not unreasonable. State v. Charles (Mo.), 268 S.W.2d 830.

(1954) Where defendant in prosecution for illegal sale of liquor failed to object to introduction of whiskey in evidence on grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the objection was waived even though motion to suppress the whiskey had been filed and overruled. State v. Egan (A.), 272 S.W.2d 719.

(1954) Where customer placed groceries and illegally purchased whiskey in his car which was parked on driveway of grocery store, a search of his car cannot be objected to by store owner on prosecution for illegal sale of liquor. State v. Egan (A.), 272 S.W.2d 719.

(1955) Where police watched house for half hour, saw persons enter a room therein and through tear in window shade saw defendant and others with policy book and other paraphernalia and when defendant and another were arrested policy result drawings were taken from him, search and seizure not violative of constitutional provisions as to search and seizure or as to self-incrimination. State v. Hardy (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 90.

(1955) Where defendant voluntarily testifying, admitted possession of stolen property, she could not complain of prior denial of motion to suppress evidence and admission of evidence obtained by allegedly illegal search. State v. Bray (A.), 278 S.W.2d 49.

(1955) Testimony of witnesses who accompanied police officers on unlawful search and testimony of others identifying articles seized in such search held inadmissible in prosecution for receiving stolen property. State v. Hunt (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 37.

(1955) Where highway patrol officer stopped car because lighted firecrackers were being thrown from windows, and observed suspicious merchandise in the car, there was no search. State v. Harre (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 41.

(1956) Police officers, dispatched to investigate report that burglar alarm in store building was sounding, arrested individuals in truck which was being operated at high speed at night and which turned on its lights on approaching city limits. Arrest of operator held lawful and search of vehicle held proper. State v. Brown (Mo.), 291 S.W.2d 615.

(1956) Where person in control of automobile consented to its search, a passenger in the automobile who was arrested with such person could not object to a search of the auto or of wardrobe bag found in the auto. State v. Green (Mo.), 292 S.W.2d 283.

(1958) Where officer was authorized to arrest a person on suspicion after seeing loaded rifle in back seat of car, a search of the car was lawful and stolen property therein found held admissible. State v. Cantrell (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 866.

(1958) In prosecution for narcotic violation, on motion to suppress evidence on ground evidence was obtained by unlawful arrest and search, trial court had discretion to require or not to require arresting officer to disclose name of person who gave him information on which arrest was based. State v. Edwards (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 441.

(1960) Where policeman had stopped car and arrested driver for running red light and through window saw rifles and guns partially covered with blankets and noticed rear end of automobile sagging and asked driver to unlock trunk disclosing merchandise, there was no unreasonable search and seizure and such items were admissible in evidence in burglary prosecution. State v. Mallory (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 383; Cert. den. 364 U.S. 852, 81 S.Ct. 99, 5 L.Ed.2d 75.

(1960) Where defendant was issued a certificate of occupancy by the department of public safety of the city for occupancy of property to be used as a rooming house and where the defendant applied for permit to operate a rooming house and was actually operating a rooming house, his refusal to permit the inspection of the premises by city inspector constituted resisting officers. The ordinance authorizing the inspection did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure nor did it require self-incrimination. City of St. Louis v. Evans (Mo.), 337 S.W.2d 948.

(1961) Where police and firemen lawfully entered building after fire, their search of the premises was lawful and not unreasonable. State v. Cohn (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 691.

(1961) Accused could not complain of alleged unlawful search of vehicle which was owned by his codefendant. State v. Martin (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 680.

(1962) Neither the federal nor state constitution nor any of our statutes requires the magistrate to appoint counsel for the accused in a preliminary examination and accordingly the failure of the record to show such appointment is not ground for setting aside a subsequent conviction based upon an information in the circuit court during the trial of which appellant had counsel. State v. Turner (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 602.

(1962) Where officer late at night arrested individual for speeding and driving without lights and upon such arrest discovered a metal cash box containing checks payable to an insurance company in the car it was not unlawful thereafter for the officer to search the trunk of the car where he found certain adding machines and calculating machines stolen from an insurance company. State v. Camper (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 676.

(1962) Where the defendant on trial for the sale of narcotics testified on direct examination that after he was arrested the contents of his stomach were removed and also that the police officers kept the contents and checked it, it was not error for the court to permit the prosecution then to show the results of the check which was to the effect that heroin was found in the defendant's stomach. State v. Odom (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 708.

(1962) Evidence sufficient to establish that officers had, prior to arrest of defendant, reasonable cause to suspect defendant was guilty of first degree robbery by means of dangerous and deadly weapon and search of closet opening off room in residence where defendant was arrested was reasonable. State v. Redding (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 103.

(1962) Policeman who heard burglar alarm go off in dry goods store about 8:00 p.m. and found front door locked and defendant standing inside framework of open rear door had reasonable ground to believe defendant had committed or attempted to commit a felony. Arrest and search of defendant's person was lawful and apparatus for use of narcotic drugs found on defendant were properly admitted in prosecution for possession of apparatus for unauthorized use of narcotic drugs. State v. Davenport (Mo.), 360 S.W.2d 710.

(1963) Where officers returned the day following defendant's arrest to search the premises a second time, the second search was not an incident of the arrest and was illegal and admission of defendant's shirt, seized during second search, over defendant's objection was reversible error. State v. Sprout (Mo.), 365 S.W.2d 572.

(1964) Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated by seizure by police of articles lying on dresser in plain sight in motel room where officers obtained key from person in charge of motel, defendant was in flight at the time and there was no showing or contention that motel room was defendant's abode. State v. Enberg (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 282.

(1964) Search of defendant's automobile without warrant after it was taken to the police department garage following defendant's arrest in motel was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to arrest and evidence obtained as result of search was inadmissible. State v. Edmondson (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 486.

(1964) Evidence obtained from search of premises where defendant's mother resided was properly admitted since constitutional guarantee is a personal one and affords no protection from search to a person who is not the owner of or in possession of the premises and where defendant was not present at time search was made. State v. Anderson (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 591.

(1967) Where defendant was arrested at scene of accident for driving while intoxicated and taken to police station, search made an hour and a half later at police headquarters was incident to arrest and was not unreasonable. State v. Darabcsek (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 97.

(1968) Search warrant describing premises to be searched as 310 North Hocker was defective when premises actually searched were at 314 North Hocker. Front yard of premises was within "curtilage" and even though evidence seized was in plain sight it was still subject to suppression in view of improper search warrant. State v. Buchanan (Mo.), 432 S.W.2d 342.

(1971) Where defendant had entered plea of guilty to charge of operating vehicle without consent of owner, contention of defendant in proceeding under court rule 27.26 that trial court should have set aside conviction because based upon unlawful arrest, illegal search, and a confession obtained without presence of counsel was properly overruled since no contention was made that alleged preliminary defects induced the plea of guilty and voluntary plea of guilty precluded relief on such grounds. Rew v. State (Mo.), 472 S.W.2d 611.

(1971) Search of farmhouse kitchen not unreasonable when upon arrest of appellant and other boys present they were lined up against kitchen wall, personally searched, then a search of the kitchen only was conducted. Items received in evidence were found in the kitchen where they were either in plain view or on appellant's person, and officers had seen one of the boys throw something behind stove so it was reasonable to move stove to discover evidence. State v. Erwin (Mo.), 473 S.W.2d 394.

(1972) Admissions contained in letter written while defendant was in jail awaiting trial were not obtained by unconstitutional search because defendant knew his letters would be read by jailers prior to mailing under jail security regulations. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 516.

(1972) Where officer was on his way to burglary and stopped to look in car parked in vicinity and was later informed by radio that items of general description of those he saw in plain sight through car window were taken in the burglary and burglars had not been apprehended, officer had probable cause to search car without search warrant. State v. Brown (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 519.

(1972) State was not obligated to hold a lineup prior to preliminary hearing and fact that eye witnesses to robbery saw defendant when they appeared at preliminary hearing which defendant waived was not so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that his motion to suppress their in-court identification should have been sustained. State v. Hazelhorst (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 543.

(1972) Where officer while shining flashlight on sticker on windshield of car to obtain city license number for citation for illegal parking saw hand-rolled cigarette on front seat of car which he believed to contain marijuana and arrested defendant for possession thereof, search of vehicle and defendant, who was standing outside of car, subsequent to arrest and seizure of marijuana revealed thereby was legal. State v. Hawkins (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 477.

(1974) Held seizure of marijuana was unreasonable search and seizure. See this case for in depth discussion of "search and seizure". Kansas City v. Butters (A.), 507 S.W.2d 49.

(1974) For discussion of law of search and seizure as related to automobiles, see State v. Achter (A.), 512 S.W.2d 894.

(1975) Where allegedly obscene film is being shown in a commercial theater the risk of loss of evidence is not so great so as to authorize seizure without procuring a warrant based on prior judicial determination of probable cause. State v. McMillan (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 26.

(1975) Warrantless search upheld on "exigent doctrine". State v. Wiley (Mo.), 522 S.W.2d 281.

(1975) Evidence seized at time of warrantless arrest where probable cause for arrest was not shown by state was inadmissible as was gun residue test made later. State v. Howell (Mo.), 524 S.W.2d 11.

(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).

Grand juries--composition--jurisdiction to convene--powers.

Section 16. That a grand jury shall consist of twelve citizens, any nine of whom concurring may find an indictment or a true bill: Provided, that no grand jury shall be convened except upon an order of a judge of a court having the power to try and determine felonies; but when so assembled such grand jury shall have power to investigate and return indictments for all character and grades of crime; and that the power of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers, and to find indictments in connection therewith, shall never be suspended.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 28 (as amended Nov. 6, 1900).

(1977) Grand jury cannot report its findings after investigation of a named public official except by indictment. If no indictment is found, an interim "report" should be expunged from the record. Matter of Interim Report of Grand Jury (Mo.), 553 S.W.2d 479.

(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).

Indictments and information in criminal cases--exceptions.

Section 17. That no person shall be prosecuted criminally for felony or misdemeanor otherwise than by indictment or information, which shall be concurrent remedies, but this shall not be applied to cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger, nor to prevent arrests and preliminary examination in any criminal case.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 12 (as amended Nov. 6, 1900), and Sch. of 1875 and § 17.

(1961) Provision authorizing prosecution of felony in state courts by information or indictment is not violative of Amendments V and XIV of the Federal Constitution. State v. Cooper (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 72; Cert. denied 368 U.S. 855, 82 S.Ct. 91.

(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) Refusal by court to require production of police report and statement made to warrant office by police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.

(1964) The constitutional limitations upon search and seizure apply only to the owner or one in possession of the premises and defendant could not raise the question of an illegal search of someone else's property. State v. Worley (Mo.), 383 S.W.2d 529.

(1967) Provisions of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be held to answer for a capital crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury does not apply to state procedure, and prosecution may be either by indictment or information. State v. Crump (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 490.

(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).

Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions.

Section 18(a). That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 22.

Generally

(1952) Where defendant was released from imprisonment in penitentiary on habeas corpus over nineteen years after original commitment because failure to have been provided counsel, his subsequent trial on same charge did not offend against constitutional guaranty of speedy trial. State v. Hadley (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 857.

(1952) Where defendant announced that he understood the charge against him and that he would represent himself and when court later requested an attorney to sit in and assist defendant, defendant stated he still did not think he needed a lawyer, a contention that defendant was not accorded counsel and that counsel was not given an opportunity to prepare defense, was overruled. State v. Hurley (Mo.), 251 S.W.2d 617.

(1953) Where accused was arrested at midnight, arraigned at 9:00 a.m. the following morning and pleaded guilty without record showing opportunity to consult with counsel, he should be released from incarceration under sentence but should be rearranged on charge. Ex parte Stone (A.), 255 S.W.2d 155.

(1954) Where defendant's counsel withdrew after verdict and defendant had no attorney to file a motion for a new trial, it could not be said his constitutional rights were violated in absence of showing of error in trial. State v. Mischanko (Mo.), 272 S.W.2d 210.

(1955) Admission of prosecutor's testimony as to what he did after he questioned alleged coconspirator in robbery prosecution and its emphasis in argument by prosecutor to jury held prejudicially erroneous as involving the denial of accuser’s right to meet witnesses against him face to face. State v. Chernick (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 56.

(1956) Defendant is not entitled to more than one court appointed attorney and trial court has discretion as to whether more than one shall be appointed. State v. Lord (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 737.

(1958) In prosecution for stealing under habitual criminal law, where certified record of the state penitentiary contained notations of defendant's imprisonment in two other states and also that defendant was wanted by police, it was error to admit in evidence the part containing such notations. State v. Dunn (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 643.

(1958) Indictment charging defendant with "feloniously and fraudulently" buying and receiving certain stolen property was insufficient as quoted words are not of similar import to "intent to defraud" and not sufficiently definite and certain to satisfy constitutional and statutory requirements. State v. Harris (Mo.), 313 S.W.2d 664.

(1958) Defendant of a mental age of twelve years was told at a coroner's inquest to which he had been subpoenaed that under the constitution he was not obligated to testify. He replied that he understood that and wanted to tell all he knew. His statements were held to be admissible. State v. Mayabb (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 609.

(1958) Defendant held to have waived right to be represented by counsel and to have been capable of doing so. State v. Glenn (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 403; Cert. den. 358 U.S. 942, 79 S.Ct. 348.

(1959) This section applies to crimes against the state and does not apply to proceedings by municipalities for violation of municipal police regulations. City of Webster Groves v. Quick (Mo.), 319 S.W.2d 543.

(1959) Where defendant had refused service of public defender and dismissed two court-appointed attorneys, one of whom he had requested by name, and insisted up to trial date that he wanted to represent himself, but the court, over defendant's objection, provided him with counsel, defendant was not denied due process of law. State v. Warren (Mo.), 321 S.W.2d 705.

(1961) Where defendant refused the offer of the court to appoint counsel for him, the court's finding that the defendant was mentally able and sufficiently informed to decide his need for counsel was supported by the evidence. State v. Slicker (Mo.), 342 S.W.2d 946.

(1961) Defendant was not deprived of constitutional right to appear and defend in person where he was represented by competent counsel throughout all stages of trial and was personally present at all times except when voluntarily absent for short time during proceedings in chambers when record of prior convictions was presented to judge under second offender law. State v. Colbert (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 115.

(1961) A proceeding under Rule 27.26 to vacate a judgment and sentence is not a step in the criminal proceedings entitling the defendant to "appear and defend, in person" under the constitution of Missouri. State v. Hurst (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 177.

(1963) Failure of trial court to grant defendant's application for subpoenas for witnesses which was not specifically ruled on and not pursued when adequate opportunity to do so existed, could not, after verdict, form basis of prejudicial error when defendant had announced ready for trial and proceeded with no request for attendance of any witnesses and made no offer of proof as to expected testimony of desired witnesses. State v. Chapman (Mo.), 365 S.W.2d 551.

(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday sales act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the constitution, and in violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.

(1964) Judge's statement to jury in answer to their question about sentence to be imposed, after submission of cause to jury and in absence of defense counsel, that the jury should refer to instructions and the three forms of verdict given them and that the court would have no objection to jury using form of verdict that did not refer to the prior conviction if they felt it appropriate was not such a denial of defendant's rights as to make judgment subject to collateral attack nor would it have afforded defendant any basis for relief had his counsel been aware of the occurrence so that the matter could have been raised on appeal. State v. Baugh (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 608.

(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not guilty held not to deprive him due process of law nor equal protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1966) Defendant in criminal case has no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.

(1966) Allegations framed in the language of the statute held sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. State v. Tandy (Mo.), 401 S.W.2d 409.

(1966) Defendant who sought or by his own conduct caused continuance cannot complain that right to speedy trial was violated. State v. Barrett (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 602.

(1967) The appointment of counsel for an accused at a preliminary examination is not required by either the federal or state constitution or by statutes of this state. State v. Benison (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 773.

(1967) The decision of United States Supreme Court in Douglas v. California that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel on state appeal applied retrospectively to the case of an indigent prisoner whose conviction was affirmed when he was not represented by counsel. Swenson v. Donnell (C.A. Mo.), 382 F.2d 248.

(1968) Denial of counsel in preliminary hearing is not a constitutional infirmity where defendant pleaded not guilty and was otherwise not shown to have been prejudiced. Pope v. Swenson (A.), 395 F.2d 321.

(1968) Failure to furnish counsel to accused during interrogation before confession at a time before decision in Escobedo case was not so prejudicial as to infect the subsequent trial with an absence of fundamental fairness. Howard v. Swenson (A.), 404 F.2d 469.

(1971) Jury trial, in juvenile proceedings where child is alleged to have committed an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult, is not required by Art. I, § 18(a) of Missouri Constitution. In re Fisher (Mo.), 468 S.W.2d 198.

(1974) Held that failure of counsel to interview state's witnesses amounted to ineffective counsel. McQueen v. Swenson (C.A. Mo.), 498 F.2d 207.

(1975) Held that admission of evidence through closed circuit television was proper in a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance. The question was raised under the provision of the United States Const. and was not questioned under Art. I, § 18(a), const. of Mo. A four to three decision. Kansas City v. McCoy (Mo.), 525 S.W.2d 336.

Right to be Present to Defend

(1967) Accuser’s presence is not necessary during proceedings which are not part of the trial, such as preliminary or formal proceedings or motions which do not affect his guilt or innocence. State v. Durham (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 79.

(1973) Right to be present to defend request for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum made one day before motion for new trial was to be heard when counsel had known of date of hearing for some time was not timely made and constitutional right to appear and defend in person was not denied. State v. Bizzle (A.), 500 S.W.2d 259.

Speedy Trial by Impartial Jury of County

(1968) Held that in the absence of apparent abuse continuances granted at request of defendant's counsel, even though made without knowledge and consent of defendant, would not constitute a denial of right to speedy trial. State v. Holmes (Mo.), 428 S.W.2d 571.

(1972) Although information was filed during September 1968 term and trial began during September 1969 term after elapse of four terms of court, since defendant took no action at any time to secure a trial until he filed motion for discharge at May 1969 term defendant was not entitled to discharge. Failure to take affirmative action seeking a speedy trial constitutes waiver of that right. State v. Wright (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 581.

(1972) Where appellant had escaped from custody before arraignment set for March 31, 1966, and was convicted of crime in California and on June 10, 1970, was paroled from California sentence and returned for trial in Missouri, there was no denial of constitutional right to speedy trial since defendant showed no prejudice except his assertions that each year made it more difficult to find witnesses and that the Missouri detainer precluded him from California rehabilitation programs. State v. Endres (Mo.), 842 S.W.2d 480.

(1974) Right to a speedy trial arises only after the information was filed. A complaint represents only a possiblity that a criminal indictment or information will be filed. Trial within eight days after filing of information held not failure to have speedy trial. State v. York (Mo.), 511 S.W.2d 758.

(1986) Whether a person's right to a speedy trial has been violated depends upon four factors: (1) The length of the delay, (2) The reason for the delay, (3) The defendant's assertion to his right to a speedy trial, and (4) The prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. State v. Kirksey, 713 S.W.2d 841 (Mo.App. 1986).

Depositions in felony cases.

Section 18(b). Upon a hearing and finding by the circuit court in any case wherein the accused is charged with a felony, that it is necessary to take the deposition of any witness within the state, other than defendant and spouse, in order to preserve the testimony, and on condition that the court make such orders as will fully protect the rights of personal confrontation and cross-examination of the witness by defendant, the state may take the deposition of such witness and either party may use the same at the trial, as in civil cases, provided there has been substantial compliance with such orders. The reasonable personal and traveling expenses of defendant and his counsel shall be paid by the state or county as provided by law.

Source: Const. of 1945.

(1973) Where state used deposition of witness taken by defendant's counsel alone, held that adequate satisfaction of both the right of confrontation and of cross examination cannot be accomplished by either the defendant or his counsel alone, and it was error to permit the use of this constitutionally and basically unacceptable deposition by the sate. State v. Jackson (A.) 495 S.W.2d 80.

Self-incrimination and double jeopardy.

Section 19. That no person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause, nor shall any person be put again in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, after being once acquitted by a jury; but if the jury fail to render a verdict the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury and commit or bail the prisoner for trial at the same or next term of court; and if judgment be arrested after a verdict of guilty on a defective indictment or information, or if judgment on a verdict of guilty be reversed for error in law, the prisoner may be tried anew on a proper indictment or information, or according to the law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 23.

(1952) Habitual criminal statute goes only to the punishment, not the guilt or innocence of the accused on trial, and under it no punishment is imposed for the prior offense. Proceedings under it, therefore, do not violate double jeopardy or other provisions of constitution. State v. O'Brien (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 357.

(1952) Where defendant is convicted of common assault in prosecution for felonious assault with intent to ravish and thereafter new trial is granted, cause stands as though there had been no trial at all and defendant may be tried for the felony charged in the indictment. State v. Higgins (A.), 252 S.W.2d 641.

(1954) Plea in abatement in criminal prosecution based on stated conclusions that defendant had been compelled to testify before the grand jury which was investigating offense with which defendant was later charged held properly overruled where testimony required was not shown either in verified plea or by evidence. State v. Bright, 269 S.W.2d 615.

(1955) Conviction of defendant of robbery does not bar his prosecution for assault with intent to kill where such assault was committed in progress of robbery or as part of the same transaction. State v. Chernick (Mo.), 278 S.W.2d 741.

(1956) Where defendant charged with first degree murder was at liberty on bond and jury was discharged on its failure to reach a verdict during his voluntary, although inadvertent, absence from courtroom, his retrial did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. McCrary, 365 Mo. 799, 287 S.W.2d 785.

(1957) Where trial on murder charge resulted in "hung jury", and case was continued for some time and nolle prosequi was entered after jury had been called and qualified but not sworn, defendant was not placed in jeopardy and could be again charged with the offense even though nolle prosequi judgment recited that defendant was "acquitted". State v. Berry (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 429.

(1957) Common assault charge did not merge in peace disturbance charge upon the street even though the disturbance was "by fighting" and so acquittal of peace disturbance charge did not bar prosecution for common assault. State v. Brooks (A.), 298 S.W.2d 511.

(1958) Where motion for new trial of accused is sustained on ground evidence was insufficient and the conviction is set aside, accused is estopped to plead the former conviction as a bar to another trial on the same or a new indictment. State v. Patton (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 641.

(1959) Where defendant was discharged from conviction by circuit court on ground information on which he was convicted was defective, his subsequent trial for same offense on valid information did not constitute double jeopardy. U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Nash, 264 F.2d 610.

(1959) Where confession appears to be entirely voluntary, the failure of the officers taking it to warn accused of constitutional right to remain silent or to have counsel present, would not make it admissible. State v. Laspy (Mo.), 323 S.W.2d 713.

(1959) When a defendant (in a criminal case) put his sanity in issue, he waives all privilege either under the physician privilege statute or under the self-incrimination section, to exclude testimony of any doctors who have examined him for this purpose. State v. Swinburne (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 746.

(1959) Section 491.080 is not as broad as the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination and so does not authorize compulsory testimony in examination of judgment debtor when constitutional privilege is claimed. State ex rel. North v. Kirtley (Mo.), 327 S.W.2d 166.

(1960) Where defendant was issued a certificate of occupancy by the department of public safety of the city for occupancy of property to be used as a rooming house and where the defendant applied for permit to operate a rooming house and was actually operating a rooming house, his refusal to permit the inspection of the premises by city inspectors constituted resisting officers. The ordinance authorizing the inspection did not constitute unreasonable search and seizure nor did it require self-incrimination. City of St. Louis v. Evans (Mo.), 337 S.W.2d 948.

(1961) Refusal of grand jury witness to answer questions as to when he sold business, whether he had interest in certain real estate and as to whether he knew certain individuals, on ground of self- incrimination, held not basis for commitment for contempt. In re Presta v. Owsley (A.), 345 S.W.2d 649.

(1961) Where accused was charged with robbing several persons at the same place, the acquittal of robbing one of such persons would not bar a prosecution for the robbery of another of such persons. State v. Ashe (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 768.

(1964) Held prejudicial error to admit testimony of police officer that defendant remained silent and refused to answer questions while under arrest and in custody especially since in view of defendant's condition there was some question as to whether defendant heard or understood what was being asked of him. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.

(1967) Breath test authorized under this section does not violate due process of law. Blydenburg v. David (Mo.), 413 S.W.2d 284.

(1967) It was not error to introduce police officer's testimony that defendant refused to make a statement while under arrest where defendant brought this testimony out first during cross-examination and subsequently called jury's attention to the refusal to make a statement during argument. State v. Yager (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 170.

(1967) The privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to refusing to answer the question asked, but also to refusing to explain how the answer might incriminate the witness. State v. Cavanaugh (A.), 419 S.W.2d 929.

(1967) Defendant who was charged with first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder in first trial and subsequently granted a new trial for error in instructions was not placed in double jeopardy by subsequent first degree murder charge. State v. Crane (Mo.), 420 S.W.2d 309.

(1968) Punishment imposed by prison official for violation of prison rule against escape involves the exercise of an administrative function, not a judicial function, and does not place the defendant in jeopardy within the constitutional sense. It constitutes no defense in a prosecution on a charge of escape. State v. Croney (Mo.), 425 S.W.2d 65.

(1968) Refusal of judgment debtor to answer questions in hearing in circuit court regarding ownership or interest in certain property came under the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. State ex rel. Howard v. Allison (A.), 431 S.W.2d 233.

(1969) Statement by prosecutor that the state's evidence was uncontradicted did not constitute a comment on the failure of defendant to take the witness stand. State v. Robb (Mo.), 439 S.W.2d 510.

(1972) Double jeopardy provision applies only where there has been an acquittal of defendant by a jury. Murray v. State (Mo.), 475 S.W.2d 67.

(1972) Admission in evidence of letter, written by defendant while in jail awaiting trial and read by jailers in the course of jail security, containing incriminating admissions did not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 516.

(1972) Held that separate trials for successive robberies of two filling station attendants did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Moton (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 785.

(1972) Accused was not subjected to double jeopardy on the ground he was charged with attempted robbery with dangerous and deadly weapon and carrying a concealed weapon since although occurring on same day, the crimes were separate and distinct, taking place at different places and times and defendant did not show that the concealed weapon taken from him at time of arrest was the same weapon used in earlier attempted robbery. Warren v. State (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 497.

(1973) Held that separate trials and convictions for successive robberies of two filling station attendants not double jeopardy. Moton v. Swenson (C.A. Mo.), 488 F.2d 1060.

(1973) Punishment administered for violation of institutional rules is administrative function and does not constitute double jeopardy for crime committed by inmate of prison. State v. Boyd (Mo.), 498 S.W.2d 532.

(1974) Held that comment on defendant's failure to disclose theory of self-defense before trial violated right against self-incrimination. State v. Butler (A.), 512 S.W.2d 466.

(1974) Privilege against self-incrimination is available in any tribunal and any proceeding including civil cases. When person asserting privilege was seeking no affirmative action, court erred in striking his answer because of his claiming privilege during taking of deposition. State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 559.

(1975) Held that conviction of violation of a city ordinance prohibiting drunken driving acts as a bar to subsequent prosecution by the state arising out of the same incident. Prohibition held to be a proper remedy. Weaver v. Schaaf (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 58.

(1975) Where victim was pistol-whipped and robbed and later shot while unconscious on floor, a charge of assault with intent to kill and armed robbery did not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Ross (A.), 523 S.W.2d 841.

(1975) Even though prosecution for offense which is subject of litigation may be barred by statute of limitation copies of income tax returns cannot be made the subject of discovery procedures since evidence of some other incriminatory nature might be disclosed. State ex rel. Caloia v. Weinstein (A), 525 S.W.2d 779.

(1976) Held, four to three that prosecution's statement "the only one who can actually say he knew is defendant" was not an improper comment on defendant's failure to testify. State v. Rothaus (Mo.), 530 S.W.2d 235.

(1976) Held, prosecution of defendant for driving while intoxicated after conviction of improper backing of motor vehicle arising out of the same occurrence is not double jeopardy. The two charges involve proof of different facts and are not identical offenses. State v. Johnson (A.), 532 S.W.2d 883.

(1976) Requiring defendant to testify, over objection, in chambers that he had been convicted twice before of driving while intoxicated was reversible error. State v. Kaiser (Mo. banc), 534 S.W.2d 19.

(1979) Provision that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself prohibits not only comments on the failure of a defendant to testify, but also comments which have the effect of compelling a defendant to testify. State v. Lindsey (Mo.), 578 S.W.2d 903.

(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).

Bail guaranteed--exceptions.

Section 20. That all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, when the proof is evident or the presumption great.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 24.

CROSS REFERENCE: Denial or conditions of bail may be set by court, Const. Art. I, § 32

(1954) Mere charge of capital offense does not justify refusal of bail. Evidence must be adduced to establish that the proof is evident or the presumption great. Hickman v. O'Connell (A.), 266 S.W.2d 9.

Excessive bail and fines--cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 21. That excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 25.

(1956) Fixing punishment for second degree murder within statutory limits by jury held not to violate inhibition against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Nord (Mo.), 286 S.W.2d 775.

(1957) $15,000 bail set for person charged with rape held excessive and reduced to $10,000 in habeas corpus proceeding. Ex parte Marvin Chandler (A.), 297 S.W.2d 616.

(1958) The fact that the defendant in robbery prosecution was given life sentence under habitual criminal statute and fact that his accomplice received only a five-year sentence did not establish that punishment was cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Eckenfels (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 532.

(1969) The method of capital punishment used in Missouri does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment. Duisen v. State (Mo.), 441 S.W.2d 688.

Right of trial by jury--qualification of jurors--two-thirds verdict.

Section 22(a). That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate; provided that a jury for the trial of criminal and civil cases in courts not of record may consist of less than twelve citizens as may be prescribed by law, and a two-thirds majority of such number concurring may render a verdict in all civil cases; that in all civil cases in courts of record, three-fourths of the members of the jury concurring may render a verdict; and that in every criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of such case to the court, whose finding shall have the force and effect of a verdict of a jury.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 28 (as amended Nov. 6, 1900).

(1953) On appeal, in misdemeanor trial, where jury was waived, the finding of the court on the merits must be allowed to stand if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Sargent, 241 A. 1085, 256 S.W.2d 265.

(1953) Since constitutional guarantees of sections 10 and 22, Article I of the Constitution, are for protection against governmental action, and not applicable to acts of individuals as between themselves, contention that labor union's action denied such rights to one of its members does not raise a constitutional question so as to give supreme court jurisdiction of cause. Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, etc. (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 337.

(1955) Where defendant was sued for damages for personal injuries by plaintiff who later died and the action was revived and who was also sued by the widow of such decedent for wrongful death, it could maintain interpleader action to determine who was owner of claim and such action was triable by court without jury (Hollingsworth, Westhues and Storckman dissenting). Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 365 Mo. 166, 280 S.W.2d 17.

(1963) Fact that no women were on the jury panel, without a claim or showing of purposeful and systematic exclusion of women, did not establish that jury was improperly selected to the prejudice of defendant. State v. Andrews (Mo.), 371 S.W.2d 324.

(1964) Where defendant, on appeal from magistrate court to circuit court, filed untimely request under rules of the circuit court for jury trial and did not attack constitutionality of the court rule until trial day, constitutional question was not in issue since not raised at first opportunity and supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal. Meadowbrook Country Club v. Davis (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 611.

(1965) An accused has no absolute right to elect that he shall be tried by court without a jury; his waiver of jury must be agreed to by court to be effective. State v. Taylor (Mo.), 391 S.W.2d 835.

(1965) Landowner who failed to file written demand for a jury trial before the assignment of commissions, along with a description of the property to be taken, as required by St. Louis charter waived right to jury trial. City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry and Construction Co. (Mo.), 394 S.W.2d 300.

(1968) There are no educational requirements, other than the ability to read, write, speak, and understand the English language, for jury service, and it is no ground for disqualification of veniremen that at the outset they are unfamiliar with or do not know the meaning of technical legal terms. Parker v. Wallace (Mo.), 431 S.W.2d 136.

(1968) Use of a six member jury in trial for violation of city ordinance does not violate the constitutional guarantee of a right to trial by jury. State ex rel. Cox v. Wilson (Mo.), 435 S.W.2d 333.

(1969) In every criminal case any defendant may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury trial and submit the trial of the case to the court, or may, with the assent of the court, waive a jury of twelve citizens and submit the trial of the case to a jury consisting of less than twelve citizens. State v. McGee (Mo. en banc), 447 S.W.2d 270.

(1971) There is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in municipal ordinance prosecution where the maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed six months. State ex rel. Cole v. Nigro (Mo.), 471 S.W.2d 933.

(1971) Assuming that record made of defense counsel's waiver of jury trial in prosecution for possession of narcotic drugs was inadequate, the additional record made in the Rule 27.26 evidentiary hearing established that defendant was fully aware at time of trial of his right to be tried by a jury and nothing in the records would justify a conclusion that finding of trial judge in the Rule 27.26 proceeding, that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived jury trial, was erroneous. Young v. State (Mo.), 473 S.W.2d 390.

(1972) Evidence supported action of trial court in action for damages for injuries to plaintiff's back in granting defendant new trial where jurors' failure to truthfully answer questions asked on voir dire in regard to prior back injuries and claims amounted to deception and deprived defendant of fair trial by jury. Rodenhauser v. Lashly (Mo.), 481 S.W.2d 231.

(1973) Held that trial by jury cannot be waived by informal statement by counsel that jury would not be required. Randolph v. Simpson (A.), 500 S.W.2d 289.

(1976) Where defendant waived jury trial under the misunderstanding of defendant and defendant's attorney that if the trial court decided to refuse parole after submission to court on an agreed statement of facts, defendant would be given an opportunity to withdraw waiver of jury trial, the waiver was held to be not intelligently made and judgment was reversed and cause remanded. State v. Sharp (Mo.), 553 S.W.2d 601.

(1978) Held, not unconstitutional to require court to hear case without jury in magistrate court since jury trial could later be had as a matter of right in circuit court. Rice v. Lucas (Mo.), 560 S.W.2d 850.

(1996) Right to jury trial applies only to those causes of action which had that right prior to 1820. Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843 (Mo.banc 1996).

Female jurors--optional exemption.

Section 22(b). No citizen shall be disqualified from jury service because of sex, but the court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption there from before being sworn as a juror.

(1972) This section was upheld against the charge that it violated defendant's rights to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross- section of the community and denied him due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. State v. Wright (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 581.

(1977) Allowing women to decline jury duty does not deny equal protection, and the supplementary statute is constitutional. State v. Duren (Mo.), 556 S.W.2d 11.

(1977) Allowing women to decline jury duty upheld. Taylor v. Louisiana discussed and distinguished. State v. Lee (Mo.), 556 S.W.2d 25; State v. Minor (Mo.), 556 S.W.2d 35; State v. Davis (Mo.), 556 S.W.2d 45.

(1979) Missouri statute authorizing women to request automatic exemption from jury service violated "fair cross section" requirement of sixth amendment as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Duren v. Missouri, 99 S.Ct. 664.

Right to keep and bear arms--exception.

Section 23. That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 17.

Subordination of military to civil power--quartering soldiers.

Section 24. That the military shall be always in strict subordination to the civil power; that no soldier shall be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner in time of peace, nor in time of war, except as prescribed by law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 27.

Elections and right of suffrage.

Section 25. That all elections shall be free and open; and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 9.

(1964) In appeal from action to contest county school superintendent election, dicta contained in opinion stated that if § 167.020 were construed to prohibit write-in candidates it might be violative of this section and unconstitutional. Kasten v. Guth (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 110.

(1974) Statute requiring voter to make his ballot preference known to judge in primary election held not to violate this provision. State ex rel. McClellan v. Kirkpatrick (Mo.), 504 S.W.2d 83.

Compensation for property taken by eminent domain--condemnation juries--payment--railroad property.

Section 26. That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such compensation shall be ascertained by a jury or board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders, in such manner as may be provided by law; and until the same shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner, the property shall not be disturbed or the proprietary rights of the owner therein divested. The fee of land taken for railroad purposes without consent of the owner thereof shall remain in such owner subject to the use for which it is taken.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 21.

(1954) Contention that condemnation procedure authorized by charter of the city of St. Louis violated equal protection provision of federal constitution held waived by failure to raise same in court below. City of St. Louis v. Gruss (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 387.

(1955) The measure of damages for the taking of land is determined as of the time of taking and from the point of view of what the owner has lost, not what the condemnor has gained so that uses to which property may be put under city zoning regulations may be considered by jury in determining damages. In re Armory Site in Kansas City (Mo.), 282 S.W.2d 464.

(1956) In action to condemn lands for gas storage under §§ 393.410 to 393.510, owners of lands adjoining those sought to be condemned did not have right to intervene because only damage they could suffer would result from use of condemned lands and not from condemnation. Laclede Gas Co. v. Abrahamson (Mo.), 296 S.W.2d 100.

(1956) Damage to land from water overflow which allegedly would result from highway construction ruled consequential damage, no claim for which would arise prior to infliction and claimants were therefore not aggrieved by plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of condemnation action as to them and had no right of appeal. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Lynch (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 400.

(1957) Where landowner was advised by state highway department that it planned to construct highway through his property and began negotiations with him for acquisition of right-of-way, and as a result he changed his subdivision development plans, there was no "taking" or "damaging" within the constitutional provision. Hamer v. State Highway Comm. (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 869.

(1957) Abutting owners have an easement of access to a highway which is a property right and interest in land and the only way to extinguish such right is by the exercise of the power of eminent domain. State ex rel. Highway Dept. v. Green (Mo.), 305 S.W.2d 688.

(1957) A trial court has no power to add any amount (such as interest) to the sum fixed by the jury in condemnation action (Ark. Mo. Pow. Co. v. Hamlin (A.), 288 S.W.2d 14, and State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v Galloway (A.), 292 S.W.2d 904 to the contrary, in effect overruled). State ex rel. Highway Dept. v. Green (Mo.), 305 S.W.2d 688.

(1959) Where power to take property by eminent domain exists, the condemnor may determine the location and route of the improvement and the land or easement to be taken for it. State ex rel. N.W. Electric Power Coop. v. Waggoner (A.), 319 S.W.2d 930.

(1959) Where amount of judgment for damages in condemnation suit exceeded commissioners award which was paid into court, property owner was entitled to interest on excess. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Mafagas (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 697.

(1959) Where city appropriated private sewer without complying with statutory procedure, its action would amount to taking private property for public use without just compensation. Gunn v. City of Versailles (A.), 330 S.W.2d 257.

(1960) This provision of the constitution requires an allowance of compensation to the landowner for the loss of the use of the amount of money by which the circuit court judgment exceeds the award of the commissioners from the time of taking or appropriation until the entry of judgment fixing the amount of damages. City of St. Louis v. Vasquez (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 839.

(1961) Evidence held sufficient to sustain judgment against city because of injury to property resulting from discharge of sewage into stream running through such property. Lewis v. City of Potosi (A.), 348 S.W.2d 577.

(1961) A provision of an ordinance in the City of St. Louis which provided that damages should be assessed as of the date of the ordinance directing the condemnation held invalid. The date on which the money is paid into the registry of the court is the date on which the value of the property is to be fixed. City of St. Louis v. International Harvester Company (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 782.

(1962) Highway commission had authority to condemn easement to provide a substitute location for pipelines which was necessary for interstate highway construction as the taking was for public purpose and was not in violation of Article III, § 38(a) since state received compensation in surrender of existing right-of-way. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eakin (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 129.

(1963) Assuming that telephone company had a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve a certain area, public service commission's orders directing another company to provide service to the area did not constitute a taking of telephone company's property in violation of this constitutional provision. State ex rel. Doniphan Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 572.

(1963) Fact of taking of property constitutes a prima facie case thus giving rise to right to have the value determined by a jury, and although owners produced no evidence to prove value of damages, jury under proper instruction could have found damages within reasonable limits of their own experience and observation and giving of instruction which foreclosed landowners from jury determination of damages was error. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Cady (A.), 372 S.W.2d 639.

(1964) Trial court properly limited evidence and instructing as to valuation of property as of the date condemnor paid amount of commissioners' award into court and deterioration of value of property as result of announcement of proposed housing project and institution of condemnation action was not an item of just compensation within the meaning of this constitutional provision. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 144.

(1964) Although metropolitan sewer district was immune to action in tort for damages resulting from negligent operation of drainage ditch, this provision of constitution is binding upon state as well as others having power of eminent domain and its self-enforcing and court suggested plaintiff might proceed under procedure known as condemnation in reverse or inverse condemnation where facts alleged in petition indicated plaintiff's property was taken (or damages) for public use. Page v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 348.

(1964) The admission of evidence in condemnation case by owner of land zoned for agricultural purposes as to value of land for industrial use was error in absence of showing of reasonable probability of change in zoning restriction in reasonably near future and fact that land was being taken for electric power plant did not establish reasonable probability that zoning restriction would be changed in reasonably near future to permit industrial use generally. Union Electric v. Saale (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 427.

(1964) In proceedings to condemn property by city for construction and maintenance of sanitary sewers evidence justified finding that special benefits equalled or exceeded the damages and owners were not entitled to awards. Thomson v. Kansas City (A.), 379 S.W.2d 194.

(1967) If property is taken or damaged without agreement or legal proceedings, one of several remedies of the owner is that he may waive the tort and sue for the compensatory damages to which he would have been entitled if condemnation proceedings had been instituted prior to the entry. Twiehaus v. Wright City (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d 450.

(1967) Expenses of litigation paid by landowners before termination of condemnation proceedings did not constitute taking or damaging of his property for public use without just compensation. Dietrich v. St. Louis County (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 777.

(1969) Section 88.673, RSMo, does not prevent recovery of damages under Art. I, § 26, of the constitution, for private property taken or damaged for public use. Lange v. City of Jackson (A.), 440 S.W.2d 758.

(1973) This provision declared to be self-enforcing. Wells v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 503 S.W.2d 689.

(1986) Section 64.090, RSMo, was held to violate section 26 of Article I of the Missouri Constitution insofar as it attempted to give certain counties the power to zone out existing uses of property. People Tags, Inc., v. Jackson County Legislature, 636 F.Supp. 1345 (W.D. Mo. 1986).

(1987) Eminent domain statutes are narrowly construed, and an activity conducted beyond the scope of such statute, such as a "soil survey", may be enough of an intrusion to constitute a taking. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission v. Eilers, 729 S.W.2d 471 (Mo.App. 1987).

(1993) When, as result of public works project, private property is damaged by an unreasonable diversion of surface waters, whether by design or by mistake, or when private property is damaged by nuisance operated by an entity having power of eminent domain, proper remedy is an action in inverse condemnation. Heins Implement v. Mo. Highway & Transportation Commission, 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. en banc).

(2000) Residents were constitutionally entitled to just compensation from sewer district in nuisance-based inverse condemnation action for odors emitted from water treatment plant. Byrom v. Little Blue Valley Sewer Dist., 16 S.W.3d 573 (Mo.banc).

Acquisition of excess property by eminent domain--disposition under restrictions.

Section 27. That in such manner and under such limitations as may be provided by law, the state, or any county or city may acquire by eminent domain such property, or rights in property, in excess of that actually to be occupied by the public improvement or used in connection therewith, as may be reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes intended, and may be vested with the fee simple title thereto, or the control of the use thereof, and may sell such excess property with such restrictions as shall be appropriate to preserve the improvements made.

Limitation on taking of private property for private use--exceptions --public use a judicial question.

Section 28. That private property shall not be taken for private use with or without compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands of others for agricultural and sanitary purposes, in the manner prescribed by law; and that when an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that the use is public.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 20.

(1954) Land clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, Sec. 99.300 et seq.), in authorizing the acquisition of sound structures and vacant land by city does not constitute taking private property for private use. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.

(1954) In determining the validity of slum clearance legislation granting power of eminent domain, section 28, Article I, and section 21, Article VI, are to be construed together and as so construed a legislative finding that a blighted or insanitary area exists so as to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain is conclusive on the courts in absence of allegation and proof that the finding is arbitrary, or induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44; (1954) Land Clearance for Redev. Authority v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 58.

(1954) Fact that owner of all of lots on one side of proposed street built homes to sell and undertook grading of street does not establish that ordinance for grading of street was not for public use. In The Matter of Proceedings to Grade North Elmwood (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 863.

(1961) The conveyance of property acquired by eminent domain in slum clearance project to university controlled by religious denomination held not to constitute the taking of private property for private purposes. Kintzelle v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 695.

(1962) Highway commission had authority to condemn easement to provide a substitute location for pipelines which was necessary for interstate highway construction as the taking was for public purpose and was not in violation of Article III, Sec. 38(a) since state received compensation in surrender of existing right-of-way. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eakin (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 129.

Organized labor and collective bargaining.

Section 29. That employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.

(1952) Picketing, for the purpose of coercing employer to sign contract recognizing as exclusive collecting bargaining agent a labor organization of which only small minority of employees of such employer were members, was for an unlawful purpose under federal statute and therefore could be restrained without violating guaranties of constitution. Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner (Mo.) 249 S.W.2d 166.

(1955) Picketing to coerce employees to join certain union and to designate that union as a bargaining agent is violative of their rights under the constitution and is, therefore, unlawful. Tallman Co. v. Latal, 365 Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547.

(1956) Picketing of hotel by bartenders' union for purpose of coercing management to coerce its employees to join the union and to accept the union as their bargaining representative was in violation of this section. American Hotel Co. v. Bartenders' International League of America, (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 411.

(1957) Violation by an employer of right to organize and to bargain collectively as guaranteed by this provision is a wrong, and coercion of employees to prevent their organization should be enjoined. Quinn v. Buchanan (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 413.

(1958) Provisions of King Thompson law (§§ 295.180 and 295.200) authorizing state seizure and prohibiting strikes sustained against attacks on this and other constitutional grounds. State v. Local 8-6, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 309.

(1963) This provision does not authorize relief for employee in the nature of reinstatement and recovery of lost wages for employee who had no contract for a definite term of employment and who was allegedly discharged for union activity, but such discharge would be wrongful and employee could maintain an action for damages. Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home (Mo.), 370 S.W.2d 249.

Treason--attainder--corruption of blood and forfeitures--estate of suicides--death by casualty.

Section 30. That treason against the state can consist only in levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort; that no person can be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on his confession in open court; that no person can be attainted of treason or felony by the general assembly; that no conviction can work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate; that the estates of such persons as may destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in cases of natural death; and when any person shall be killed by casualty, there shall be no forfeiture by reason thereof.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. II, § 13.

Fines or imprisonments fixed by administrative agencies.

Section 31. That no law shall delegate to any commission, bureau, board or other administrative agency authority to make any rule fixing a fine or imprisonment as punishment for its violation.

Crime victims' rights.

Section 32. 1. Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights, as defined by law:

(1) The right to be present at all criminal justice proceedings at which the defendant has such right, including juvenile proceedings where the offense would have been a felony if committed by an adult;

(2) Upon request of the victim, the right to be informed of and heard at guilty pleas, bail hearings, sentencings, probation revocation hearings, and parole hearings, unless in the determination of the court the interests of justice require otherwise;

(3) The right to be informed of trials and preliminary hearings;

(4) The right to restitution, which shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other civil cause of action, or as otherwise provided by law;

(5) The right to the speedy disposition and appellate review of their cases, provided that nothing in this subdivision shall prevent the defendant from having sufficient time to prepare his defense;

(6) The right to reasonable protection from the defendant or any person acting on behalf of the defendant;

(7) The right to information concerning the escape of an accused from custody or confinement, the defendant's release and scheduling of the defendant's release from incarceration; and

(8) The right to information about how the criminal justice system works, the rights and the availability of services, and upon request of the victim the right to information about the crime.

2. Notwithstanding section 20 of article I of this Constitution, upon a showing that the defendant poses a danger to a crime victim, the community, or any other person, the court may deny bail or may impose special conditions which the defendant and surety must guarantee.

3. Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a cause of action for money damages against the state, a county, a municipality, or any of the agencies, instrumentalities, or employees provided that the General Assembly may, by statutory enactment, reverse, modify, or supercede any judicial decision or rule arising from any cause of action brought pursuant to this section.

4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize a court to set aside or to void a finding of guilt, or an acceptance of a plea of guilty in any criminal case.

5. The general assembly shall have power to enforce this section by appropriate legislation.

(Adopted November 3, 1992.)

CROSS REFERENCE: Bail to be allowed, when, Const. Art. I Sec. 20

Article II
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

Three departments of government--separation of powers.

Section 1. The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments--the legislative, executive and judicial--each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. III.

(1954) Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, § 99.300 et seq.), does not contravene this provision of the Constitution. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.

(1958) Section 71.015 providing for action by city for declaratory judgment authorizing annexation of unincoproated areas is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. City of St. Joseph v. Hankinson (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 4.

(1960) City ordinance granting commission power to establish parking zones, with their time limitations and fixing the fees therefore to be collected through parking meters, held invalid as unlawful delegation of legislative power. Automobile Club of Mo. v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 355.

(1970) The courts have inherent authority to employ necessary personnel with which to carry out their functions, to fix compensation of these personnel, and to require appropriation and payment therefore. State ex rel. Weinstein v. St. Louis Co. (Mo.), 451 S.W.2d 99.

(1976) Portion of statute providing that violation of rule or regulation made pursuant to such statute is a misdemeanor is unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. State v. Raccagno (Mo.), 530 S.W.2d 699.

Article III
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Legislative power--general assembly.

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives to be styled "The General Assembly of the State of Missouri."

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 1.

(1957) The senate, acting independently, has no power to create committees to sit after adjournment of the general assembly but both houses of the general assembly acting jointly by resolution may create such committees. State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury (Mo.), 300 S.W.2d 806.

Election of representatives--apportionment commission, appointment, duties, compensation.

Section 2. The house of representatives shall consist of one hundred sixty-three members elected at each general election and apportioned in the following manner: Within sixty days after the population of this state is reported to the President for each decennial census of the United States and, in the event that a reapportionment has been invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction, within sixty days after notification by the governor that such a ruling has been made, the congressional district committee of each of the two parties casting the highest vote for governor at the last preceding election shall meet and the members of the committee shall nominate, by a majority vote of the members of the committee present, provided that a majority of the elected members is present, two members of their party, residents in that district, as nominees for reapportionment commissioners. Neither party shall select more than one nominee from any one state legislative district. The congressional committees shall each submit to the governor their list of elected nominees. Within thirty days the governor shall appoint a commission consisting of one name from each list to reapportion the state into one hundred and sixty-three representative districts and to establish the numbers and boundaries of said districts.

If any of the congressional committees fails to submit a list within such time the governor shall appoint a member of his own choice from that district and from the political party of the committee failing to make the appointment.

Members of the commission shall be disqualified from holding office as members of the general assembly for four years following the date of the filing by the commission of its final statement of apportionment.

For the purposes of this article, the term congressional district committee or congressional district refers to the congressional district committee or the congressional district from which a congressman was last elected, or, in the event members of congress from this state have been elected at large, the term congressional district committee refers to those persons who last served as the congressional district committee for those districts from which congressmen were last elected, and the term congressional district refers to those districts from which congressmen were last elected. Any action pursuant to this section by the congressional district committee shall take place only at duly called meetings, shall be recorded in their official minutes and only members present in person shall be permitted to vote.

The commissioners so selected shall on the fifteenth day, excluding Sundays and holidays, after all members have been selected, meet in the capitol building and proceed to organize by electing from their number a chairman, vice chairman and secretary and shall adopt an agenda establishing at least three hearing dates on which hearings open to the public shall be held. A copy of the agenda shall be filed with the clerk of the house of representatives within twenty-four hours after its adoption. Executive meetings may be scheduled and held as often as the commission deems advisable.

The commission shall reapportion the representatives by dividing the population of the state by the number one hundred sixty-three and shall establish each district so that the population of that district shall, as nearly as possible, equal that figure.

Each district shall be composed of contiguous territory as compact as may be.

Not later than five months after the appointment of the commission, the commission shall file with the secretary of state a tentative plan of apportionment and map of the proposed districts and during the ensuing fifteen days shall hold such public hearings as may be necessary to hear objections or testimony of interested persons.

Not later than six months after the appointment of the commission, the commission shall file with the secretary of state a final statement of the numbers and the boundaries of the districts together with a map of the districts, and no statement shall be valid unless approved by at least seven-tenths of the members.

After the statement is filed members of the house of representatives shall be elected according to such districts until a reapportionment is made as herein provided, except that if the statement is not filed within six months of the time fixed for the appointment of the commission, it shall stand discharged and the house of representatives shall be apportioned by a commission of six members appointed from among the judges of the appellate courts of the state of Missouri by the state supreme court, a majority of whom shall sign and file its apportionment plan and map with the secretary of state within ninety days of the date of the discharge of the apportionment commission. Thereafter members of the house of representatives shall be elected according to such districts until a reapportionment is made as herein provided.

Each member of the commission shall receive as compensation fifteen dollars a day for each day the commission is in session but not more than one thousand dollars, and, in addition, shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses incurred while serving as a member of the commission.

No reapportionment shall be subject to the referendum.

(Amended January 14, 1966) (Amended November 2, 1982)

CROSS REFERENCE: Voter qualifications, RSMo 115.133

Qualifications of representatives.

Section 4. Each representative shall be twenty-four years of age, and next before the day of his election shall have been a qualified voter for two years and a resident of the county or district which he is chosen to represent for one year, if such county or district shall have been so long established, and if not, then of the county or district from which the same shall have been taken.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 4.

Senators--number--senatorial districts.

Section 5. The senate shall consist of thirty-four members elected by the qualified voters of the respective districts for four years. For the election of senators, the state shall be divided into convenient districts of contiguous territory, as compact and nearly equal in population as may be.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 5, 9. (Amended January 14, 1966)

(1975) Held that state senate districts substantially met compactness test. See also dissent. Preisler v. Kirkpatrick (Mo.), 528 S.W.2d 422.

Qualifications of senators.

Section 6. Each senator shall be thirty years of age, and next before the day of his election shall have been a qualified voter of the state for three years and a resident of the district which he is chosen to represent for one year, if such district shall have been so long established, and if not, then of the district or districts from which the same shall have been taken.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 6.

(1972) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not eliminate the right of the State of Missouri to establish and enforce the one-year residency in the district requirement as a condition to serve as State Senator. State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh (Mo.), 483 S.W.2d 70.

Senatorial apportionment commission--number, appointment, duties, compensation.

Section 7. Within sixty days after the population of this state is reported to the President for each decennial census of the United States, and within sixty days after notification by the governor that a reapportionment has been invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the state committee of each of the two political parties casting the highest vote for governor at the last preceding election shall, at a committee meeting duly called, select by a vote of the individual committee members, and thereafter submit to the governor a list of ten persons, and within thirty days thereafter the governor shall appoint a commission of ten members, five from each list, to reapportion the thirty-four senatorial districts and to establish the numbers and boundaries of said districts.

If either of the party committees fails to submit a list within such time the governor shall appoint five members of his own choice from the party of the committee so failing to act.

The commissioners so selected shall on the fifteenth day, excluding Sundays and holidays, after all members have been selected, meet in the capitol building and proceed to organize by electing from their number a chairman, vice chairman and secretary and shall adopt an agenda establishing at least three hearing dates on which hearings open to the public shall be held. A copy of the agenda shall be filed with the secretary of the senate within twenty-four hours after its adoption. Executive meetings may be scheduled and held as often as the commission deems advisable.

The commission shall reapportion the senatorial districts by dividing the population of the state by the number thirty-four and shall establish each district so that the population of that district shall, as nearly as possible, equal that figure; no county lines shall be crossed except when necessary to add sufficient population to a multi-district county or city to complete only one district which lies partly within such multi-district county or city so as to be as nearly equal as practicable in population. Any county with a population in excess of the quotient obtained by dividing the population of the state by the number thirty-four is hereby declared to be a multi-district county.

After the statement is filed senators shall be elected according to such districts until a reapportionment is made as herein provided, except that if the statement is not filed within six months of the time fixed for the appointment of the commission, it shall stand discharged and the senate shall be apportioned by a commission of six members appointed from among the judges of the appellate courts of the state of Missouri by the state supreme court, a majority of whom shall sign and file its apportionment plan and map with the secretary of state within ninety days of the date of the discharge of the apportionment commission. Thereafter senators shall be elected according to such districts until a reapportionment is made as herein provided.

Term limitations for members of General Assembly.

Section 8. No one shall be elected or appointed to serve more than eight years total in any one house of the General Assembly nor more than sixteen years total in both houses of the General Assembly. In applying this section, service in the General Assembly resulting from an election or appointment prior to the effective date of this section shall not be counted.

(Adopted November 3, 1992)

Apportionment of representatives.

Section 9. Until the convening of the Seventy-fourth General Assembly the House of Representatives shall consist of one hundred sixty-three members elected from the one hundred sixty-three representative districts, as they existed January 1, 1965.

(Amended January 14, 1966)

Basis of apportionment--alteration of districts.

Section 10. The last decennial census of the United States shall be used in apportioning representatives and determining the population of senatorial and representative districts. Such districts may be altered from time to time as public convenience may require.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 2, 5, 7, 9.

(1955) Only one valid apportionment of senatorial districts may be made for each decennial period, but, where division of city of St. Louis into districts was held invalid, the board of election commissioners may divide the city legally if this is done before March 1 of the year of the next general election. Preisler v. Doherty, 365 Mo. 460, 284 S.W.2d 427.

(1968) The enabling legislation for the St. Louis earnings tax does not violate constitutional provisions against arbitrary and unreasonable classification of taxes. Barhorst v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 423 S.W.2d 843.

Time of election of senators and representatives.

Section 11. The first election of senators and representatives under this constitution, shall be held at the general election in the year one thousand nine hundred and forty-six when the whole number of representatives and the senators from the districts having even numbers, who shall compose the first class, shall be elected, and two years thereafter the whole number of representatives and the senators from districts having odd numbers, who shall compose the second class, shall be elected, and so on at each succeeding general election.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 10.

Members of general assembly disqualified from holding other offices.

Section 12. No person holding any lucrative office or employment under the United States, this state or any municipality thereof shall hold the office of senator or representative. When any senator or representative accepts any office or employment under the United States, this state or any municipality thereof, his office shall thereby be vacated and he shall thereafter perform no duty and receive no salary as senator or representative. During the term for which he was elected no senator or representative shall accept any appointive office or employment under this state which is created or the emoluments of which are increased during such term. This section shall not apply to members of the organized militia, of the reserve corps and of school boards, and notaries public.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 12.

Vacation of office by removal of residence.

Section 13. If any senator or representative remove his residence from the district or county for which he was elected, his office shall thereby be vacated.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 13.

(1971) Legislative body of which he is a member has exclusive right to determine elected representative's qualifications to hold or assume office and courts are without jurisdiction to determine issue of removal of residence from district. State v. Hickey (Mo.), 475 S.W.2d 617.

(1972) Speaker of house of representatives, upon request by a member of house, must issue subpoenas for witnesses to appear before public and depose and testify in the matter of a charge made in the house that a member has removed his residence from his district and thereby vacated his office but clear right to issuance of subpoenas duces tecum not shown by members. In re Marshall (Mo.), 478 S.W.2d 1.

Writs of election to fill vacancies.

Section 14. Writs of election to fill vacancies in either house of the general assembly shall be issued by the governor.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 14.

Oath of office of members of assembly--administration--effect of refusal to take oath and conviction of violation.

Section 15. Every senator or representative elect, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will support the Constitution of the United States and of the state of Missouri, and faithfully perform the duties of my office, and that I will not knowingly receive, directly or indirectly, any money or other valuable thing for the performance or nonperformance of any act or duty pertaining to my office, other than the compensation allowed by law." The oath shall be administered in the halls of the respective houses to the members thereof, by a judge of the supreme court or a circuit court, or after the organization by the presiding officer of either house, and shall be filed in the office of the secretary of state. Any senator or representative refusing to take said oath or affirmation shall be deemed to have vacated his office, and any member convicted of having violated his oath or affirmation shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and be forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit in this state.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 15.

Compensation, mileage allowance and expenses of general assembly members.

Section 16. Senators and representatives shall receive from the state treasury as salary such sums as are provided by law. No law fixing the compensation of members of the general assembly shall become effective until the first day of the regular session of the general assembly next following the session at which the law was enacted. Upon certification by the president and secretary of the senate and by the speaker and chief clerk of the house of representatives as to the respective members thereof, the state comptroller shall audit and the state treasurer shall pay such compensation without legislative enactment. Until otherwise provided by law senators and representatives shall receive one dollar for every ten miles traveled in going to and returning from their place of meeting while the legislature is in session, on the most usual route.

Until otherwise provided by law, each senator or representative shall be reimbursed from the state treasury for the actual and necessary expenses incurred by him in attending sessions of the general assembly in the sum of ten dollars ($10.00) per day for each day on which the journal of the senate or house respectively shows the presence of such senator or representative. Upon certification by the president and secretary of the senate and by the speaker and chief clerk of the house of representatives as to the respective members thereof, the state comptroller shall approve and the state treasurer shall pay monthly such expense allowance without legislative enactment.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 16 (as amended Nov. 3, 1942). (Amended November 3, 1970)

Limitation on number of legislative employees.

Section 17. Until otherwise provided by law, the house of representatives shall not employ more than one hundred twenty-five and the senate shall not employ more than seventy-five employees elective, appointive or any other at any time during any session.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 16a (adopted Nov. 8, 1932). (Amended November 3, 1970)

Appointment of officers of houses--jurisdiction to determine membership--power to make rules, punish for contempt and disorderly conduct and expel members.

Section 18. Each house shall appoint its own officers; shall be sole judge of the qualifications, election and returns of its own members; may determine the rules of its own proceedings, except as herein provided; may arrest and punish by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars, or imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding ten days, or both, any person not a member, who shall be guilty of disrespect to the house by any disorderly or contemptuous behavior in its presence during its sessions; may punish its members for disorderly conduct; and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all members elect, may expel a member; but no member shall be expelled a second time for the same cause.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 17.

(1954) Action by person desiring to be candidate for senate at election already held, challenging validity of act apportioning senatorial districts, held moot because senate is the sole judge of qualificaitons of its members. Priesler v. Doherty, 364 Mo. 596, 265 S.W.2d 405.

(1970) Each house of General Assembly is the sole judge of the qualifications of its members, including residence, and the court will not intervene. State v. Banks (Mo.), 454 S.W.2d 498.

(1972) In proceeding in prohibition to prohibit respondent election boards from placing the name of intervenor on the primary ballot, held that this section applies when a general election has been held and the person elected presents himself for membership, and in instances after the person has been seated and question as to his qualifications and right to remain a member arises, but primary election controveries are to be decided by the courts. State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh (Mo.), 483 S.W.2d 70.

(1974) Held that lieutenant governor has right to preside over senate but is subject to procedural rules of senate while so doing. State v. Cason (Mo.), 507 S.W.2d 405.

Legislative privileges.

Section 19. Senators and representatives shall, in all cases except treason, felony, or breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the general assembly, and for the fifteen days next before the commencement and after the termination of each session; and they shall not be questioned for any speech or debate in either house in any other place.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 12.

Regular sessions of assembly--quorum--compulsory attendance--public sessions--limitation on power to adjourn.

Section 20. The general assembly shall meet on the first Wednesday after the first Monday in January following each general election. The general assembly may provide by law for the introduction of bills during the period between the first day of December and the first Wednesday after the first Monday of January.

The general assembly shall reconvene on the first Wednesday after the first Monday of January after adjournment at midnight on May thirtieth of the preceding year. A majority of the elected members of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide. The sessions of each house shall be held with open doors, except in cases which may require secrecy but not including the final vote on bills, resolutions and confirmations. Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than ten days at any one time, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses may be sitting.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV §§ 18, 19, 20, 23. (Amended November 3, 1970) (Amended November 8, 1988)

Automatic adjournment--tabling of bills, when.

Section 20(a). The general assembly shall adjourn at midnight on May thirtieth until the first Wednesday after the first Monday of January of the following year, unless it has adjourned prior thereto. All bills in either house remaining on the calendar after 6:00 p.m. on the first Friday following the second Monday in May are tabled. The period between the first Friday following the second Monday in May and May thirtieth shall be devoted to the enrolling, engrossing, and the signing in open session by officers of the respective houses of bills passed prior to 6:00 p.m. on the first Friday following the second Monday in May.

The general assembly shall automatically stand adjourned sine die at 6:00 p.m. on the sixtieth calendar day after the date of its convening in special session unless it has adjourned sine die prior thereto.

(Adopted November 4, 1952) (Amended November 8, 1960) (Amended November 3, 1970) (Amended November 8, 1988)

(1957) The senate, acting independently, has no power to create committees to sit after final adjournment of the general assembly but both houses of the general assembly acting jointly by resolution may create such committees. State ex rel. Jones v. Atterbury (Mo.), 300 S.W.2d 806.

Special session, procedure to convene--limitations--automatic adjournment.

Section 20(b). Upon the filing with the secretary of state of a petition stating the purpose for which the session is to be called and signed by three-fourths of the members of the senate and three-fourths of the members of the house of representatives, the president pro tem of the senate and the speaker of the house shall by joint proclamation convene the general assembly in special session. The proclamation shall state specifically each matter contained in the petition on which action is deemed necessary. No appropriation bill shall be considered in a special session convened pursuant to this section if in that year the general assembly has not passed the operating budget in compliance with Section 25 of this article.

The general assembly shall automatically stand adjourned sine die at 6:00 p.m. on the thirtieth calendar day after the date of its convening in special session under this section unless it has adjourned sine die prior thereto.

(Adopted November 8, 1988)

LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Style of laws--bills--limitation on amendments--power of each house to originate and amend bills--reading of bills.

Section 21. The style of the laws of this state shall be: "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows." No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose. Bills may originate in either house and may be amended or rejected by the other. Every bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 24, 25, 26.

(1975) Held that original purpose was not changed by amendment and that title did clearly express the purpose of senate bill 253 of the second regular session of the 77th general assembly. State ex rel. Toedebusch Transfer, Inc. v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 38.

(1999) Failure to read concurrent resolution of the General Assembly, which would have prevented schedule of compensation submitted by Citizen's Commission from becoming effective, by title on three different days in House of Representatives rendered resolution invalid. Weinstocks v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 411 (Mo.banc).

Referral of bills to committees--recall of referred bills--records of committees--provision for interim meetings.

Section 22. Every bill shall be referred to a committee of the house in which it is pending. After it has been referred to a committee, one-third of the elected members of the respective houses shall have power to relieve a committee of further consideration of a bill and place it on the calendar for consideration. Each committee shall keep such record of its proceedings as is required by rule of the respective houses and this record and the recorded vote of the members of the committee shall be filed with all reports on bills.

Each house of the general assembly may provide by rule for such committees of that house as it deems necessary to meet to consider bills or to perform any other necessary legislative function during the interim between the session ending on the thirtieth day of May and the session commencing on the first Wednesday after the first Monday of January.

(Amended November 3, 1970) (Amended November 8, 1988)

(1953) Senate rule requiring total number of members of committee voting favorably on bill and total number voting unfavorably to be filed with committee report held literal compliance with this section. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377.

Limitation of scope of bills--contents of titles--exceptions.

Section 23. No bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except bills enacted under the third exception in section 37 of this article and general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts for which moneys are appropriated.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 28.

(1954) Land Clearance for Redevelopment Law (RSMo, § 99.300 et seq.) in providing for the clearance of blighted and unsanitary areas and also for the redevelopment of areas which have been cleared, does not contain more than one subject. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.

(1956) Title reading "An act to make uniform the law of warehouse receipts" held broad enough to embrace not only the substantive law as to relation of warehouseman and depositor but also the procedural law whereby their rights are to be determined. Brown v. Sloan's Moving & Storage Co. (Mo.), 296 S.W.2d 20.

(1957) Title reading "An Act to make uniform the law of warehouse receipts" held sufficient to include provision of law imposing upon warehouseman burden of establishing excuse for failure or refusal to deliver goods when demanded. Hoerath v. Sloan's Mvg. & Storage Co. (Mo.), 305 S.W.2d 418.

(1959) An act amending the act providing for the organization of levee districts so as to authorize such districts to cooperate with the federal government in securing and constructing reclamation projects held germane to the original title of the act and consequently not in violation of this provision of the constitution. In re Tarkio-Squaw Levee Dist. of Holt County (Mo.), 319 S.W.2d 660.

(1959) Title of act reenacting section fixing and limiting fees and commissions of county collectors which stated that it was to repeal and reenact section of chapter entitled collectors and collection of taxes, held sufficient although as reenacted section contained provision making limits applicable to ex officio collectors. State v. Ludwig (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 841.

(1960) The title of an act is essentially a part of the act and is itself a legislative expression of the general scope of a bill and it may be looked to as an aid in arriving at the intent of the legislation. In re Tompkins' Estate (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 866.

(1962) Provision vesting jurisdiction of appeals from the lower court in cases involving the termination of minimum wages on public works held not within a title reading "an act regulating wages of laborers, mechanics and other workmen employed in the construction of public works." United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. Industrial Commission (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 633.

(1962) Section authorizing board of school district to lease or sell to institution of higher education property not required for use of school district and which could be used for purposes of offering education beyond grade twelve, contained in act "to provide for the formation of junior college districts and to establish the powers and duties of the state board of education with respect thereto", held to be unconstitutional and violation of this section. State ex rel. Normandy School Dist. of St. Louis County v. Small (Mo.), 356 S.W.2d 864.

(1962) Validity of section 556.280 upheld against charge that title of act violated provisions of this constitutional provision. Title read "An act to repeal section 556.280, RSMo 1949, relating to second and subsequent offenses, and to enact in lieu thereof a new section relating to the same subject and to the trial and punishment of persons convicted of crime following one or more convictions, to be known as section 556.280." State v. Weindorf (Mo.), 361 S.W.2d 806.

(1975) Held that title of bill which used language "industrial development of blighted, unsanitary or underdeveloped industrial areas" was not unconstitutional for failure to clearly express its subject because the bill contained provisions relating to financing and to powers of cities and other public bodies in relation to such functions. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (Mo.), 517 S.W.2d 36.

(1975) Held that bill creating office of medical examiner and abolishing office of coroner did not contain two subjects. State ex rel. McClellan v. Godfrey (Mo.), 519 S.W.2d 4.

(1984) Title to a bill needs only to indicate general content and amendments need only be germane to the general area indicated by title. Westin Crown Plaza Hotel v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. en banc 1984).

(1994) Section 2 of House Bill 551 & 552, codified as §§ 66.700 to 66.710, RSMo, enacted by Eighty-Seventh General Assembly was held unconstitutional because it violated procedural requirement of this section, that no bill shall contain more than one subject and court severed § 2 from bill and declared it void. Hammerschmidt v. Boone Co., Mo., No. 76607, March 17, 1994 (Mo. en banc).

(1994) Section 2 of H.C.S. for H.B.s 551 and 552 enacted by 87th General Assembly (sections 66.700 to 66.710, RSMo) declared unconstitutional because it violates procedural requirement of section. Bill was found to contain more than one subject. Section was severed from bill and declared void. Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. en banc).

(1997) "Relating to economic development" is an overly broad subject matter for a bill. Carmack v. Director, Missouri Department of Agriculture, 945 S.W.2d 956 (Mo.banc 1997).

Printing of bills and amendments.

Section 24. No bill shall be considered for final passage in either house until it, with all amendments thereto, has been printed and copies distributed among the members. If a bill passed by either house be returned thereto, amended by the other, the house to which the same is returned shall cause the amendment or amendments so received to be printed and copies distributed among the members before final action on such amendments.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 27, 30.

Limitation on introduction of bills.

Section 25. No bill other than an appropriation bill shall be introduced in either house after the sixtieth legislative day unless consented to by a majority of the elected members of each house or the governor shall request a consideration of the proposed legislation by a special message. No appropriation bill shall be taken up for consideration after 6:00 p.m. on the first Friday following the first Monday in May of each year.

(Amended November 3, 1970) (Amended November 8, 1988)

Legislative journals--demand for yeas and nays--manner and record of vote.

Section 26. Each house shall publish a journal of its proceedings. The yeas and nays on any question shall be taken and entered on the journal on the motion of any five members. Whenever the yeas and nays are demanded, or required by this constitution, the whole list of members shall be called and the names of the members voting yea and nay and the absentees shall be entered in the journal.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 42.

Concurrence in amendments--adoption of conference committee reports --final passage of bills.

Section 27. No amendments to bills by one house shall be concurred in by the other, nor shall reports of committees of conference be adopted in either house, nor shall a bill be finally passed, unless a vote by yeas and nays be taken and a majority of the members elected to each house be recorded as voting favorably.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 31, 32.

Form of reviving, reenacting and amending bills.

Section 28. No act shall be revived or reenacted unless it shall be set forth at length as if it were an original act. No act shall be amended by providing that words be stricken out or inserted, but the words to be stricken out, or the words to be inserted, or the words to be stricken out and those inserted in lieu thereof, together with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full as amended.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 33, 34.

(1959) Amendment of bill reenacting section prescribing and limiting fees of county collectors which made limits applicable to ex officio county collectors (theretofore excluded by the section) held not to change purpose of bill. State v. Ludwig (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 841.

(1967) Legislative intent is no substitute for legislative enactment, particularly when the criminal law is concerned, and the enactment must be broad enough to describe the offenses covered by the repealed provisions if the ascribed intent is to be fulfilled. State v. Eye (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 729.

(1975) Where act is to be amended by addition or deletion of words, that act as amended must be set forth in full and language that requires a change wherever it appears in a statute without setting out that section in full violates this section. State ex rel. McNary v. Susie (Mo.), 518 S.W.2d 630.

(1995) Section 1.205, RSMo, sets out the intention of the general assembly that the Missouri courts should read all Missouri statutes in pari materia with section. Constitution does not prohibit general assembly from adopting rules of construction. Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. en banc).

Effective date of laws--exceptions--procedure in emergencies and upon recess.

Section 29. No law passed by the general assembly, except an appropriation act, shall take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session in either odd-numbered or even-numbered years at which it was enacted. However, in case of an emergency which must be expressed in the preamble or in the body of the act, the general assembly by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house, taken by yeas and nays may otherwise direct; and further except that, if the general assembly recesses for thirty days or more it may prescribe by joint resolution that laws previously passed and not effective shall take effect ninety days from the beginning of the recess.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 36.

(Amended November 3, 1970)

(1952) Words "laws previously passed and not effective" in last proviso includes those bills passed by both houses of the general assembly, and signed by the presiding officers thereof, prior to the beginning of a recess, even though such bills have not been approved by the governor prior to the recess. State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 363 Mo. 245, 250 S.W.2d 701.

(1991) "Later in time" rule of statutory construction does not apply when sections are passed in the same legislative session and neither has an emergency clause. Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846 (Mo.banc 1991).

Signing of bills by presiding officers--procedure on objections --presentation of bills to governor.

Section 30. No bill shall become a law until it is signed by the presiding officer of each house in open session, who first shall suspend all other business, declare that the bill shall now be read and that if no objection be made he will sign the same. If in either house any member shall object in writing to the signing of a bill, the objection shall be noted in the journal and annexed to the bill to be considered by the governor in connection therewith. When a bill has been signed, the secretary, or the chief clerk, of the house in which the bill originated shall present the bill in person to the governor on the same day on which it was signed and enter the fact upon the journal.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 37, 38.

(1956) Requirement that bill be signed by legislative officers before it becomes law is directory only, and failure of speaker of house to sign bill is a procedural error which is cured on approval of the bill on referendum. Brown v. Morris, 365 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d 160.

Governor's duty as to bills--time limitations--failure to return, bill becomes law.

Section 31. Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate shall be presented to and considered by the governor, and, within fifteen days after presentment, he shall return such bill to the house in which it originated endorsed with his approval or accompanied by his objections. If the bill be approved by the governor it shall become a law. When the general assembly adjourns, or recesses for a period of thirty days or more, the governor shall return within forty-five days any bill to the office of the secretary of state with his approval or reasons for disapproval. If any bill shall not be returned by the governor within the time limits prescribed by this section it shall become law in like manner as if the governor had signed it.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 38, Art. V, § 12.

(Amended August 5, 1986)

Vetoed bills reconsidered, when.

Section 32. Every bill presented to the governor and returned with his objections shall stand as reconsidered in the house to which it is returned. If the governor returns any bill with his objections on or after the fifth day before the last day upon which a session of the general assembly may consider bills, the general assembly shall automatically reconvene on the first Wednesday following the second Monday in September for a period not to exceed ten calendar days for the sole purpose of considering bills returned by the governor. The objections of the governor shall be entered upon the journal and the house shall proceed to consider the question pending, which shall be in this form: "Shall the bill pass, the objections of the governor thereto notwithstanding?" The vote upon this question shall be taken by yeas and nays and if two-thirds of the elected members of the house vote in the affirmative the presiding officer of that house shall certify that fact on the roll, attesting the same by his signature, and send the bill with the objections of the governor to the other house, in which like proceedings shall be had in relation thereto. The bill thus certified shall be deposited in the office of the secretary of state as an authentic act and shall become a law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 39.

(Amended November 3, 1970) (Amended November 7, 1972) (Amended November 8, 1988)

Revision of general statutes--limitation on compensation.

Section 34. In the year 1949 and at least every ten years thereafter all general statute laws shall be revised, digested and promulgated as provided by law. No senator or representative shall receive any compensation in addition to his salary as a member of the general assembly for any services rendered in connection with said revision.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 41 (as adopted Nov. 8, 1932)

Committee on legislative research.

Section 35. There shall be a permanent joint committee on legislative research, selected by and from the members of each house as provided by law. The general assembly, by a majority vote of the elected members, may discharge any or all of the members of the committee at any time and select their successors. The committee may employ a staff as provided by law. The committee shall meet when necessary to perform the duties, advisory to the general assembly, assigned to it by law. The members of the committee shall receive no compensation in addition to their salary as members of the general assembly, but may receive their necessary expenses while attending the meetings of the committee.

(1996) Section limits committee to performance of duties that are advisory to general assembly. Fiscal note summary on initiative petitions is not advisory to general assembly. Thompson v. Legislative Research, 932 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.banc 1996).

LIMITATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

Payment of state revenues and receipts to treasury--limitation of withdrawals to appropriations--order of appropriations.

Section 36. All revenue collected and money received by the state shall go into the treasury and the general assembly shall have no power to divert the same or to permit the withdrawal of money from the treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations made by law. All appropriations of money by successive general assemblies shall be made in the following order:

First: For payment of sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state.

Second: For the purpose of public education.

Third: For the payment of the cost of assessing and collecting the revenue.

Fourth: For the payment of the civil lists.

Fifth: For the support of eleemosynary and other state institutions.

Sixth: For public health and public welfare.

Seventh: For all other state purposes.

Eighth: For the expense of the general assembly.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 43.

(1976) Transfer of appropriations by commissioner of administration with the authorization of the fiscal affairs committee is unconstitutional and violates Art. III, § 36, Const. of Mo. State ex inf. Danforth v. Merrell (Mo.), 530 S.W.2d 209.

Limitation on state debts and bond issues. Section 37. The general assembly shall have no power to contract or authorize the contracting of any liability of the state, or to issue bonds therefore, except (1) to refund outstanding bonds, the refunding bonds to mature not more than twenty-five years from date, (2) on the recommendation of the governor, for a temporary liability to be incurred by reason of unforeseen emergency or casual deficiency in revenue, in a sum not to exceed one million dollars for any one year and to be paid in not more that five years from its creation, and (3) when the liability exceeds one million dollars, the general assembly as on constitutional amendments, or the people by the initiative, may also submit a measure containing the amount, purpose and terms of the liability, and if the measure is approved by a majority of the qualified electors of the state voting thereon at the election, the liability may be incurred, and the bonds issued therefore must be retired serially and by installments within a period not exceeding twenty-five years from their date. Before any bonds are issued under this section the general assembly shall make adequate provision for the payment of the principal and interest, and may provide an annual tax on all taxable property in an amount sufficient for the purpose.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 44.

State building bond issue authorized--interest rate--payment from income tax and other funds.

Section 37(a). In addition to the exceptions made in Section 37, the General Assembly shall have power to contract, or to authorize the contracting of, a debt or liability on behalf of the state, and to issue bonds or other evidence of indebtedness therefore, not exceeding in the aggregate Seventy-five Million Dollars ($75,000,000), for the purpose of repairing, remodeling or rebuilding, or of repairing, remodeling and rebuilding state buildings and properties at all or any of the penal, correctional and reformatory institutions of this state, the state training schools, state hospitals and state schools and other eleemosynary institutions of this state, and institutions of higher education of this state, and for building additions thereto and additional buildings where necessary, and for furnishing and equipping any such improvements.

Such bonds shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding three per centum (3%) per annum, payable semiannually, except that the first interest payable thereon may be paid not later than one year from the date of issuance, and maturing not later than twenty-five years from their date. Such bonds shall be issued by the State Board of Fund Commissioners in such amount, from time to time, as may be necessary to carry on the building program as determined by the General Assembly. The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the "Second State Building Fund."

The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund, which is hereby created. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the State Board of Fund Commissioners shall notify the State Comptroller of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which said bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the said bonds, and of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the said bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year, and for the establishment and maintenance of a sinking fund to pay said bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the State Board of Fund Commissioners shall notify the State Comptroller of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the said bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year and for the maintenance of the sinking fund to pay said bonds maturing in such next succeeding fiscal year.

It shall be the duty of the State Comptroller to transfer, at least monthly, the proceeds of the state income tax, after deducting there from the proportionate part thereof appropriated for the support of the free public schools, to the credit of the Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund until there shall have been transferred to said fund the amount so certified to him by the State Board of Fund Commissioners, as hereinabove provided.

If at any time after the issuance of any of the said bonds, it shall become apparent to the State Comptroller that the proceeds of the state income tax, as aforesaid, will not be sufficient for the payment of the principal and interest maturing and accruing on said bonds during the next succeeding fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of said bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the State Comptroller annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the next succeeding fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The State Comptroller shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county and to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of said clerks and the said comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St. Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the same means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund.

If at any time the balance in said Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund should be insufficient to pay accruing interest or maturing principal of said bonds, the Board of Fund Commissioners shall direct the State Comptroller to transfer from the State Revenue Fund to said Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund the sum required for said purposes, or either of them, and said sum so transferred shall be reimbursed to the State Revenue Fund whenever there may be a balance in the Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund in excess of the amount which may then be needed to meet the accruing interest and maturing principal of the said bonds during one fiscal year next succeeding.

All funds paid into the Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the said bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of said bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of said bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall prevent the reimbursement from the said Second State Building Bond Interest and Sinking Fund of the State Revenue Fund, as hereinabove provided.

The General Assembly shall enact such laws as may be necessary to carry this amendment into effect.

(Adopted at special election held January 24, 1956)

Water pollution control fund established--bonds authorized--funds to stand appropriated.

Section 37(b). The general assembly may authorize the contracting of an indebtedness on behalf of the state of Missouri and the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of one hundred fifty million dollars for the purpose of providing funds for use in this state for the protection of the environment through the control of water pollution. The bonds shall be issued by the state board of fund commissioners from time to time and in such amounts as may be necessary to carry on a program by the water pollution board of the state as determined by the general assembly for the planning, financing and constructing sewage treatment facilities by any county, municipality, sewer district, or any combination of the same and the board of fund commissioners shall offer such bonds at public sale, and shall provide such method as it may deem necessary for the advertisement of the sale of each issue of said bonds before the same are sold.

The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the "Water Pollution Control Fund".

The bonds shall be retired serially and by installments within a period not to exceed twenty-five years from their date of issue and shall bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding the rate permitted by law.

The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the "Water Pollution Control Bond and Interest Fund", which is hereby created, and the payment of said bonds and the interest thereon shall be secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and resources of the state of Missouri. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the state comptroller of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which said bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the said bonds, and of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the said bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year, and to pay said bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the state comptroller of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the said bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year and to pay said bonds maturing in such next succeeding fiscal year.

It shall be the duty of the state comptroller to transfer, at least monthly, from the state revenue fund, after deducting there from the proportionate part thereof appropriated for the support of the free public schools, and to credit to the water pollution control bond and interest fund such sum as may be necessary from time to time until there shall have been transferred to said fund the amount so certified to him by the state board of fund commissioners, as hereinabove provided.

If at any time after the issuance of any of the said bonds, it shall become apparent to the state comptroller that the funds available in the state revenue fund, as aforesaid, will not be sufficient for the payment of the sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state and for the purpose of public education and the principal and interest maturing and accruing on said bonds during the next succeeding fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of said bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the state comptroller annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the next succeeding fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The state comptroller shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county and to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of said clerks and the said comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St. Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the same means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the water pollution control bond and interest fund.

All funds paid into the water pollution control bond and interest fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the said bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of said bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of said bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid.

The general assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to carry this amendment into effect.

(Adopted October 5, 1971)

Additional water pollution control bonds authorized--procedure.

Section 37(c). The general assembly may authorize the contracting of an indebtedness on behalf of the state of Missouri and the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of two hundred million dollars for the purpose of providing funds for use in this state for the protection of the environment through the control of water pollution. The bonds shall be issued by the State Board of Fund Commissioners from time to time and in such amounts as may be necessary to carry on a program by the Clean Water Commission of the state as determined by the General Assembly for the planning, financing and constructing sewage treatment facilities by any county, municipality, sewer district, or any combination of the same and the Board of Fund Commissioners shall offer such bonds at public sale, and shall provide such method as it may deem necessary for the advertisement of the sale of each issue of said bonds before the same are sold.

The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the "Water Pollution Control Fund."

The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the Water Pollution Control Bond and Interest Fund, which is hereby created, and the payment of said bonds and the interest thereon shall be secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and resources of the State of Missouri. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the State Board of Fund Commissioners shall notify the Commissioner of Administration of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which said bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the said bonds, and of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the said bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year, and to pay said bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the State Board of Fund Commissioners shall notify the Commissioner of Administration of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the said bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year and to pay said bonds maturing in such next succeeding fiscal year.

It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Administration to transfer at least monthly, from the State Revenue Fund, after deducting there from the proportionate part thereof appropriated for the support of the free public schools, and to credit to the Water Pollution Control Bond and Interest Fund such sum as may be necessary from time to time until there shall have been transferred to said fund the amount so certified to him by the State Board of Fund Commissioners, as hereinabove provided.

If at any time after the issuance of any of the said bonds, it shall become apparent to the Commissioner of Administration that the funds available in the State Revenue Fund, as aforesaid, will not be sufficient for the payment of the sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state and for the purpose of public education and the principal and interest maturing and accruing on said bonds during the next succeeding fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of said bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Administration annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the next succeeding fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The Commissioner of Administration shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of said clerks and the said comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St. Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the same means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the "Water Pollution Control Bond and Interest Fund."

All funds paid into the Water Pollution Control Bond and Interest Fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the said bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of said bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of said bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid.

The General Assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to carry this amendment into effect.

(Adopted November 6, 1979)

Additional water pollution control bonds authorized--procedure.

The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the "Water Pollution Control Fund."

The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

The General Assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to carry this amendment into effect.

(Adopted November 6, 1979)

Water pollution control, improvement of drinking water systems and storm water control--amount of indebtedness, bonds authorized, procedure.

Section 37(e). 1. The general assembly may authorize the contracting of an indebtedness on behalf of the state of Missouri and the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of two hundred seventy-five million dollars for the purpose of providing funds for use in this state for the control of water pollution and improvements to drinking water systems, including the establishment of water supply hook-ups from unincorporated areas of any county to water supplies, whether or not a particular county as a whole is classified as rural, and for storm water control, through grants and loans administered by the clean water commission and the department of natural resources pursuant to law. The repeal and re-enactment of this section shall not be construed to increase the aggregate amount of indebtedness which may be authorized pursuant to this section above the amount authorized pursuant to this section immediately prior to such repeal and re-enactment. The bonds shall be issued by the state board of fund commissioners from time to time and in such amounts as may be necessary to carry on the program of the clean water commission and the department of natural resources as determined by the general assembly for the financing and constructing of these improvements by any county, municipality, sewer district, water district, or any combination of the same. The board of fund commissioners shall offer such bonds at public sale, and shall provide such method as it may deem necessary for the advertisement of the sale of each issue of bonds before such bonds are sold. The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the water pollution control fund. The bonds shall be retired serially and by installments within a period not to exceed twenty-five years from their date of issue and shall bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding the rate permitted by law. The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

2. The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the "Water Pollution Control Bond and Interest Fund", which is hereby created, and the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and resources of the state of Missouri. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which such bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the bonds, and of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year, and to pay such bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year and to pay such bonds maturing in the next succeeding fiscal year.

3. It shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration to transfer at least monthly, from the state general revenue fund, after deducting there from the proportionate part thereof appropriated for the support of the free public schools, and to credit to the water pollution control bond and interest fund such sum as may be necessary from time to time until there shall have been transferred to such fund the amount so certified to the commissioner of administration by the state board of fund commissioners, as provided in this section.

4. If at any time after the issuance of any of the bonds, it shall become apparent to the commissioner of administration that the funds available in the state general revenue fund will not be sufficient for the payment of the sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state and for the purpose of public education and the principal and interest maturing and accruing on the bonds during the next succeeding fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of such bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the next succeeding fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The commissioner of administration shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of such clerks and the comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the water pollution control bond and interest fund.

5. All funds paid into the water pollution control bond and interest fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of such bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid. The general assembly may appropriate in any year such amount from the water pollution control fund as it determines to be necessary for the purposes specified herein. However, such appropriations may not exceed fifty million dollars, in the aggregate, for the purpose of providing rural water and sewer grants, including grants for the establishment of water supply hook-ups from unincorporated areas of any county to water supplies, whether or not a particular county as a whole is classified as rural, administered by the department of natural resources pursuant to law, and may not exceed twenty-five million dollars, in the aggregate, for the purpose of storm water control. The general assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to carry this amendment into effect.

(Adopted November 8, 1988) (Amended November 3, 1998)

Fourth state building bond and interest fund created--bond issue authorized, procedure--use of funds.

Section 37(f). 1. The general assembly may authorize the contracting of an indebtedness on behalf of the state of Missouri and the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of two hundred fifty million dollars for the purpose of providing funds for rebuilding buildings of institutions of higher education including public community colleges, the department of corrections and the division of youth services, providing additions thereto or additional buildings where necessary, for land acquisition, for construction or purchase of buildings, and for planning, furnishing, equipping and landscaping such improvements and buildings. The bonds shall be issued by the state board of fund commissioners from time to time and in such amounts as may be necessary as determined by the general assembly for such purposes. The board of fund commissioners shall offer such bonds at public sale, and shall provide such method as it may deem necessary for the advertisement of the sale of each issue of bonds before such bonds are sold. The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued under this section shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the fourth state building fund. The bonds shall be retired serially and by installments within a period not to exceed twenty-five years from their date of issue and shall bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding the rate permitted by law. The proceeds of the sale of the bonds authorized in this section shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are authorized to be issued.

2. The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the "Fourth State Building Bond and Interest Fund", which is hereby created, and the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and resources of the state of Missouri. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which such bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the bonds, and of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the following fiscal year, and to pay such bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the following fiscal year and to pay such bonds maturing in the following fiscal year.

3. It shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration to transfer at least monthly, from the state general revenue fund or from any other fund established by law for this purpose, after deducting there from the proportionate part thereof appropriated for the support of the free public schools, and to credit to the fourth state building bond and interest fund such sum as may be necessary from time to time until there shall have been transferred to such fund the amount so certified to the commissioner of administration by the state board of fund commissioners, as provided in this section.

4. If at any time after the issuance of any of the bonds, it shall become apparent to the commissioner of administration that the funds available in the state general revenue fund will not be sufficient for the payment of the sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state and for the purpose of public education and the principal and interest maturing and accruing on the bonds during the following fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of such bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the following fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The commissioner of administration shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of such clerks and the comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St. Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the fourth state building bond and interest fund.

5. All funds paid into the fourth state building bond and interest fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of such bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid. The general assembly may appropriate in any year such amount from the fourth state building fund as it determines to be necessary for the purposes specified in this section. The general assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this section. The additional revenue provided by this section shall not be part of "total state revenue" in sections 17 and 18 of article X of this constitution. The expenditure of such additional revenue shall not be an "expense of state government" under section 20 of article X of this constitution.

6. The governor or his designated representative shall develop in consultation with the state board of fund commissioners a percentage plan for application by African Americans, women and other minority businesses in all state bond programs. The governor or his designated representative shall develop, in consultation with the state board of fund commissioners, a percentage plan for application by African American, women, and other minority, for employment opportunity in the state construction building plan. Such minority business and employment plans shall be filed with the Missouri minority business advocacy commission.

(Adopted August 2, 1994)

Rural water and sewer grants and loans--bonds authorized, procedure --appropriation of funds, limitations.

Section 37(g). 1. In addition to any other indebtedness authorized under this constitution or the laws of this state, the general assembly may authorize the contracting of an indebtedness on behalf of the state of Missouri and the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of one hundred million dollars for the purpose of providing rural water and sewer grants and loans, including grants for the establishment of water supply hook-ups in unincorporated areas of any county to water supplies, whether or not a particular county as a whole is classified as rural, through grants and loans administered by the clean water commission and the department of natural resources pursuant to procedures in chapter 640, RSMo, and chapter 644, RSMo. The bonds shall be issued by the state board of fund commissioners from time to time and in such amounts as may be necessary to carry on the program of the clean water commission and the department of natural resources as determined by the general assembly for the financing and constructing of these improvements by any county, municipality, sewer district, water district, or any combination of the same. The board of fund commissioners shall offer such bonds at public sale, and shall provide such method as it may deem necessary for the advertisement of the sale of each issue of bonds before such bonds are sold. The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to the water pollution control bond fund. The bonds shall be retired serially and by installments within a period not to exceed twenty-five years from their date of issue and shall bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding the rate permitted by law. The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

2. The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the water pollution control bond and interest fund and the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and resources of the state of Missouri. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which such bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year, and to pay such bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year and to pay such bonds maturing in the next succeeding fiscal year.

4. If at any time after the issuance of any of the bonds, it shall become apparent to the commissioner of administration that the funds available in the state general revenue fund will not be sufficient for the payment of the sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state and for the purpose of public education and the principal and interest maturing and accruing on the bonds during the next succeeding fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of such bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the next succeeding fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The commissioner of administration shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county and to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of such clerks and the comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St. Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the water pollution control bond and interest fund.

5. All funds paid into the water pollution control bond and interest fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of such bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid. The general assembly may appropriate in any year such amount from the water pollution control fund as it determines to be necessary for the purposes specified herein. However, such appropriations may not exceed ten million dollars for the purpose of providing rural water and sewer grants and loans, including grants for the establishment of water supply hook-ups from unincorporated areas of any county to water supplies, whether or not a particular county as a whole is classified as rural, administered by the department of natural resources pursuant to law. The general assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to carry this amendment into effect.

(Adopted November 3, 1998)

Storm water control plans, studies and projects--bonds authorized, procedure--storm water control bond and interest fund created, administration (includes St. Louis City and counties of the first classification).

Section 37(h). 1. In addition to any other indebtedness authorized under this constitution or the laws of this state, the general assembly may authorize the contracting of an indebtedness on behalf of the state of Missouri and the issuance of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness not exceeding in the aggregate the sum of two hundred million dollars for the purpose of providing funds for use in this state for stormwater control plans, studies and projects in counties of the first classification and in any city not within a county, through grants and loans administered by the clean water commission and the department of natural resources pursuant to the procedures in chapter 644, RSMo. The bonds shall be issued by the state board of fund commissioners from time to time and in such amounts as may be necessary to carry on the program of the clean water commission and the department of natural resources as determined by the general assembly for the financing and constructing of these plans, studies and projects by any municipality, sewer district, sewer district established pursuant to article VI, section 30(a) of the Missouri Constitution, water district, or any combination of the same located in a county of the first classification or in any city not within a county or by any county of the first classification. The board of fund commissioners shall offer such bonds at public sale, and shall provide such method as it may deem necessary for the advertisement of the sale of each issue of bonds before such bonds are sold. The proceeds of the sale or sales of any bonds issued hereunder shall be paid into the state treasury and be credited to a fund to be designated the "Storm water Control Fund". The bonds shall be retired serially and by installments within a period not to exceed twenty-five years from their date of issue and shall bear interest at a rate or rates not exceeding the rate permitted by law. The proceeds of the sale of the bonds herein authorized shall be expended for the purposes for which the bonds are hereinabove authorized to be issued.

2. The bonds and the interest thereon shall be paid out of the "Storm water Control Bond and Interest Fund", which is hereby created, and the payment of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be secured by a pledge of the full faith, credit and resources of the state of Missouri. Upon the issuance of such bonds, or any portion thereof, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required, in the remaining portion of the fiscal year during which such bonds shall have been issued, for the payment of interest on the bonds, and of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year, and to pay such bonds as they mature. Thereafter, within thirty days after the beginning of each fiscal year, the state board of fund commissioners shall notify the commissioner of administration of the amount of money required for the payment of interest on the bonds in the next succeeding fiscal year and to pay such bonds maturing in the next succeeding fiscal year.

3. It shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration to transfer at least monthly, from the state general revenue fund, after deducting there from the proportionate part thereof appropriated for the support of the free public schools, and to credit to the storm water control bond and interest fund such sum as may be necessary from time to time until there shall have been transferred to such fund the amount so certified to the commissioner of administration by the state board of fund commissioners, as provided in this section.

4. If at any time after the issuance of any of the bonds, it shall become apparent to the commissioner of administration that the funds available in the state general revenue fund will not be sufficient for the payment of the sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the state and for the purpose of public education and the principal and interest maturing and accruing on the bonds during the next succeeding fiscal year, a direct tax shall be levied upon all taxable tangible property in the state for the payment of such bonds and the interest that will accrue thereon. In such event, it shall be the duty of the commissioner of administration annually, on or before the first day of July, to determine the rate of taxation necessary to be levied upon all taxable tangible property within the state to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal of and interest on such bonds maturing and accruing in the next succeeding fiscal year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and costs of collection. The commissioner of administration shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the county clerk of each county and to the comptroller or other officer in the city of St. Louis whose duty it shall be to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the ad valorem state taxes. It shall be the duty of such clerks and the comptroller or other proper officer in the city of St Louis to extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and to certify the same to the collectors of the revenue of their respective counties and of the city of St. Louis, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the means as are now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and to pay the same into the state treasury for the credit of the storm water control bond and interest fund.

5. All funds paid into the storm water control bond and interest fund shall be and stand appropriated without legislative action to the payment of principal and interest of the bonds, there to remain until paid out in discharge of the principal of such bonds and the interest accruing thereon, and no part of such fund shall be used for any other purpose so long as any of the principal of such bonds and the interest thereon shall be unpaid. The general assembly may appropriate in any year such amount from the storm water control fund as it determines to be necessary for the purposes specified in this section; provided that such appropriations may not exceed twenty million dollars, in the aggregate, per fiscal year. Of those grant and loan funds appropriated pursuant to this section, fifty percent shall be allocated to grants and fifty percent shall be allocated to loans. Grants shall be fifty percent of the cost of the plan, study or project and may be combined with loans such as those provided by the commission or the department. Grants and loans from the storm water control fund shall be dispersed to eligible recipients in counties of the first classification and in a city not within a county in an amount equal to the percentage ratio that the population of the recipient county or city bears to the total population of all counties of the first classification and cities not within a county as determined by the last decennial census. Any city with a population of at least twenty-five thousand inhabitants located in such counties of the first classification shall receive such funds directly in an amount equal to the percentage ratio that the city's population bears to the total population of the county. Other provisions of this section notwithstanding, in those cities or counties served by a sewer district established pursuant to article VI, section 30(a) of the Missouri Constitution, such district shall receive the grants or loans directly.

6. The general assembly may enact such laws as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.

(Adopted November 3, 1998)

Limitation on use of state funds and credit--exceptions--public calamity--blind pensions--old age assistance--aid to children--direct relief--adjusted compensation for veterans--rehabilitation --participation in federal aid.

Section 38(a). The general assembly shall have no power to grant public money or property, or lend or authorize the lending of public credit, to any private person, association or corporation, excepting aid in public calamity, and general laws providing for pensions for the blind, for old age assistance, for aid to dependent or crippled children or the blind, for direct relief, for adjusted compensation, bonus or rehabilitation for discharged members of the armed services of the United States who were bona fide residents of this state during their service, and for the rehabilitation of other persons. Money or property may also be received from the United States and be redistributed together with public money of this state for any public purpose designated by the United States.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 45, 46, 47 (as amended in 1916, 1920, 1932, 1936, and 1938).

(1962) Highway commission had authority to condemn easement to provide a substitute location for pipelines which was necessary for interstate highway construction as the taking was for public purpose and was not in violation of Article III, Sec. 38 (a) since state received compensation in surrender of existing right-of-way. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Eakin (Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 129.

(1975) The requirement in Sec. 552.080, RSMo, that the state pay the costs of medical care of person committed to state hospital after being acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease does not violate this section since commitment is not voluntary. Robb v. Estate of Brown (A.), 158 S.W.2d 729.

(1987) This section forbids the issuance of revenue bonds which provide a tax credit upon default. Curchin v. Missouri Industrial Development Board, 722 S.W.2d 930 (Mo. banc 1987).

Tax levy for blind pension fund.

Section 38(b). The general assembly shall provide an annual tax of not less than one-half of one cent nor more than three cents on the one hundred dollars valuation of all taxable property to be levied and collected as other taxes, for the purpose of providing a fund to be appropriated and used for the pensioning of the deserving blind as provided by law. Any balance remaining in the fund after the payment of the pensions may be appropriated for the adequate support of the commission for the blind, and any remaining balance shall be transferred to the distributive public school fund.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. VI, § 47.

CROSS REFERENCE: Rate of levy, RSMo 209.130

(1954) Section 99.450, RSMo, which requires sale of property cleared at public expense at fair value is not grant of special privilege or of public property in aid of private persons. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44; (1954) Land Clearance for Redev. Auth. v. City of St. Louis (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 58.

Neighborhood improvement districts, cities and counties may be authorized to establish, powers and duties--limitation on indebtedness.

Section 38(c). 1. The general assembly may authorize cities and counties to create neighborhood improvement districts and incur indebtedness and issue general obligation bonds to pay for all or part of the cost of public improvements within such districts. The cost of all indebtedness so incurred shall be levied and assessed by the governing body of the city or county on the property benefited by such improvements. The city or county shall collect the special assessments so levied and use the same to reimburse the city or county for the amount paid or to be paid by it on the general obligation bonds issued for such improvements.

2. Neighborhood improvement districts may be created by a city or county only when approved by the vote of a percentage of electors voting thereon within such district, or by a petition signed by the owners of record of a percentage of real property located within such district, that is equal to the percentage of voter approval required for the issuance of general obligation bonds under article VI, section 26.

3. The total amount of city or county indebtedness for all such districts shall not exceed ten percent of the assessed valuation of all taxable tangible property, as shown by the last completed property assessment for state or local purposes, within the city or county.

(Adopted August 7, 1990)

(1996) "Neighborhood" does not require multiple parcels or multiple residents. Section creates an exception to Art. VI, Sec. 26 (f). Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 924 S.W.2d 259 (Mo.banc 1996).

Limitation of power of general assembly.

Section 39. The general assembly shall not have power:

(1) To give or lend or to authorize the giving or lending of the credit of the state in aid or to any person, association, municipal or other corporation;

(2) To pledge the credit of the state for the payment of the liabilities, present or prospective, of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation;

(3) To grant or to authorize any county or municipal authority to grant any extra compensation, fee or allowance to a public officer, agent, servant or contractor after service has been rendered or a contract has been entered into and performed in whole or in part;

(4) To pay or to authorize the payment of any claim against the state or any county or municipal corporation of the state under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law;

(5) To release or extinguish or to authorize the releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, without consideration, the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or individual due this state or any county or municipal corporation;

(6) To make any appropriation of money for the payment, or on account of or in recognition of any claims audited or that may hereafter be audited by virtue of an act entitled "An Act to Audit and Adjust the War Debts of the State," approved March 19, 1874, or any act of a similar nature, until the claim so audited shall have been presented to and paid by the government of the United States to this state;

(7) To act, when convened in extra session by the governor, upon subjects other than those specially designated in the proclamation calling said session or recommended by special message to the general assembly after the convening of an extra session;

(8) To remove the seat of government from the City of Jefferson;

(9) Except as otherwise provided in section 39(b), section 39(c), section 39(e) or section 39(f) of this article, to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises for any purpose, and shall enact laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise tickets, or tickets in any scheme in the nature of a lottery; except that, nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent or prohibit citizens of this state from participating in games or contests of skill or chance where no consideration is required to be given for the privilege or opportunity of participating or for receiving the award or prize and the term "lottery or gift enterprise" shall mean only those games or contests whereby money or something of value is exchanged directly for the ticket or chance to participate in the game or contest. The general assembly may, by law, provide standards and conditions to regulate or guarantee the awarding of prizes provided for in such games or contests under the provision of this subdivision;

(10) To impose a use or sales tax upon the use, purchase or acquisition of property paid for out of the funds of any county or other political subdivision.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, §§ 45, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, Art. XIV § 10.

(Amended November 7, 1978) (Amended November 6, 1984) (Amended August 5, 1986) (Amended November 8, 1994) (Amended November 3, 1998)

(1960) Tax imposed with respect to special motor vehicle fuel is a tax on the act of placing fuel in the fuel tank of a vehicle and not a use tax upon the use or acquisition of property paid for out of funds of political subdivision as prohibited by Article III Sec. 39(10) of the constitution. State ex rel. Arenson v. City of Springfield (Mo.), 332 S.W.2d 942.

(1970) Oil company's promotional game, even though participant need make no purchase to play, is a lottery. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Danforth (Mo.), 455 S.W.2d 505.

(1975) Constitutionality upheld as not violating Art. III, § 39, or Art. VI, § 25, of the constitution of Missouri. State ex rel. Dreer v. Public School Retirement System (Mo.), 519 S.W.2d 290.

(1975) Held that state has the authority to require that names of residents of this state be taken off of mailing list of company allegedly mailing lottery material, this does not interfere with United States mail. State ex rel. Danforth v. Reader's Digest (Mo.), 527 S.W.2d 355.

(1994) Bingo, keno, numbers tickets, pull tabs, jar tickets, push cards and punch boards either fall within definition of lottery or have no element of skill as demonstrated by their similarity to lottery games and are lotteries within meaning of this section. Twenty-one and poker are not lotteries within meaning of this section. Case is remanded for determination whether slot machines, video slot machines, baccarat, craps, roulette wheel, klondike table, faro layout and video games of chance are games of pure chance or if there is an element of skill in game. Harris v. Missouri Gaming Commission, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. en banc).

Bingo may be authorized--requirements.

Section 39(a). The game commonly known as bingo when conducted by religious, charitable, fraternal, veteran or service organizations is not a lottery or gift enterprise within the meaning of subdivision (9) of section 39 of this article if the general assembly authorizes by law that religious, charitable, fraternal, service, or veteran organizations may conduct the game commonly known as bingo, upon the payment of the license fee and the issuance of the license as provided for by law. Any such law shall include the following requirements:

(1) All net receipts over and above the actual cost of conducting the game as set by law shall be used only for charitable, religious or philanthropic purposes, and no receipts shall be used to compensate in any manner any person who works for or is in any way affiliated with the licensed organization;

(2) No license shall be granted to any organization unless it has been in continuous existence for at least five years immediately prior to the application for the license. An organization must have twenty bona fide members to be considered to be in existence;

(3) No person shall participate in the management, conduct or operation of any game unless that person:

(a) Has been a bona fide member of the licensed organization for the two years immediately preceding such participation, and volunteers the time and service necessary to conduct the game;

(b) Is not a paid staff person for the licensed organization;

(d) Has never purchased a tax stamp for wagering or gambling activity;

(e) Has never been convicted of any felony;

(f) Has never been convicted of or pleaded nolo contender to any illegal gambling activity;

(g) Is of good moral character;

(4) Any person, any officer or director of any firm or corporation, and any partner of any partnership renting or leasing to a licensed organization any equipment or premises for use in a game shall meet all of the qualifications of paragraph (3) except subparagraph (a);

(5) No lease, rental arrangement or purchase arrangement for any equipment or premise for use in a game shall provide for payment in excess of the reasonable market rental rate for such premises and in no case shall any payment based on a percentage of the gross receipts or proceeds be permitted;

(6) No person, firm, partnership or corporation shall receive any remuneration or profit for participating in the management, conduct or operation of the game;

(7) No advertising of any game shall be permitted except on the premises of the licensed organization or through ordinary communications between the organization and its members;

(8) Any other requirement the general assembly finds necessary to insure that any games are conducted solely for the benefit of the eligible organizations and the general community.

(Adopted November 4, 1980)

(1998) Ban on advertising bingo games in subdivision (7) is a violation of First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Association of Charitable Games of Missouri v. Missouri Gaming Commission, 1998 WL 602050 (W.D.Mo.).

Bingo may be authorized--requirements.

(3) No person shall participate in the management, conduct or operation of any game unless that person:

(a) Has been a bona fide member of the licensed organization for the two years immediately preceding such participation, and volunteers the time and service necessary to conduct the game;

(b) Is not a paid staff person for the licensed organization;

(d) Has never purchased a tax stamp for wagering or gambling activity;

(e) Has never been convicted of any felony;

(f) Has never been convicted of or pleaded nolo contender to any illegal gambling activity;

(g) Is of good moral character;

(6) No person, firm, partnership or corporation shall receive any remuneration or profit for participating in the management, conduct or operation of the game;

(7) No advertising of any game shall be permitted except on the premises of the licensed organization or through ordinary communications between the organization and its members;

(8) Any other requirement the general assembly finds necessary to insure that any games are conducted solely for the benefit of the eligible organizations and the general community.

(Adopted November 4, 1980)

STATE LOTTERY

State lottery, authority to establish--lottery proceeds fund established, purpose.

Section 39(b). 1. The general assembly shall have authority to authorize a Missouri state lottery by law. If such legislation is adopted, there shall be created a "State Lottery Commission" consisting of five members who shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate and who may be removed, for cause by the governor and who shall be chosen from the state at large and represent a broad geographic spectrum with no more than one member chosen from each federal congressional district. Each member at the time of his appointment and qualification shall have been a resident of this state for a period of at least five years next preceding his appointment and qualification and shall also be a qualified elector therein and be not less than thirty years of age. No more than three members of the commission shall be members of the same political party. Members of the commission shall have three-year terms as provided by law. Members of the commission shall receive no salary but shall receive their actual expenses incurred in the performance of their responsibilities. The commission shall employ such persons as provided by law. The commission shall have the authority to join other states and jurisdictions for the purpose of conducting joint lottery games.

2. The money received by the Missouri State lottery commission from the sale of Missouri lottery tickets, and from all other sources, shall be deposited in the "State Lottery Fund", which is hereby created in the state treasury.

3. The monies received from the Missouri state lottery shall be governed by appropriation of the general assembly. Beginning July 1, 1993, monies representing net proceeds after payment of prizes and administrative expenses shall be transferred by appropriation to the "Lottery Proceeds Fund" which is hereby created within the state treasury and such monies in the lottery proceeds fund shall be appropriated solely for public institutions of elementary, secondary and higher education.

4. A minimum of forty-five percent of the money received from the sale of Missouri state lottery tickets shall be awarded as prizes.

5. The commission shall have the authority to purchase and hold title to any securities of the United States government or its agencies and instrumentalities thereof for prizes, as provided by law.

6. Until July 1, 1993, any person possessing a department of revenue retail sales license as provided by law or any chartered civic, fraternal, charitable or political organization or labor organization shall be eligible to obtain a license to act as a lottery ticket sales agent except a license to act as an agent to sell lottery tickets shall not be issued to any person primarily engaged in business as a lottery ticket sales agent. Until July 1, 1993, the general assembly may impose additional qualifications on such persons to obtain a lottery ticket sales agent license as it deems appropriate. Until July 1, 1993, the commission is also authorized to sell lottery tickets at its office and at special events as provided by law. Beginning July 1, 1993, the general assembly shall enact laws governing lottery ticket sales.

7. Revenues produced from the conduct of a state lottery shall not be part of "total state revenues" as defined in sections 17 and 18 of article X of this constitution and the expenditure of such revenue shall not be an "expense of state government" under section 20 of article X of this constitution.

(Adopted November 6, 1984) (Amended August 2, 1988) (Amended August 4, 1992)

(1988) Lottery Commission may participate in multistate lottery. Tichenor v. Missouri State Lottery Commission, 742 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. en banc 1988).

Pari-mutuel wagering may be authorized by general assembly--horse racing commission established, election procedure to adopt or reject horse racing.

Section 39(c) 1. The general assembly may authorize on track pari-mutuel betting on horse racing in a manner provided by law. There is hereby created the Missouri Horse Racing Commission which shall consist of five members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Members of the commission shall be citizens and eligible voters of Missouri and shall not have been convicted of a felony. Not more than three members shall be affiliated with the same political party, and not more than one member may be a resident of any one congressional district or of any single county or of the City of St. Louis. Of the members first appointed, one shall be appointed for a one year term, one shall be appointed for a two year term, one shall be appointed for a three year term, one shall be appointed for a four year term and one shall be appointed for a five year term; and thereafter members shall be appointed for terms of five years. The governor shall designate one of the members to be chairman. The governor may remove any member of the commission from office for malfeasance or neglect of duty in office. Members of the commission shall be reimbursed and paid for the expenses which they reasonably incur in the performance of their official duties, but they shall not, however, be paid a salary or other remuneration for their services unless such be authorized by law. No person may serve as a member of the commission and his office shall be deemed vacated if:

(i) The member, the member's spouse, child or parent owns any interest in a race track licensed by the Commission.

(ii) The member, the member's spouse, child or parent is an officer, employee, consultant or otherwise receives any remuneration from race track licensee.

(iii) The member, the member's spouse, child or parent holds a financial interest in a management or concession contract with a race track licensee. A member shall not, however, be disqualified because either the member or the member's spouse, child or parent is a horse owner or a horse breeder whose horse participates as other horses and wins purses or awards in a race at a licensed race track.

2. At the general election to be held in November, 1986, every officer or body in charge of the elections shall order the following question on the ballot: "Shall pari-mutuel wagering upon horse races be permitted in ............... County (or the City of St. Louis)?" This question may also be ordered upon the ballot at the general election occurring in 1988 and every four years thereafter by the governing body of any county where pari-mutuel wagering has not been previously authorized. The general provisions of law with respect to the conduct of elections and the submission of questions to voters for determination shall apply insofar as they are applicable. No license shall be issued by the commission authorizing pari-mutuel wagering within the grounds or enclosure of a race track until a majority of the qualified voters of the county where the race track is proposed to be located vote to accept pari-mutuel wagering in that county at one of the elections referred to above. Once pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing has been accepted by the voters of that county at an appropriate election, no other vote shall be held on the question of the legality of such wagering in that county. If the qualified voters of the county reject pari-mutuel wagering on horse races in that county, no elections shall be held on the question in that county except as in the manner specified above. As used in this section, the term "county" includes the City of St. Louis.

(Adopted August 5, 1986)

Gaming revenues to be appropriated to public institutions of elementary, secondary and higher education.

Section 39(d). All state revenues derived from the conduct of all gaming activities as are now or hereafter authorized by this constitution or by law, unless otherwise provided by law on the effective date of this section, shall be appropriated beginning July 1, 1993, solely for the public institutions of elementary, secondary and higher education and shall not be included within the definition of "total state revenues" in section 17 of article X of this constitution.

(Adopted August 4, 1992)

Riverboat gambling authorized on Missouri and Mississippi Rivers --boats in moats authorized.

Section 39(e). Riverboat gambling authorized on Missouri and Mississippi rivers.-- The general assembly is authorized to permit upon the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers only, which shall include artificial spaces that contain water and that are within 1000 feet of the closest edge of the main channel of either of those rivers, lotteries, gift enterprises and games of chance to be conducted on excursion gambling boats and floating facilities. Any license issued before or after the adoption date of this amendment for any excursion gambling boat or floating facility located in any such artificial space shall be deemed to be authorized by the General Assembly and to be in compliance with this Section.

(Adopted November 8, 1994)

(Amended November 3, 1998)

Raffles and sweepstakes, charitable or religious organizations may sponsor, standards and conditions.

Section 39(f). Any organization recognized as charitable or religious pursuant to federal law may sponsor raffles and sweepstakes in which a person risks something of value for a prize. The general assembly may, by law, provide standards and conditions to regulate or guarantee the awarding of prizes provided for in such raffles or sweepstakes.

(Adopted November 3, 1998)

Limitations on passage of local and special laws.

Section 40. The general assembly shall not pass any local or special law:

(1) authorizing the creation, extension or impairment of liens;

(2) granting divorces;

(3) changing the venue in civil or criminal cases;

(4) regulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in any judicial proceeding or inquiry before courts, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators or other tribunals, or providing or changing methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcing of judgments, or prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate;

(5) summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries;

(6) for limitation of civil actions;

(7) remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures or refunding money legally paid into the treasury;

(8) extending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from the due performance of their duties, or their securities from liability;

(9) changing the law of descent or succession;

(10) giving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds;

(11) affecting the estates of minors or persons under disability;

(12) authorizing the adoption or legitimation of children;

(13) declaring any named person of age;

(14) changing the names of persons or places;

(15) vacating town plats, roads, streets or alleys;

(16) relating to cemeteries, graveyards or public grounds not of the state;

(17) authorizing the laying out, opening, altering or maintaining roads, highways, streets or alleys;

(18) for opening and conducting elections, or fixing or changing the place of voting;

(19) locating or changing county seats;

(20) creating new townships or changing the boundaries of townships or school districts;

(21) creating offices, prescribing the powers and duties of officers in, or regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, election or school districts;

(22) incorporating cities, towns, or villages or changing their charters;

(23) regulating the fees or extending the powers of aldermen, magistrates or constables;

(24) regulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of schoolhouses, and the raising of money for such purposes;

(25) legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of any officer or agent of the state or of any county or municipality;

(26) fixing the rate of interest;

(27) regulating labor, trade, mining or manufacturing;

(28) granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity, or to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down a railroad track;

(29) relating to ferries or bridges, except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form the boundary between this and any other state;

(30) where a general law can be made applicable, and whether a general law could have been made applicable is a judicial question to be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 53.

(1952) Land Tax Collection Law is not a local or special law prohibited by § 40, Art. III of the constitution nor does it violate § 8, Art. VI relating to classification of counties. Collector v. Parcels of Land, 362 Mo. 1054, 247 S.W.2d 83.

(1953) City ordinance prohibiting the operation of places of business selling automobiles in certain areas held invalid as special law because it excludes businesses selling merchandise and commodities other than automobiles. McKaig v. Kansas City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W.2d 815.

(1953) Act authorizing tax levy by city of 700,000, enacted in 1952 and having an expiration date in 1954, held not local or special law forbidden by the constitution. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377.

(1955) Ordinance of St. Louis city which prohibited retail auction sales of jewelry, unless owner of stock offered had been in retail jewelry business at location where auction was conducted for one year and had not conducted auction at such location for year, held special law and, therefore, violative of section 40, (30) Art. 3 of Constitution. Hagerman v. City of St. Louis, 365 Mo. 403, 283 S.W.2d 623.

(1959) City ordinance prohibiting auction sales on Sunday held reasonable and valid exercise of police power as against contentions that it violated prohibitions against discriminatory laws and local or special laws. A B C Liquidators Inc. v. Kansas City (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 876.

(1960) Act providing for the licensing of persons engaging in the business of selling checks, drafts and money orders but excluding persons the major portion of whose business consists of sale of merchandise, held to be arbitrary and a special law and therefore void under the federal and state constitutional provisions. Petitt v. Field (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 106.

(1962) Missouri Unfair Milk Sales Practices Law (416.410 to 416.560) held not to be special law within this constitutional provision. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 735.

(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation of plaintiffs' right to equal rights and opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty and property without due process of law. GEM Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.

(1966) This constitutional provision applies to municipal as well as state legislation. Mathison v. Public Water Supply District No. 2 (Mo.), 401 S.W.2d 425.

(1974) Held that sections 92.700 to 92.920 do not violate this section. Collector of Revenue v. Parcels of Land (Mo.), 517 S.W.2d 49.

(1975) Where an act does not exclude any city which may come within its classification, the fact that it is improbable that any will do so does not make the act a special law. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Planned Industrial Expansion Authority (Mo.), 517 S.W.2d 36.

(1975) Held not unconstitutional as violating prohibition against special legislation. Bopp v. Spainhower (Mo.), 519 S.W.2d 281.

(1977) A statute applying only in "any county of the first class having a charter form of government and not containing all or part of a city with a population of more than four hundred fifty thousand inhabitants" is not invalid as constituting a special or local law. Manchester Fire Protection District v. St. Louis (Mo.), 555 S.W.2d 297.

(1993) Section 72.400, RSMo, is unconstitutional, where act is not open-ended and does not demonstrate a substantial justification for excluding other counties from choosing to have a boundary commission. The ordinance and acts of the boundary commission made pursuant to statute in approving the annexation are void. O'Reilly v. City of Hazelwood, 850 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. en banc).

(1994) Bill enacted by General Assembly which provides for licensing of excursion gambling boats designates area for licensing continuously docked vessel by geographic locale and by precise size and type of boat. Immutable characteristics describe one area and violate prohibition against special laws. Harris v. Missouri Gaming Commission, 869 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. en banc).

(1995) Proscription against the enactment of local or special laws applies with equal force to municipalities and their ordinances as it does to general assembly. Hunter Avenue Property v. Union Electric Co., 895 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. App. E.D.).

Indirect enactment of local and special laws--repeal of local and special laws.

Section 41. The general assembly shall not indirectly enact a special or local law by the partial repeal of a general law; but laws repealing local or special acts may be passed.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 53(33).

Notice of proposed local or special laws.

Section 42. No local or special law shall be passed unless a notice, setting forth the intention to apply therefore and the substance of the contemplated law, shall have been published in the locality where the matter or thing to be affected is situated at least thirty days prior to the introduction of the bill into the general assembly and in the manner provided by law. Proof of publication shall be filed with the general assembly before the act shall be passed and the notice shall be recited in the act.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 54.

Title and control of lands of United States--exemption from taxation --taxation of lands of nonresidents.

Section 43. The general assembly shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States, nor with any regulation which Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to bona fide purchasers. No tax shall be imposed on lands the property of the United States; nor shall lands belonging to persons residing without the state ever be taxed at a higher rate than lands belonging to persons residing within the state.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIV, § 1.

Uniform interest rates.

Section 44. No law shall be valid fixing rates of interest or return for the loan or use of money, or the service or other charges made or imposed in connection therewith, for any particular group or class engaged in lending money. The rates of interest fixed by law shall be applicable generally and to all lenders without regard to the type or classification of their business.

(1979) Section 370.300.1 violates Art. III, § 44 Mo. Const. in that it fixes rates of interest for a particular group or class lending money and is contrary to the requirement that rate of interest fixed by law shall be applicable generally to all lenders without regard to the type or classification of their business. St. Louis Teachers' Credit Union v. Marsh, et al. (Mo.), 585 S.W.2d 474.

Congressional apportionment.

Section 45. When the number of representatives to which the state is entitled in the House of the Congress of the United States under the census of 1950 and each census thereafter is certified to the governor, the general assembly shall by law divide the state into districts corresponding with the number of representatives to which it is entitled, which districts shall be composed of contiguous territory as compact and as nearly equal in population as may be.

(1962) Statute dividing state into 10 congressional districts, the least populous containing .087% and the most populous containing .117% of the state population and all but one of which were reasonably compact, was a constitutional apportionment. Priesler v. Hearnes (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 552.

Term limitations for members of U.S. Congress--effective when --voluntary observance required, when.

Section 45(a). (1) No United States Senator from Missouri shall serve more than two terms in the United States Senate, and no United States Representative from Missouri shall serve more than four terms in the United States House of Representatives. This limitation on the number of terms shall apply to terms of office beginning on or after the effective date of this section. Any person appointed or elected to fill a vacancy in the United States Congress and who serves at least one-half of a term of office shall be considered to have served a term in that office for purposes of this subsection (1). The provisions of this subsection (1) shall become effective whenever at least one-half of the states enact term limits for their members of the United States Congress.

(2) The people of Missouri declare that the provisions of this section shall be deemed severable and that their intention is that federal officials elected from Missouri will continue voluntarily to observe the wishes of the people as stated in this section in the event any provision thereof is held invalid.

(Adopted November 3, 1992)

Militia.

Section 46. The general assembly shall provide for the organization, equipment, regulations and functions of an adequate militia, and shall conform the same as nearly as practicable to the regulations for the government of the armed forces of the United States.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIII, § 2.

Emergency duties and powers of assembly on enemy attack.

Section 46(a). The General Assembly, in order to insure continuity of state and local governmental operations in periods of emergency only resulting from disasters occurring in this state caused by enemy attack on the United States, shall have the power to such extent as the General Assembly deems advisable. In the event there occurs in this state a disaster caused by enemy attack on the United States, the General Assembly shall immediately convene in the City of Jefferson or in such place as designated by joint proclamation of the highest presiding officers of each house, and shall have power

(1) To provide by legislative enactment for prompt and temporary succession to the powers and duties of public offices, of whatever nature and whether filled by election or appointment, the incumbents of which may become unavailable for carrying on the powers and duties of such offices, and

(2) To adopt by legislative enactment such other legislation as may be necessary and proper for insuring the continuity of governmental operations. Notwithstanding the power conferred by this section of the constitution, elections shall always be called as soon as possible to fill any elective vacancies in any office temporarily occupied by operation of any legislation enacted pursuant to the provisions of this section.

(Adopted November 8, 1960)

State parks--appropriations for, required.

Section 47. For twelve years beginning with the year 1961, the general assembly shall appropriate for each year out of the general revenue fund, an amount not less than that produced annually at a tax rate of one cent on each one hundred dollars assessed valuation of the real and tangible personal property taxable by the state, for the exclusive purpose of providing a state park fund to be expended and used by the agency authorized by law to control and supervise state parks, and historic sites of the state, for the purposes of the acquisition, supervision, operation, maintenance, development, control, regulation and restoration of state parks and state park property, as may be determined by such agency; and thereafter the general assembly shall appropriate such amounts as may be reasonably necessary for such purposes.

The amount required to be appropriated by this section may be reduced to meet budgetary demands provided said appropriation is not less than that appropriated for the prior similar appropriation period.

(Amended November 8, 1960)

Historical memorials and monuments--acquisition of property.

Section 48. The general assembly may enact laws and make appropriations to preserve and perpetuate memorials of the history of the state by parks, buildings, monuments, statues, paintings, documents of historical value or by other means, and to preserve places of historic or archaeological interest or scenic beauty, and for such purposes private property or the use thereof may be acquired by gift, purchase, or eminent domain or be subjected to reasonable regulation or control.

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

Reservation of power to enact and reject laws.

Section 49. The people reserve power to propose and enact or reject laws and amendments to the constitution by the initiative, independent of the general assembly, and also reserve power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.

Source: Const of 1875, Art. IV, § 57 (Amended November 3, 1908).

(1963) Initiative process could not be used as method of amending St. Louis County zoning ordinance. State v. Donohue (Mo.), 368 S.W.2d 432.

Initiative petitions--signatures required--form and procedure.

Section 50. Initiative petitions proposing amendments to the constitution shall be signed by eight percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state, and petitions proposing laws shall be signed by five percent of such voters. Every such petition shall be filed with the secretary of state not less than six months before the election and shall contain an enacting clause and the full text of the measure. Petitions for constitutional amendments shall not contain more than one amended and revised article of this constitution, or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith, and the enacting clause thereof shall be "Be it resolved by the people of the state of Missouri that the Constitution be amended:". Petitions for laws shall contain not more than one subject which shall be expressed clearly in the title, and the enacting clause thereof shall be "Be it enacted by the people of the state of Missouri:".

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 57.

(Amended November 3, 1998)

(1972) The requirement of this section that initiative petitions contain an enacting clause is mandatory and not directory. State ex rel. Scott v. Kirkpatrick (Mo.), 484 S.W.2d 161.

(1974) "Legal voter" held to mean "registered voter". Scott v. Kirkpatrick (Mo.), 513 S.W.2d 442.

(1990) Organization of Missouri constitution into separate articles creates a presumption that matters pertaining to separate subjects should be set forth in separate articles and not commingled. The organizational headings of the constitution are strong evidence of what the drafters of the constitution meant by "one subject". Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).

Appropriations by initiative--effective date of initiated laws --conflicting laws concurrently adopted.

Section 51. The initiative shall not be used for the appropriation of money other than of new revenues created and provided for thereby, or for any other purpose prohibited by this constitution. Except as provided in this constitution, any measure proposed shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon. When conflicting measures are approved at the same election the one receiving the largest affirmative vote shall prevail.

(1974) A city charter amendment which would require salaries of city firemen to equal those of another city's firemen violates this section in that it in effect constitutes an appropriation measure which failed to provide new revenues. State ex rel. Card v. Kaufman (Mo.), 517 S.W.2d 78.

Referendum--exceptions--procedure.

Section 52(a). A referendum may be ordered (except as to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, and laws making appropriations for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of state institutions and for the support of public schools) either by petitions signed by five percent of the legal voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts in the state, or by the general assembly, as other bills are enacted. Referendum petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state not more than ninety days after the final adjournment of the session of the general assembly which passed the bill on which the referendum is demanded.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 57.

(1952) Referendum petitions as to laws which become effective ninety days after recess under Art. III, Sec. 29, must be filed within ninety days after beginning of recess in order to be effective. State ex rel. Moore v. Toberman, 363 Mo. 245, 250 S.W.2d 701.

Veto power--elections--effective date.

Section 52(b). The veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures referred to the people. All elections on measures referred to the people shall be had at the general state elections, except when the general assembly shall order a special election. Any measure referred to the people shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not otherwise. This section shall not be construed to deprive any member of the general assembly of the right to introduce any measure.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 57.

(1956) As general rule after a measure is passed by the legislature, approved by voters on referendum and proclaimed to be in effect, it will not be held invalid because of procedural errors occurring during the course of its adoption. Brown v. Morris, 365 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d 160.

(1956) Where bill was referred by a provision of the bill, the signature of the speaker of the house was not necessary to constitute the bill a valid enactment after its approval by people. Brown v. Morris, 365 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d 160.

Basis for computation of signatures required.

Section 53. The total vote for governor at the general election last preceding the filing of any initiative or referendum petition shall be used to determine the number of legal voters necessary to sign the petition. In submitting the same to the people, the secretary of state and all other officers shall be governed by general laws.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 57.

Article IV
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Executive power--the governor.

Section 1. The supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 4.

Duties of governor.

Section 2. The governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and faithfully executed, and shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 6.

Qualifications of governor.

Section 3. The governor shall be at least thirty years old and shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least fifteen years and a resident of this state at least ten years next before election.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 5.

(1972) Word "resident" as used in this section does not mean or require actual, physical presence, continuous and uninterrupted for ten years, but means that place where a man has his true fixed and permanent home and principal establishment and to which whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning. State ex rel. King v. Walsh (Mo.), 484 S.W.2d 641.

Power of appointment to fill vacancies--tenure of appointees.

Section 4. The governor shall fill all vacancies in public offices unless otherwise provided by law, and his appointees shall serve until their successors are duly elected or appointed and qualified.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 11.

Commissions of state officers.

Section 5. The governor shall commission all officers unless otherwise provided by law. All commissions shall be issued in the name of the state, signed by the governor, sealed with the great seal of the state and attested by the secretary of state.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 23.

Commander in chief of militia--authority.

Section 6. The governor shall be the commander in chief of the militia, except when it is called into the service of the United States, and may call out the militia to execute the laws, suppress actual and prevent threatened insurrection, and repel invasion.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 7.

Reprieves, commutations and pardons--limitations on power.

Section 7. The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper, subject to provisions of law as to the manner of applying for pardons. The power to pardon shall not include the power to parole.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 8.

(1975) Held governor's power to pardon is limited to criminal prosecutions and does not extend to administrative revocation of license. The court also held that the governor has no authority to "order" an action by the director of liquor control when the statute places such duty on the director. Theodoro v. Department of Liquor Control (Mo.), 527 S.W.2d 350.

Concurrent resolutions--duty of governor--exceptions--limitation of effect.

Section 8. Every resolution to which the concurrence of the senate and house of representatives may be necessary, except on questions of adjournment, going into joint session, and of amending this constitution, shall be presented to the governor, and before the same shall take effect, shall be proceeded upon in the same manner as in the case of a bill; provided, that no resolution shall have the effect to repeal, extend, or amend any law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 14.

Governor's messages and recommendations to assembly--call of extra sessions.

Section 9. The governor shall, at the commencement of each session of the general assembly, at the close of his term of office, and at such other times as he may deem necessary, give to the general assembly information as to the state of the government, and shall recommend to its consideration such measures as he shall deem necessary and expedient. On extraordinary occasions, he may convene the general assembly by proclamation, wherein he shall state specifically each matter on which action is deemed necessary.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, §§ 9, 10.

Lieutenant governor--qualifications, powers and duties.

Section 10. There shall be a lieutenant governor who shall have the same qualifications as the governor and shall be ex officio president of the senate. In committee of the whole he may debate all questions, and shall cast the deciding vote on equal division in the senate and on joint vote of both houses.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, §§ 1, 15.

(1974) Held that lieutenant governor has right to preside over senate but is subject to procedural rules of senate while so doing. State v. Cason (Mo.), 507 S.W.2d 405.

Order of succession to governorship, when.

Section 11(a). If the governor-elect dies before taking office, the lieutenant governor-elect shall take the term of the governor-elect. On the death, conviction or impeachment, or resignation of the governor, the lieutenant governor shall become governor for the remainder of the term. If there be no lieutenant governor the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, the secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer or the attorney general in succession shall become governor. On the failure to qualify, absence from the state or other disability of the governor, the powers, duties and emoluments of the governor shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor for the remainder of the term or until the disability is removed. If there be no lieutenant governor, or for any of said causes the lieutenant governor is incapable of acting, the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, the secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer, and the attorney general in succession shall act as governor until the disability is removed.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, §§ 16, 17.

(Adopted August 6, 1968)

Governor's declaration of disability, effect of--disability board, membership, duties--governor to resume office, when--disputed illness, supreme court to decide.

Section 11(b). Whenever the governor transmits to the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the lieutenant governor, or if there be no lieutenant governor, by the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer, or the attorney general in succession, as acting governor. Whenever a majority of a disability board comprised of the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer, the attorney general, president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, the majority floor leader of the senate, and majority floor leader of the house, transmits to the president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives their written declaration that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the lieutenant governor, or if there be no lieutenant governor, the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, the secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer or the attorney general in succession, shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as acting governor. Thereafter when the governor transmits to the disability board his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office on the fourth day after he transmits such declaration unless a majority of the disability board transmits their written declaration that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office to the supreme court within that four day period, and the supreme court shall then convene to decide the issue. If the supreme court within twenty-one days after receipt of such declaration, determines by a majority vote of all members thereof that the governor is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the acting governor shall continue to discharge the same as acting governor; otherwise, the governor shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

(Adopted August 6, 1968)

(1991) Where powers, duties and emolument of governor shall devolve upon the lieutenant governor upon absence from state or other disability of the governor, absence from the state does not mean physical absence of governor but means effective absence which effectively debilitates or prevents governor from exercising the duties of his office. State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Blunt, 813 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. en banc).

(1991) Lieutenant governor not entitled to be paid compensation at the salary level of governor based on governor's presence or absence from the state but based only upon serving as acting governor. State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Blunt, 813 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. en banc).

Acting as governor not to vacate regular office.

Section 11(c). If any state officer other than the lieutenant governor is acting as governor, his regular elective office shall not be deemed vacant and all duties of that office shall be performed by his chief administrative assistant.

(Adopted August 6, 1968)

Executive department, composition of--elective officials--departments and offices enumerated.

Section 12. The executive department shall consist of all state elective and appointive officials and employees except officials and employees of the legislative and judicial departments. In addition to the governor and lieutenant governor there shall be a state auditor, secretary of state, attorney general, a state treasurer, an office of administration, a department of agriculture, a department of conservation, a department of natural resources, a department of elementary and secondary education, a department of higher education, a department of highways and transportation, a department of insurance, a department of labor and industrial relations, a department of economic development, a department of public safety, a department of revenue, a department of social services, and a department of mental health. In addition to the elected officers, there shall not be more than fifteen departments and the office of administration. The general assembly may create by law two departments, in addition to those named, provided that the departments shall be headed by a director or commission appointed by the governor on the advice and consent of the senate. The director or commission shall have administrative responsibility and authority for the department created by law. Unless discontinued all present or future boards, bureaus, commissions and other agencies of the state exercising administrative or executive authority shall be assigned by law or by the governor as provided by law to the office of administration or to one of the fifteen administrative departments to which their respective powers and duties are germane.

(Amended August 8, 1972) (Amended November 6, 1979) (Amended August 7, 1984) (Amended August 7, 1990)

State auditor--qualifications and duties--limitations on duties.

Section 13. The state auditor shall have the same qualifications as the governor. He shall establish appropriate systems of accounting for all public officials of the state, post-audit the accounts of all state agencies and audit the treasury at least once annually. He shall make all other audits and investigations required by law, and shall make an annual report to the governor and general assembly. He shall establish appropriate systems of accounting for the political subdivisions of the state, supervise their budgeting systems, and audit their accounts as provided by law. No duty shall be imposed on him by law which is not related to the supervising and auditing of the receipt and expenditure of public funds.

(1974) Held that state auditor's duty to post audit the accounts of the department of revenue does not require or authorize identification of individual tax returns and there is no conflict between the confidentiality statutes and the auditor's constitutional duty. Director of Revenue v. State Auditor (Mo.), 511 S.W.2d 779.

(1997) For purposes of Hancock Amendment, State Auditor's duties include establishing accounting for calculating total state revenues and revenue limit and enforcing such accounting system. Kelly v. Hanson, 959 S.W.2d 107 (Mo.banc).

Secretary of state--duties--state seal--official register--limitation on duties.

Section 14. The secretary of state shall be custodian of the seal of the state, and authenticate therewith all official acts of the governor except the approval of laws. The seal shall be called the "Great Seal of the State of Missouri," and its present emblems and devices shall not be subject to change. He shall keep a register of the official acts of the governor, attest them when necessary, and when required shall lay copies thereof, and of all papers relative thereto, before either house of the general assembly. He shall be custodian of such records, and documents and perform such duties in relation thereto, and in relation to elections and corporations, as provided by law, but no duty shall be imposed on him by law which is not related to his duties as prescribed in this constitution.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, §§ 20, 21.

State treasurer--duties--custody, investment and deposit of state funds--duties limited--nonstate funds to be in custody and invested by department of revenue--nonstate funds defined.

Section 15. The state treasurer shall be custodian of all state funds and funds received from the United States government. The department of revenue shall take custody of and invest nonstate funds as defined herein, and other moneys authorized to be held by the department of revenue. All revenue collected and moneys received by the state which are state funds or funds received from the United States government shall go promptly into the state treasury. All revenue collected and moneys received by the department of revenue which are nonstate funds as defined herein shall be promptly credited to the fund provided by law for that type of money. Immediately upon receipt of state or United States funds the state treasurer shall deposit all moneys in the state treasury in banking institutions selected by him and approved by the governor and state auditor, and he shall hold them for the benefit of the respective funds to which they belong and disburse them as provided by law. Unless otherwise provided by law, all interest received on nonstate funds shall be credited to such funds. The state treasurer shall determine by the exercise of his best judgment the amount of moneys in his custody that are not needed for current expenses and shall place all such moneys on time deposit, bearing interest, in banking institutions in this state selected by the state treasurer and approved by the governor and state auditor or in obligations of the United States government or any agency or instrumentality thereof maturing and becoming payable not more than five years from the date of purchase. In addition the treasurer may enter into repurchase agreements maturing and becoming payable within ninety days secured by United States Treasury obligations or obligations of United States government agencies or instrumentalities of any maturity, as provided by law. The treasurer may also invest in banker's acceptances issued by domestic commercial banks possessing the highest rating issued by a nationally recognized rating agency and in commercial paper issued by domestic corporations which has received the highest rating issued by a nationally recognized rating agency. Investments in banker's acceptances and commercial paper shall mature and become payable not more than one hundred eighty days from the date of purchase, maintain the highest rating throughout the duration of the investment and meet any other requirements provided by law. The state treasurer shall prepare, maintain and adhere to a written investment policy which shall include an asset allocation plan limiting the total amount of state money which may be invested in each investment category authorized by this section. The investment and deposit of state, United States and nonstate funds shall be subject to such restrictions and requirements as may be prescribed by law. Banking institutions in which state and United States funds are deposited by the state treasurer shall give security satisfactory to the governor, state auditor and state treasurer for the safekeeping and payment of the deposits and interest thereon pursuant to deposit agreements made with the state treasurer pursuant to law. No duty shall be imposed on the state treasurer by law which is not related to the receipt, investment, custody and disbursement of state funds and funds received from the United States government. As used in the section, the term "banking institutions" shall include banks, trust companies, savings and loan associations, credit unions, production credit associations authorized by act of the United States Congress, and other financial institutions which are authorized by law to accept funds for deposit or which in the case of production credit associations, issues securities. As used in this section, the term "nonstate funds" shall include all taxes and fees imposed by political subdivisions and collected by the department of revenue; all taxes which are imposed by the state, collected by the department of revenue and distributed by the department of revenue to political subdivisions; and all other moneys which are hereafter designated as "nonstate funds" to be administered by the department of revenue.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 43, Art. X, § 15. (Amended November 6, 1956) (Amended August 5, 1986) (Amended November 3, 1998)

(1973) This section requires state treasurer to hold investments made from state road fund for the benefit of that fund, and includes interest from such investments in view of Art. IV, § 30(b), Constitution of Missouri. State Highway Commission v. Spainhower (Mo.), 504 S.W.2d 121.

Filing of administrative rules and regulations.

Section 16. All rules and regulations of any board or other administrative agency of the executive department, except those relating to its organization and internal management, shall take effect not less than ten days after the filing thereof in the office of the secretary of state.

(1959) In prosecution for violating public service commission rule, procedures whereby rule was adopted held not required to be set forth in information. State v. Graham (A.), 322 S.W.2d 188.

Elective state officers--time of election and terms--limitation on reelection--selection of department heads--removal and qualifications of appointive officers.

Section 17. The governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer and attorney general shall be elected at the presidential elections for terms of four years each. The state auditor shall be elected for a term of two years at the general election in the year 1948, and his successors shall be elected for terms of four years. No person shall be elected governor or treasurer more than twice, and no person who has held the office of governor or treasurer, or acted as governor or treasurer, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected to the office of governor or treasurer shall be elected to the office of governor or treasurer more than once. The heads of all the executive departments shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. All appointive officers may be removed by the governor and shall possess the qualifications required by this constitution or by law.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 2.

(Amended August 17, 1965)

(Amended August 4, 1970)

Election returns--board of state canvassers--time of meeting and duties--requirement for election--tie votes.

Section 18. The returns of every election for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer and attorney general shall be sealed and transmitted by the returning officers to the secretary of state, who shall appoint two disinterested judges of a court of record of the state, and the three shall constitute a board of state canvassers. The board shall meet at the state capitol on, or at the call of the secretary of state before, the second Tuesday of December next after the election and forthwith open and canvass the returns of the votes cast and from the face thereof ascertain and proclaim the result of the election. The persons having the highest number of votes for the respective offices shall be declared elected, and if two or more persons have an equal and the highest number of votes for the same office, at its next regular session the general assembly, by joint vote and without delay, shall choose one of such persons for the office.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 3. (Amended November 7, 1978)

Department personnel--selection and removal--merit system--veterans' preference.

Section 19. The head of each department may select and remove all appointees in the department except as otherwise provided in this constitution, or by law. All employees in the state eleemosynary and penal institutions, and other state employees as provided by law, shall be selected on the basis of merit, ascertained as nearly as practicable by competitive examinations; provided that any honorably discharged member of the armed services of the United States who is a citizen of this state shall have preference in examination and appointment as prescribed by law.

(Amended October 5, 1971)

Location of executive and administrative offices.

Section 20. The executive and administrative officials and departments herein provided for shall establish their principal offices and keep all necessary public records, books and papers at the City of Jefferson.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 1.

Limitation on changes of salaries--fees, costs.

Section 21. The officers named in this article shall receive for their services salaries fixed by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their terms. After the expiration of the terms of those now in office the officers named shall not receive to their own use any fees, costs, perquisites of office or other compensation, and all fees provided by law for any service performed by them shall be paid in advance into the state treasury.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 25.

REVENUE

Department of revenue, duties of--director, appointment of.

Section 22. The department of revenue shall be in charge of a director of revenue appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The department shall have divisions as provided by law. The department shall collect all taxes and fees payable to the state as provided by law.

(Amended November 4, 1958) (Amended August 8, 1972)

(1974) Held that Chap. 296, RSMo, does not violate this section by fixing the powers or duties of a municipal officer of a charter city. City of St. Louis v. Mo. Com'n. on Human Rights (Mo.), 517 S.W.2d 65.

Fiscal year--limitations on appropriations--specification of amount and purpose.

Section 23. The fiscal year of the state and all its agencies shall be the twelve months beginning on the first day of July in each year. The general assembly shall make appropriations for one or two fiscal years, and the sixty-third general assembly shall also make appropriations for the six months ending June 30, 1945. Every appropriation law shall distinctly specify the amount and purpose of the appropriation without reference to any other law to fix the amount or purpose.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. X, § 19.

Governor's budget and recommendations as to revenue.

Section 24. The governor shall, within thirty days after it convenes in each regular session, submit to the general assembly a budget for the ensuing appropriation period, containing the estimated available revenues of the state and a complete and itemized plan of proposed expenditures of the state and all its agencies, together with his recommendations of any laws necessary to provide revenues sufficient to meet the expenditures.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 13.

Limitation of governor's budget on power of appropriations.

Section 25. Until it acts on all the appropriations recommended in the budget, neither house of the general assembly shall pass any appropriation other than emergency appropriations recommended by the governor.

(1975) Held not unconstitutional as violating prohibition against special legislation. Bopp v. Spainhower (Mo.), 519 S.W.2d 281.

Power of partial veto of appropriation bills--procedure--limitations.

Section 26. The governor may object to one or more items or portions of items of appropriation of money in any bill presented to him, while approving other portions of the bill. On signing it he shall append to the bill a statement of the items or portions of items to which he objects and such items or portions shall not take effect. If the general assembly be in session he shall transmit to the house in which the bill originated a copy of the statement, and the items or portions objected to shall be reconsidered separately. If it be not in session he shall transmit the bill within forty-five days to the office of the secretary of state with his approval or reasons for disapproval. The governor shall not reduce any appropriation for free public schools, or for the payment of principal and interest on the public debt.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. V, § 13.

(1973) Words which set out purpose of appropriation bill may not be stricken unless the money therein appropriated is vetoed. State ex rel. Cason v. Bond (Mo.), 495 S.W.2d 385.

(1992) Federally mandated state expenditures for desegregation purposes in the public schools of Kansas City, the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County are state expenditures for free public schools within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution. Such expenditures are part of the funds expended by the state on the public schools, therefore, the Governor did not reduce the total expenditures below the appropriations approved for that purpose. Sikeston R-VI School Dist. v. Ashcroft, 828 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. en banc).

(1992) Constitutional mandate that funds appropriated to the public schools "be distributed according to law" does not mandate expenditures exclusively through the foundation formula. The foundation formula is only one such law and the United States Constitution is another such law which can direct the distribution of state funds to public schools. Sikeston R-VI School Dist. v. Ashcroft, 828 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. en banc).

Power of governor to control rate of and reduce expenditures.

Section 27. The governor may control the rate at which any appropriation is expended during the period of the appropriation by allotment or other means, and may reduce the expenditures of the state or any of its agencies below their appropriations whenever the actual revenues are less than the revenue estimates upon which the appropriations were based.

Budget Reserve Fund established--investment--excess transfer to general revenue, when.

Section 27(a). 1. There is hereby established within the state treasury a fund to be known as the " Budget Reserve Fund". The balances in the cash operating reserve fund and the budget stabilization fund shall be transferred to the budget reserve fund.

2. The commissioner of administration may, throughout any fiscal year, transfer amounts from the budget reserve fund to the general revenue fund or any other state fund without other legislative action if he determines that such amounts are necessary for the cash requirements of this state. Such transfers shall be deemed "cash operating transfers".

3. The commissioner of administration shall transfer from the general revenue fund or other recipient fund to the budget reserve fund an amount equal to the cash operating transfer received by such fund pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, together with the interest that would have been earned on such amount, prior to May sixteenth of the fiscal year in which the transfer was made. No cash operating transfers out of the budget reserve fund may be made after May fifteenth of any fiscal year.

4. Funds in the budget reserve fund shall be invested by the treasurer in the same manner as other state funds are invested. Interest earned on such investments shall be credited to the budget reserve fund. Subject to the provisions of subsection 7 of this section, the unexpended balance in the budget reserve fund at the close of any fiscal year shall remain in the fund.

5. In any fiscal year in which the governor reduces the expenditures of the state or any of its agencies below their appropriations in accordance with section 27 of this article, or in which there is a budget need due to a disaster, as proclaimed by the governor to be an emergency, the general assembly, upon a request by the governor for an emergency appropriation and by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house, may appropriate funds from the budget reserve fund to fulfill the expenditures authorized by any of the existing appropriations which were affected by the governor's decision to reduce expenditures pursuant to section 27 of this article or to meet budget needs due to the disaster. Such expenditures shall be deemed to be for "budget stabilization purposes". The maximum amount which may be appropriated at any one time for such budget stabilization purposes shall be one-half of the sum of the balance in the fund and any amounts appropriated or otherwise owed to the fund, less all amounts owed to the fund for budget stabilization purposes but not yet appropriated for repayment to the fund.

6. One-third of the amount transferred or expended from the budget reserve fund for budget stabilization purposes during any fiscal year, together with interest that would otherwise have been earned on such amount, shall stand appropriated to the budget reserve fund during each of the next three fiscal years, and such amount, and any additional amounts which may be appropriated for that purpose, shall be transferred from the fund which received such transfer to the budget reserve fund by the fifteenth day of the fiscal year for each of the next three fiscal years or until the full amount, plus interest, has been returned to the budget reserve fund. The maximum amount which may be outstanding at any one time and subject to repayment to the budget reserve fund for budget stabilization purposes shall be one-half of the sum of the balance in the fund and all outstanding amounts appropriated or otherwise owed to the fund.

7. If the balance in the budget reserve fund at the close of any fiscal year exceeds seven and one-half percent of the net general revenue collections for the previous fiscal year, the commissioner of administration shall transfer that excess amount to the general revenue fund unless such excess balance is as a result of direct appropriations made by the general assembly for the purpose of increasing the balance of the fund; provided, however, that if the balance in the fund at the close of any fiscal year exceeds ten percent of the net general revenue collections for the previous fiscal year, the commissioner of administration shall transfer the excess amount to the general revenue fund notwithstanding any specific appropriations made to the fund. For purposes of this section, "net general revenue collections" means all revenue deposited into the general revenue fund less refunds and revenues originally deposited into the general revenue fund but designated by law for a specific distribution or transfer to another state fund.

8. If the sum of the ending balance of the budget reserve fund in any fiscal year and any amounts owed to the fund pursuant to subsection 6 of this section is less than seven and one-half percent of the net general revenue collections for the same year, the difference shall stand appropriated and shall be transferred from the general revenue fund to the budget reserve fund by the fifteenth day of the succeeding fiscal year.

(Adopted August 5, 1986)

(Amended November 7, 2000)

Facilities maintenance and review fund created, purpose--state facilities, defined--transfer of moneys into fund, reduction or elimination of transfer by governor.

Section 27(b). 1. The "Facilities Maintenance Reserve Fund" is hereby created in the state treasury for use in maintaining, repairing and renovating state facilities. "State facilities" shall include all improvements to real property owned by the state except real property owned or possessed by the conservation and highways and transportation commissions, including bridges and highways constructed pursuant to article IV, section 29.

2. Beginning July 1, 1997, moneys shall be transferred from the general revenue fund to the facilities maintenance reserve fund. The amount transferred in fiscal year 1998 shall be equal to one-tenth of one percent of net general revenue collections of fiscal year 1997. During each succeeding fiscal year the percentage of the immediately preceding fiscal year's net general revenue collections to be transferred to the facilities maintenance reserve fund shall be increased by one-tenth of one percent, until the total percentage transferred equals one percent of the net general revenue collections for the immediately preceding fiscal year. Each year thereafter one percent of the net general revenue collections for the immediately preceding fiscal year shall be transferred to the facilities maintenance reserve fund; provided, however, that the governor may reduce or eliminate the amount of this transfer during any fiscal year in which he exercised his right to reduce expenditures pursuant to article IV, section 27, or during the next succeeding fiscal year after he exercised such power. The general assembly may also appropriate other moneys to the fund.

3. Moneys in the facilities maintenance reserve fund shall be invested by the state treasurer in the same manner as other state funds are invested. Interest earned on such investments shall be credited to the facilities reserve maintenance fund.

4. The general assembly may appropriate moneys from the fund to be used for maintenance, repair or renovation of state facilities.

(Adopted November 5, 1996)

Facilities maintenance and review fund created, purpose--state facilities, defined--transfer of moneys into fund, reduction or elimination of transfer by governor.

4. The general assembly may appropriate moneys from the fund to be used for maintenance, repair or renovation of state facilities.

(Adopted November 5, 1996)

Treasury withdrawals, how made, certified how--appropriation, period of.

Section 28. No money shall be withdrawn from the state treasury except by warrant drawn in accordance with an appropriation made by law, nor shall any obligation for that payment of money be incurred unless the commissioner of administration certifies it for payment and certifies that the expenditure is within the purpose as directed by the general assembly of the appropriation and that there is in the appropriation an unencumbered balance sufficient to pay it. At the time of issuance each such certification shall be entered on the general accounting books as an encumbrance on the appropriation. No appropriation shall confer authority to incur an obligation after the termination of the fiscal period to which it relates, and every appropriation shall expire six months after the end of the period for which made.

(Amended November 4, 1958) (Amended August 8, 1972)

HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORTATION

Highways and transportation commission--qualifications of members and employees--authority over state highways and other transportation programs.

Section 29. The department of highways and transportation shall be in charge of a highways and transportation commission. The number, qualifications, compensation and terms of the members of the highways and transportation commission shall be fixed by law, and not more than one-half of its members shall be of the same political party. The selection and removal of all employees shall be without regard to political affiliation. The highways and transportation commission shall have authority over all state transportation programs and facilities as provided by law, including, but not limited to, bridges, highways, aviation, railroads, mass transportation, ports, and waterborne commerce, and shall have authority to limit access to, from and across state highways where the public interest and safety may require. The present members of the highway commission shall serve as members of the highways and transportation commission for the remainder of the terms for which they were appointed. All references to the highway commission and the department of highways in this constitution and in the statutes shall mean the highways and transportation commission and the department of highways and transportation.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 44a (Adopted Nov. 6, 1928). (Amended November 6, 1979)

Effective 1-1-80

(1956) Where new roadway as limited access highway was condemned through defendant's land, no easement of access arose and damages for the taking of such easement should not be awarded; but the separation of the land by the limited access road should be considered in determining the damages. State ex rel. Highway Comm. v. Clevenger, 365 Mo. 970, 291 S.W.2d 57.

(1958) Power to limit access to highways is attributable to police power which cannot be contracted away, and contract between city and highway commission to keep certain street in city open held invalid so that property owner in city could not recover for failure of commission to keep street open. Handlan-Buck Co. v. State Highway Comm. (Mo.), 315 S.W.2d 219.

(1959) Court held without jurisdiction to enjoin location of highway through village at site of village on ground that such highway would obstruct village streets. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Elliott (Mo.), 326 S.W.2d 745.

(1963) Promise of state highway commission to construct planned access roads and an overpass in exchange for conveyance by property owner of the land needed for highway purposes did not preclude later abandonment of the plan and condemnation of the necessary land by the state highway commission. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Hammel (Mo.), 372 S.W.2d 852.

(1964) Abutting owners had property right in easement of direct ingress and egress into preexisting conventional highway which, when taken in connection with portion of his land taken in condemnation for construction of limited access highway, entitled him to compensatory damages and fact that owner would have indirect access highway through outer service roadway would be considered only in mitigation of damages. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Brockfeld (A.), 378 S.W.2d 254.

(1968) State highway commission has power to extinguish or limit access of abutting owner and when it accepted deed with access restrictions it was not an ultra vires act and commission was bound by restrictions. Shepherd v. State (Mo.), 427 S.W.2d 382.

(1968) Toll Road Authority Act of the 74th General Assembly which permitted resorting to gas tax money to meet bonding obligations violated constitutional provision for allocation of gas tax money. Pohl v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 431 S.W.2d 99.

(1970) Public Service Commission cannot order State Highway Commission to pay portion of cost of maintenance of overpass used by railroad. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Public Service Commission (A.), 459 S.W.2d 736.

Apportionment of motor vehicle fuel tax--limitation on local fuel taxes.

Section 30(a). 1. On and after the first day of the month next following the adoption of this section, a tax upon or measured by fuel used for propelling highway motor vehicles shall be levied and collected as provided by law. Any amount of the tax collected with respect to fuel not used for propelling highway motor vehicles shall be refunded by the state in the manner provided by law. The remaining net proceeds of the tax, after deducting costs of collection, apportionment and making refunds shall be apportioned between the counties, cities and the state as hereinafter provided and shall stand appropriated without legislative action for the following purposes:

(1) Ten percent of the remaining net proceeds shall be deposited in a special trust fund known as the "County Aid Road Trust Fund". In addition, beginning July 1, 1994, an additional five percent of the remaining net proceeds which is derived from the difference between the amount received from a tax rate equal to the tax rate in effect on March 31, 1992, and the tax rate in effect on and after July 1, 1994, shall also be deposited in the county aid road trust fund, and of such monies generated by the additional five percent, five percent shall be credited solely to cities not within any county in this state. After such credit to cities not within any county, the proceeds in the county aid road trust fund shall be credited to the various counties of the state on the following basis: One-half on the ratio that the county road mileage of each county bears to the county road mileage of the entire state as determined by the last available report of the state highways and transportation commission and one-half on the ratio that the rural land valuation of each county bears to the rural land valuation of the entire state as determined by the last available report of the state tax commission, except that county road mileage in incorporated villages, towns or cities and the land valuation in incorporated villages, towns or cities shall be excluded in such determination, except that, if the assessed valuation of rural lands in any county is less than five million dollars, the county shall be treated as having an assessed valuation of five million dollars. The funds credited to each county shall be used by the county solely for the construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repairs of roads, bridges and highways, and subject to such other provisions and restrictions as provided by law. The monies generated by the additional five percent of the remaining net proceeds which is derived from the difference between the amount received from a tax rate equal to the tax rate in effect on March 31, 1992, and the tax rate in effect on and after July 1, 1994, shall not be used for equipment, machinery, salaries, fringe benefits or capital improvements, other than roads and bridges. In the absence of other controls provided by law, the state highways and transportation commission shall prescribe policy, rules and requirement for the expenditure of these funds by counties, including, among other things, highways and transportation commission approval of plans for projects on which the funds are to be used. In counties having the township form of county organization, the funds credited to such counties shall be expended solely under the control and supervision of the county court, and shall not be expended by the various townships located within such counties. "Rural land" as used in this section shall mean all land located within any county, except land in incorporated villages, towns, or cities.

(2) Fifteen percent of the remaining net proceeds shall be allocated to the various incorporated cities, towns and villages within the state solely for construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, policing, signing, lighting and cleaning roads and streets and for the payment of principal and interest on indebtedness incurred prior to January 1, 1980, on account of road and street purposes, and the use thereof being subject to such other provisions and restrictions as provided by law. The amount apportionable to each city, town or village shall be based on the ratio that the population of the city, town or village bears to the population of all incorporated cities, towns or villages in the state having a like population, as shown by the last federal decennial census, provided that any city, town or village which had a motor fuel tax prior to the adoption of this section shall annually receive not less than an amount equal to the net revenue derived there from in the year 1960; and

(3) All the remaining net proceeds in excess of the allocations to counties, and to cities, towns and villages under this section shall be allocated to the state and shall be disbursed as provided in section 30(a) and (b) of Article IV of this Constitution.

2. The director of revenue of the state shall make the division and apportionment of the funds monthly in the manner required hereby.

3. Except for taxes or licenses which may be imposed uniformly on all merchants or manufacturers based upon sales, or which uniformly apply ad valorem to the stocks of merchants or manufacturers, no political subdivision in this state shall collect any tax, excise, license or fee upon, measured by or with respect to the importation, receipt, manufacture, storage, transportation, sale or use, on or after the first day of the month next following the adoption of this section of fuel used for propelling motor vehicles, unless the tax, excise, license or fee is approved by a vote of the people of any city, town or village subsequent to the adoption of this section, by a two-thirds majority. All funds collected shall be used solely for construction, reconstruction, maintenance, repair, policing, signing, lighting, and cleaning roads and streets and for the payment of principal and interest on indebtedness incurred prior to January 1, 1980, on account of road and street purposes.

4. Beginning on July 1, 1993, the net proceeds of fuel taxes allocated under this section to counties and to cities, towns and villages shall not be included within the definition of "total state revenues" in section 17 of article X of this constitution.

(Adopted March 6, 1962) (Amended November 6, 1979) (Amended August 4, 1992)

Effective 9-3-92

CROSS REFERENCE: Federal census results to be used for distribution of revenue, when, RSMo 66.351

Source and application of state road fund and state transportation fund.

Section 30(b). 1. For the purpose of constructing and maintaining an adequate system of connected state highways all state revenue derived from highway users as an incident to their use or right to use the highways of the state, including all state license fees and taxes upon motor vehicles, trailers and motor vehicle fuels, and upon, with respect to, or on the privilege of the manufacture, receipt, storage, distribution, sale or use thereof (excepting the sales tax on motor vehicles and trailers, except as hereinafter provided, and all property taxes), less the cost (1) of collection thereof, (2) of maintaining the highway related activities of the highways and transportation commission and department including any workers' compensation and retirement programs, (3) and of administering and enforcing any state motor vehicle laws or traffic regulations, and less refunds and that portion of the fuel tax revenue to be allocated to counties and to cities, towns and villages under section 30(a) of Article IV of this Constitution, shall be credited to the state road fund and stand appropriated without legislative action for the following purposes, and no other:

First, to the payment of the principal and interest on any outstanding state road bonds.

Second, any balance in excess of the amount necessary to meet the payment of the principal and interest of any state road bonds for the next succeeding twelve months shall be credited to the state road fund and shall be expended under the supervision and direction of the commission for the following purposes:

(1) To complete and widen or otherwise improve and maintain the state system of highways heretofore designated and laid out under existing laws;

(2) To reimburse the various counties and other political subdivisions of the state, except incorporated cities and towns, for money expended by them in the construction or acquisition of roads and bridges now or hereafter taken over by the state as permanent parts of the system of state highways, to the extent of the value to the state of such roads and bridges at the time taken over, not exceeding in any case the amount expended by such counties and subdivisions in the construction or acquisition of such roads and bridges, except that the highways and transportation commission may, in its discretion, repay, or agree to repay, any cash advanced by a county or subdivision to expedite state road construction or improvement;

(3) In the discretion of the commission to locate, relocate, establish, acquire, construct and maintain the following:

(a) supplementary state highways and bridges in each county of the state as hereinafter provided;

(b) state highways and bridges in, to and through state parks, public areas and reservations, and state institutions now or hereafter established, and connect the same with the state highways; and also national, state or local parkways, travel ways, tour ways, with coordinated facilities;

(c) any tunnel or interstate bridge or part thereof, where necessary to connect the state highways of this state with those of other states;

(d) any highway within the state when necessary to comply with any federal law or requirement which is or shall become a condition to the receipt of federal funds;

(e) any highway in any city or town which is found necessary as a continuation of any state or federal highway, or any connection therewith, into and through such city or town; and

(f) additional state highways, bridges and tunnels, outside the corporate limits of cities having a population in excess of one hundred fifty thousand, either in congested traffic areas of the state or where needed to facilitate and expedite the movement of through traffic.

(4) To acquire materials, equipment and buildings necessary for the purposes herein described; and

(5) For such other purposes and contingencies relating and appertaining to the construction and maintenance of such highways and bridges as the highways and transportation commission may deem necessary and proper.

2. One-half of the proceeds from the state sales tax on all motor vehicles, trailers, motorcycles, mopeds and motor tricycles shall be dedicated for highway and transportation use and shall be distributed as follows: ten percent to the counties, fifteen percent to the cities, one percent to the state transportation fund, which is hereby created to be used in a manner provided by law and seventy-four percent to the state road fund. The amounts distributed shall be allocated as provided in section 30(a) of this article, to be used for highway and transportation purposes.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1 of this section, any increase in state license fees and taxes on motor vehicles, trailers, motorcycles, mopeds and motor tricycles over and above those in effect upon adoption of this section shall be distributed as follows: ten percent to the counties, fifteen percent to the cities and seventy-five to the state road fund. The amounts distributed shall be allocated as provided in section 30(a) of this article, to be used for highway and transportation purposes.

(Adopted March 6, 1962) (Amended November 6, 1979)

Effective 1-1-80

(1968) Toll road authority act of the 74th General Assembly which permitted resorting to gas tax money to meet bonding obligations violated constitutional provision for allocation of gas tax money. Pohl v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 431 S.W.2d 99.

(1972) Subdivision (5) of this section does not empower the State Highway Commission to provide rest areas abutting state routes. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Pinkley (A.), 474 S.W.2d 46.

(1973) Held, this provision requires interest or income from state road fund to be credited to such fund and not diverted to general revenue or any purpose other than state highway purposes. State Highway Commission v. Spainhower (Mo.), 504 S.W.2d 121.

(1984) Fees collected by motor vehicle unit of Dept. of Revenue for copies of motor vehicle records made pursuant to section 109.190, RSMo, are "revenue derived from state highway users" and as such are to be credited to state road fund. State Highways and Transportation Commission of Missouri v. Director, Department of Revenue (Mo. banc), 672 S.W.2d 953.

(1992) Logo signs along highway rights-of-way, announcing availability of purveyors of food, fuel and lodging at highway exits constitute an improvement to the highways and the initial use of highway funds, whether reimbursed or not, does not transgress constitutional restrictions. Missouri Outdoor Advertising Association, Inc. v. Missouri State Highways and Transportation Commission, 826 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. en banc).

(1994) Expenditure of state road fund for mitigation plan required by federal Pipeline Safety Act is appropriate expenditure as it relates and appertains to the construction of Page Avenue Extension of state highway. DeMere v. Missouri State Highway and Transportation Commission, 876 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App. W.D.).

Transportation programs and facilities, administration of by commission.

Section 30(c). The highways and transportation commission shall have authority to locate, relocate, establish, acquire, construct, maintain, control, and as provided by law to operate, develop or fund public facilities as part of any state transportation program such as but not limited to aviation, mass transportation, railroads, ports, and waterborne commerce, provided that funds other than those designated for highway purposes in this constitution are made available for such purposes.

(Adopted November 6, 1979)

Effective 1-1-80

State highways in municipalities.

Section 31. Any state highway authorized herein to be located in any municipality may be constructed without limitations concerning the distance between houses or other buildings abutting such highway or concerning the width or type of construction. The commission may enter into contracts with cities, counties or other political subdivisions for and concerning the maintenance of, and regulation of traffic on any state highway within such cities, counties or subdivision.

(1971) State highway commission had authority to contract with special road district whereby district agreed to maintain roadway although § 31 of Art. IV, Constitution 1945, was not in effect at time easement for roadway was granted in 1934. The legality of the conveyance of easement is determined by laws existing at time of conveyance but the authority granted by § 31 of Art. IV may be exercised by the commission regardless of when easement was acquired. Floreth v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 472 S.W.2d 614.

Apportionment of funds for supplementary state highways.

Section 32. The funds which are allotted by the commission to the construction or acquisition of supplementary state highways and bridges in each of the counties of the state shall be apportioned to the several counties as follows: One-fourth in the ratio that the area of each county bears to the area of the state, one-fourth in the ratio of the population, and two-fourths on such basis as the commission may deem to be for the best interest of highway users; provided the areas and population of cities having a population of 150,000 or more shall not be considered in making such apportionment, and the latest available United States decennial census shall be used; provided further, that if traffic on any supplementary state highway becomes such that a higher type than ordinary supplementary highway construction shall be required, then the commission may construct such higher type and charge such extra cost to unallotted state highway funds. Supplementary state highways shall be selected by mutual agreement of the commission and the local officials having charge of or jurisdiction over roads in the territory through which such supplementary state highways are to be constructed.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 44a (as adopted Nov. 6, 1928)

Retirement benefits not changed.

Section 33. Any transfer of employees made pursuant to the provisions of this article shall not affect or abridge any rights or benefits accrued under any retirement system in which such employees are members on the effective date of this article, and the employees may continue coverage under such retirement system until otherwise provided by law.

(Adopted November 6, 1979)

Effective 1-1-80

*This section has no continuity with § 33, amended August 8, 1972, and repealed by HJR 39, 40, 44 & 48, adopted November 6, 1979.

Recognition of outstanding bonds--determination, certification and collection of annual state highway bond tax.

Section 34. All bonds issued under or recognized by section 44a of article IV of the previous constitution, which remains unpaid shall be valid obligations of the state and shall be paid according to the tenor thereof. On or before the first day of July of each year the state auditor shall determine the rate of taxation for that year necessary to raise the amount of money needed to pay the principal and interest maturing in the next succeeding year, taking into consideration available funds, delinquencies and the cost of collection. The auditor shall annually certify the rate of taxation so determined to the officer in each county whose duty it is to make up and certify the tax books wherein are extended the state taxes. Said officers shall extend upon the tax books the taxes to be collected and certify the same to the collector of revenue of their respective counties, who shall collect such taxes at the same time and in the same manner and by the same means as are provided by law for the collection of state and county taxes, and pay the same into the state treasury.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. IV, § 44a (as adopted in 1928).

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture, department of--director, how appointed--funds to be provided, how.

Section 35. The department of agriculture shall be in charge of a director appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The general assembly shall provide the department of agriculture with funds adequate for administration of its functions; and shall enact such laws and provide such other appropriations as may be required to protect, foster and develop the agricultural resources of the state.

(Amended August 8, 1972)

Forestry and forest fires.

Section 36. The general assembly may enact laws to encourage forestry, and prevent and suppress forest fires on private lands.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Economic development, department of--duties of department--director, how appointed.

Section 36(a). The department of economic development shall be in charge of a director appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The department shall administer all programs provided by law relating to the promotion of the economy of the state, the economic development of the state, trade and business, and other activities and programs impacting on the economy of the state.

(Adopted August 8, 1972) (Amended August 7, 1984)

INSURANCE

Department of insurance, established--director, appointment--office of consumer affairs to be established within department, duties.

Section 36(b). The department of insurance shall be headed by a director of the department of insurance who shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. The organization and duties of the department of insurance shall be determined by law. All references to the division of insurance and the insurance division in this constitution and in the statutes shall mean the department of insurance. There shall be an office of consumer affairs within the department of insurance to investigate in conjunction with other personnel of the department all allegations of unfair or unlawful acts by any person or entity whose activities are regulated by the department of insurance.

(Adopted August 7, 1990)

SOCIAL SERVICES

Social services, department of--duties of department--director, how appointed.

Section 37. The health and general welfare of the people are matters of primary public concern; and to secure them there shall be established a department of social services in charge of a director appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, charged with promoting improved health and other social services to the citizens of the state as provided by law, and the general assembly may grant power with respect thereto to counties, cities or other political subdivisions of the state.

(Amended August 8, 1972)

MENTAL HEALTH

Mental health, department of--duties of department--director, how appointed.

Section 37(a). The department of mental health shall be in charge of a director who shall be appointed by the commission, as provided by law, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The department shall provide treatment, care, education and training for persons suffering from mental illness or retardation, shall have administrative control of the state hospitals and other institutions and centers established for these purposes and shall administer such other programs as provided by law.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

Cooperation with federal and other state governments.

Section 39. In all matters of public welfare the general assembly may provide by law for cooperation with the United States, or other states.

CONSERVATION

Conservation commission, members, qualifications, terms, how appointed--duties of commission--expenses of members.

Section 40(a). The control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the state, including hatcheries, sanctuaries, refuges, reservations and all other property owned, acquired or used for such purposes and the acquisition and establishment thereof, and the administration of all laws pertaining thereto, shall be vested in a conservation commission consisting of four members appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, not more than two of whom shall be of the same political party. The members shall have knowledge of and interest in wildlife conservation. The members shall hold office for terms of six years beginning on the first day of July of consecutive odd years. Two of the terms shall be concurrent; one shall begin two years before and one two years after the concurrent terms. If the governor fails to fill a vacancy within thirty days, the remaining members shall fill the vacancy for the unexpired term. The members shall receive no salary or other compensation for their services as members, but shall receive their necessary traveling and other expenses incurred while actually engaged in the discharge of their official duties.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIV, § 16 (as adopted November 3, 1936)

(Amended August 8, 1972)

Incumbent members.

Section 40(b). The members of the present conservation commission shall serve out the terms for which they were appointed, with all their powers and duties.

Acquisition of property--eminent domain.

Section 41. The commission may acquire by purchase, gift, eminent domain, or otherwise, all property necessary, useful or convenient for its purposes, and shall exercise the right of eminent domain as provided by law for the highway commission.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIV, § 16.

Director of conservation and personnel of commission.

Section 42. The commission shall appoint a director of conservation who, with its approval, shall appoint the assistants and other employees deemed necessary by the commission. The commission shall fix the qualifications and salaries of the director and all appointees and employees, and none of its members shall be an appointee or employee.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIV, § 16.

Sales tax, use for conservation purposes.

Section 43(a). For the purpose of providing additional moneys to be expended and used by the conservation commission, department of conservation, for the control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and wildlife resources of the state, including the purchase or other acquisition of property for said purposes, and for the administration of the laws pertaining thereto, an additional sales tax of one-eighth of one percent is hereby levied and imposed upon all sellers for the privilege of selling tangible personal property or rendering taxable services at retail in this state upon the sales and services which now are or hereafter are listed and set forth in, and, except as to the amount of tax, subject to the provisions of and to be collected as provided in the "Sales Tax Law" and subject to the rules and regulations promulgated in connection therewith; and an additional use tax of one-eighth of one percent is levied and imposed for the privilege of storing, using or consuming within this state any article of tangible personal property as set forth and provided in the "Compensating Use Tax Law" and, except as to the amount of the tax, subject to the provisions of and to be collected as provided in the "Compensating Use Tax Law" and subject to the rules and regulations promulgated in connection therewith.

(Adopted November 2, 1976)

Use of revenue and funds of conservation commission.

Section 43(b). The moneys arising from the additional sales and use taxes provided for in section 43(a) hereof and all fees, moneys or funds arising from the operation and transactions of the conservation commission, department of conservation, and from the application and the administration of the laws and regulations pertaining to the bird, fish, game, forestry and wildlife resources of the state and from the sale of property used for said purposes, shall be expended and used by the conservation commission, department of conservation, for the control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of the bird, fish, game, forestry and wildlife resources of the state, including the purchase or other acquisition of property for said purposes, and for the administration of the laws pertaining thereto, and for no other purpose. The moneys and funds of the conservation commission arising from the additional sales and use taxes provided for in 43(a) hereof shall also be used by the conservation commission, department of conservation, to make payments to counties for the unimproved value of land for distribution to the appropriate political subdivisions as payment in lieu of real property taxes for privately owned land acquired by the commission after July 1, 1977 and for land classified as forest cropland in the forest cropland program administered by the department of conservation in such amounts as may be determined by the conservation commission, but in no event shall the amount determined be less than the property tax being paid at the time of purchase of acquired lands.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIV, § 16.

(Amended November 2, 1976) (Amended November 4, 1980)

Effective date--self-enforceability.

Section 43(c). The effective date of this amendment shall be July 1, 1977. All laws inconsistent with this amendment shall no longer remain in full force and effect after July 1, 1977. All of the provisions of sections 43(a)-(c) shall be self-enforcing except that the general assembly shall adjust brackets for the collection of the sales and use taxes.

(Adopted November 2, 1976)

*This amendment contained §§ 43(a), 43(b) and 43(c).

Self-enforceability--enabling clause--repealing clause.

Section 44. Sections 40-43, inclusive, of this article shall be self-enforcing, and laws not inconsistent therewith may be enacted in aid thereof. All existing laws inconsistent with this article shall no longer remain in force or effect.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. XIV, § 16.

Rules and regulations--filing--review.

Section 45. The rules and regulations of the commission not relating to its organization and internal management shall become effective not less than ten days after being filed with the secretary of state as provided in section 16 of this article, and such final rules and regulations affecting private rights as are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature shall be subject to the judicial review provided in section 22 of article V.

Distribution of rules and regulations.

Section 46. The commission shall supply to all persons on request, printed copies of its rules and regulations not relating to organization or internal management.

NATURAL RESOURCES

Natural resources, department of--duties of department--director, how appointed.

Section 47. The department of natural resources shall be in charge of a director appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The department shall administer the programs of the state as provided by law relating to environmental control and the conservation and management of natural resources.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

Sales and use tax levied for soil and water conservation and for state parks--distribution of parks sales tax fund to counties, purpose, limitation.

Section 47(a). For the purpose of providing additional monies to be expended and used by the department of natural resources through the state soil and water districts commission as defined in Section 278.070, RSMo, for the saving of the soil and water of this state for the conservation of the productive power of Missouri agricultural land, and by the department of natural resources through the division responsible for the State park system for the acquisition, development, maintenance and operation of state parks and state historic sites in accordance with Chapter 253, RSMo, and for the administration of the laws pertaining thereto, an additional sales tax of one-tenth of one percent is hereby levied and imposed upon all sellers for the privilege of selling tangible personal property or rendering taxable services at retail in this state upon the sales and services which now are or hereafter are listed and set forth in, and, except as to the amount of tax, subject to the provisions of and to be collected as provided in the "Sales Tax Law" and subject to the rules and regulations promulgated in connection therewith; and an additional use tax of one-tenth of one percent is levied and imposed for the privilege of storing, using or consuming within this state any article of tangible personal property as set forth and provided in the "Compensating Use Tax Law" and, except as to the amount of the tax, subject to the provisions of and to be collected as provided in the "Compensating Use Tax Law" and subject to the rules and regulations promulgated in connection therewith. In addition, monies deposited in the state parks sales tax fund pursuant to the provisions of section 47(b) of this article shall also be appropriated to make payments to counties for a period of five years for the unimproved value of land for distribution to the appropriate political subdivisions as payment in lieu of real property taxes for privately owned land acquired by the department of natural resources for park purposes after July 1, 1985, in such amounts as determined by appropriation, but in no event shall such amounts be more than the amount of property tax imposed by political subdivisions at the time the department acquired or acquires such land.

(Adopted August 7, 1984) (Amended November 8, 1988) (Amended November 8, 1994) (Amended November 5, 1996) Effective 11-8-1998 Expires 11-8-2008

Disbursement of revenue, purposes.

Section 47(b). Fifty percent of the monies arising from the additional sales and use taxes provided for in Section 47(a) hereof shall be deposited in the Soil and Water Sales Tax Fund and fifty percent shall be deposited in the State Park Sales Tax Fund, and the monies in both funds shall be expended pursuant to appropriation by the General Assembly and used by the state soil and water districts commission and the department of natural resources for the purposes set forth in Section 47(a), and for no other purpose.

(Adopted August 7, 1984) (Amended November 8, 1988) (Amended November 5, 1996) Effective 11-8-1998 Expires 11-8-2008

Provisions self-enforcing, exception--not part of general revenue or expense of state--effective and expiration dates.

Section 47(c). The effective date of this amendment shall be November 8, 1998. All laws inconsistent with this amendment shall no longer remain in full force and effect after the effective date of this section. All of the provisions of Sections 47(a), 47(b) and 47(c) shall be self-enforcing except that the General Assembly shall adjust brackets for the collection of the sales and use taxes. The additional revenue provided by Sections 47(a), 47(b) and 47(c) shall not be part of the "total state revenue" within the meaning of Sections 17 and 18 of Article X of this Constitution. The expenditure of this additional revenue shall not be an "expense of state government" under Section 20 of Article X of this Constitution. This Section 47(a), 47(b) and 47(c) shall terminate after ten years following the effective date of this amendment.

(Adopted August 7, 1984) (Amended November 8, 1988) (Amended November 5, 1996) Effective 11-8-1998 Expires 11-8-2008

PUBLIC SAFETY

Public safety, department of--duties of department--director, how appointed.

Section 48. The department of public safety shall be in charge of a director to be appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and shall administer the programs provided by law to protect and safeguard the lives and property of the people of the state.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Labor and industrial relations, department of--duties--commission members, how appointed, terms, qualifications.

Section 49. The department of labor and industrial relations shall be in charge of a "Labor and Industrial Relations Commission" consisting of three members appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. One member of the commission shall be a person who, on account of his previous vocation, employment, affiliation or interests shall be classified as a representative of employers, and one member who, on account of his previous vocation, employment, affiliation or interests shall be classified as a representative of employees, and one member, who, by reason of his previous activities and interests shall be classified as a representative of the public and who is licensed to practice law in the state of Missouri; except that not more than two members of the commission shall be of the same political party. A member of the commission shall be designated by the governor as the chairman. The labor and industrial commission shall be the successor to the industrial commission and the terms of members shall be as provided by law for the industrial commission. The department shall also administer the programs of the state relating to the protection and improvement of human rights.

(Adopted August 8, 1972) (Amended August 7, 1984)

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION

Administration, office of--commissioner, how appointed.

Section 50. The office of administration shall be in charge of a commissioner of administration. The commissioner shall be appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEADS

Appointments, how made--failure to confirm, effect of.

Section 51. The appointment of all members of administrative boards and commissions and of all department and division heads, as provided by law, shall be made by the governor. All members of administrative boards and commissions, all department and division heads and all other officials appointed by the governor shall be made only by and with the advice and consent of the senate. The authority to act of any person whose appointment requires the advice and consent of the senate shall commence, if the senate is in session, upon receiving the advice and consent of the senate. If the senate is not in session, the authority to act shall commence immediately upon appointment by the governor but shall terminate if the advice and consent of the senate is not given within thirty days after the senate has convened in regular or special session. If the senate fails to give its advice and consent to any appointee, that person shall not be reappointed by the governor to the same office or position.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

HIGHER EDUCATION

Higher education, department of established--coordinating board for higher education established, members, terms, qualifications.

Section 52. There shall be established a department of higher education. A "Coordinating Board for Higher Education" which shall consist of nine members appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate shall be established within the department. The qualifications and terms of the members of the board shall be fixed by law, but not more than five of its members shall be of the same political party. The coordinating board shall succeed the commission on higher education with all its powers and duties and shall have such other powers and duties as may be prescribed by law.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

NONDISCRIMINATION IN APPOINTMENTS

Discrimination as to race, creed, color or national origin prohibited.

Section 53. The appointment of all members of administrative boards and commissions and of all departments and division heads and all the employees thereof shall be made without regard to race, creed, color or national origin.

(Adopted August 8, 1972)

Article V
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as prescribed by law, and circuit courts.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. VI, §§ 1, 12; Amdt. of 1884, §§ 2, 3; Sch. of 1875, §§ 4, 5.

(Amended August 4, 1970) (Amended August 3, 1976)

Supreme court--controlling decisions--number of judges--sessions.

Section 2. The supreme court shall be the highest court in the state. Its jurisdiction shall be coextensive with the state. Its decisions shall be controlling in all other courts. It shall be composed of seven judges, who shall hold their sessions in Jefferson City at times fixed by the court.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. VI, §§ 2, 9; Amdt. of 1884, § 6; Amdt. of 1890, § 1.

Jurisdiction of the supreme court.

Section 3. The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, or of a statute or provision of the constitution of this state, the construction of the revenue laws of this state, the title to any state office and in all cases where the punishment imposed is death. The court of appeals shall have general appellate jurisdiction in all cases except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court.

Source: Const. of 1875, Art. VI, § 12; Amdt. of 1884, §§ 3, 5.

(Amended August 4, 1970)

(Amended August 3, 1976)

(Amended November 2, 1982)

In General

(1957) On appeal from judgment in condemnation action, supreme court has no jurisdiction to appoint commissioner to take evidence as to facts reducing damages which occurred after judgment nisi. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Dockery (Mo.), 300 S.W.2d 444.

(1957) In appeal from judgment enjoining appropriation and use of trade secrets and ordering accounting, where the accounting feature was not before the court, there was no question of which the Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Engel Sheet Met. Co. v. Shewman (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 434.

(1960) Appeal in declaratory judgment action for ruling as to whether certain practices constituted the practice of law, held not within jurisdiction of Supreme Court. Automobile Club of Mo. v. Hoffmeister (Mo.), 332 S.W.2d 957.

(1961) Where issue of whether appellants, by reason of their petition for review of administrative board's decision in proceeding where they appeared as witnesses, were entitled to judicial review under administrative procedure act was to be determined before necessity of ruling on constitutional question arose, the supreme court would transfer case to court of appeals. Clay & Bailey Mfg. Co. v. Anderson (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 46.

(1961) Denial of continuance or stay of proceedings on claim based on the federal Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act did not present a federal question within the constitutional provision fixing jurisdiction. Salzwedel v. Vassil (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 218.

(1975) In incompetence proceeding jury found alleged incompetent to be competent, judge granted new trial and alleged incompetent appealed, among other things challenging constitutionality of § 475.355, although from time of trial appellant had been under no restraint. Court held that since habeas corpus would be immediately available to anyone believed to be unconstitutionally restrained, public importance of determining issue was not such as to vest supreme court with jurisdiction and immediate controversy had become moot. Appeal transferred to court of appeals. Motion for rehearing or to transfer to court en banc denied. In re Brown (Mo.), 518 S.W.2d 518.

Constitutional Questions

(1952) In order to raise an issue involving a construction of the constitution, the section which has been violated must be designated and the facts constituting such violation must be narrated. Averments of a general nature or legal conclusions do not present an issue involving construction of the constitution, federal or state, so as to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court. State ex rel. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (Mo.), 248 S.W.2d 592.

(1952) Where petition did not allege statute was unconstitutional, but court found that statute did not relieve defendant of liability for negligence, and if it purported so to do it was invalid, supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal on ground that constitutional question was involved. Cotton v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 363 Mo. 400, 251 S.W.2d 246.

(1952) Constitutional questions held not preserved in mandamus action so as to vest jurisdiction of appeal therein in supreme court and prosecuting attorney held not state officer under constitutional provision because his duties are not coextensive with state. State ex rel. Kirks v. Allen (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 348.

(1952) Appeal from judgment sustaining order of city board of adjustment revoking permit authorizing building alterations in certain property did not present constitutional issue where law and ordinance authorizing action were conceded to be valid and objection to procedure was not timely made. Veal v. Leinkuehler (A.), 249 S.W.2d 491, 344 U.S. 913.

(1952) In action for injunction and for damages for razing building which was being done under contract with city, where plaintiff's cause depended upon the constitutional invalidity of a city ordinance under which such contract was made, the supreme court had jurisdiction. Cirese v. Spitcaufsky (A.), 253 S.W.2d 512.

(1953) An allegation that a statute would be unconstitutional if construed in a certain manner does not constitute such a direct challenge to the statute as to raise a constitutional question so as to give supreme court appellate jurisdiction. Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Brandstetter, 363 Mo. 904, 254 S.W.2d 636.

(1953) Where adverse ruling on constitutional question was not assigned as error in motion for new trial, appeal did not involve construction of constitution. Cirese v. Spitcaufsky (Mo.), 259 S.W.2d 836.

(1953) Where petition challenging validity of election to form reorganized school district, alleged failure to comply with statutes requiring a secret ballot and motion for new trial claimed decision was violative of constitutional guarantee of secret ballot, appeal did not require construction of constitution. Nelson v. Watkinson (Mo.), 260 S.W.2d 1.

(1953) Where petition was based in part on the alleged unconstitutionality of a city ordinance and court sustained motion for judgment on pleadings, supreme court had no jurisdiction of appeal in absence of record showing that judgment was based on such invalidity. Ingle v. City of Fulton (Mo.), 260 S.W.2d 666.

(1953) Where record fails to show that trial court did, in fact, pass on constitutional question, supreme court has no jurisdiction. State ex rel. Barnett v. Sappington (Mo.), 260 S.W.2d 670.

(1953) Where plaintiff asserted that statute would violate his constitutional rights if trial court's construction prevailed, no constitutional question was raised. Knight v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. (Mo.), 260 S.W.2d 673.

(1954) The four requirements for the raising of constitutional question are: (1) It must be raised at the first opportunity; (2) the constitutional provision alleged to be violated must be specifically designated or quoted; (3) facts showing violation of the provision must be stated, and (4) the constitutional question must be preserved throughout for review. State ex rel. Thompson v. Roberts (Mo.), 264 S.W.2d 314; (1954) State v. Harold (Mo.), 271 S.W.2d 527.

(1954) Where defendant questioned validity of statute on ground it contravened "due process clause" of the state and federal constitutions, the constitutional question was preserved so as to give supreme court jurisdiction. State v. Becker (A.), 268 S.W.2d 51.

(1954) Constitutionality of statute may be ruled by supreme court even though validity is not challenged, when public interest is involved. State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72; (1954) Harris v. Bates (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 763.

(1954) A claim of violation of a constitutional right must be substantial and not merely colorable in order to vest jurisdiction in the supreme court. State v. Egan (A.), 272 S.W.2d 719.

(1954) Where questions of constitutionality of statutes were first raised in motion for new trial, they were not raised at earliest opportunity and so did not present case involving the construction of the constitution. McClard v. Morrison (Mo.), 273 S.W.2d 225.

(1955) Where motion to suppress evidence on ground of illegal search and seizure stated that same were made without warrant, not as an incident to an arrest and without consent of defendant and that officers had no reasonable ground to believe defendant guilty of felony, but did not mention state or federal constitution, it raised no constitutional issue. State v. Bray (A.), 278 S.W.2d 49.

(1955) Where appellants sought a construction of constitutional provision, Supreme Court had jurisdiction even though court found it unnecessary to pass on constitutional question. Haley v. Harjul, Inc. (Mo.), 281 S.W.2d 832.

(1956) In suit to enjoin picketing by labor union, where defendants contended injunction violated free speech provision of federal constitution, construction of United States Constitution was involved and supreme court had jurisdiction. Heath v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union No. 170, 365 Mo. 934, 290 S.W.2d 152.

(1956) Where motion for new trial failed to mention any constitutional question, such questions were waived and cannot be urged on appeal. Deacon v. City of Ladue (A.), 294 S.W.2d 616.

(1956) The supreme court had jurisdiction of appeal from action of trial court sustaining motion to quash summons and return of service thereon where defendant was foreign corporation and service was made on the president in this state as the appeal presented constitutional question involving due process under the federal and state constitutions. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co. (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d 88.

(1957) Contention on appeal that trial court "legislated" instead of interpreting statute does not raise constitutional question. Swenson v. Swenson (Mo.), 299 S.W.2d 523.

(1957) Where appellant claimed that effect of judgment was to delegate power to tax to administrative agency in violation of constitution, no question of construction of constitution was involved. E.B. Jones Motor Co. v. Indust. Comm. (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 407.

(1957) Where constitutional question was raised and kept open at time appeal was taken, supreme court had jurisdiction although the constitutional question was determined in another case while appeal was pending. Hoerath v. Sloan's Mvg. & Storage Co. (Mo.), 305 S.W.2d 418.

(1958) Where trial court in action to review order of zoning board refused to dismiss action because not timely filed, but after review, affirmed order, an attack on statute fixing time for filing review did not raise constitutional question, nor was one raised where real question involved whether order was supported by evidence. Cohen v. Ennis (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 669.

(1958) Where fundamental issue tried by parties was whether picketing of employer's plant was unlawful because it was designed to force employer to coerce its salesmen into joining union, in violation of § 29, Art. I of the constitution, a question of construction of the constitution was not involved since that issue has been settled by prior adjudications. Swift & Co. v. Doe (Mo.), 311 S.W.2d 15.

(1958) Supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from decision that consolidated school district, in constructing school building, need not comply with ordinances of fire protection district on basis of contention that opposite construction of statutes would infringe upon the school district's constitutional authority to establish and maintain schools, particularly since one who raised the constitutional question was not injured by the ruling. Community Fire Protection Dist. v. Board of Education (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 75.

(1958) Where constitutional validity of reciprocity agreements was challenged in prosecution for violation of motor vehicle licensing law, the supreme court did not have jurisdiction on ground constitutional guaranty against impairment of contract was involved, since the law on which prosecution was based was in effect prior to reciprocity agreement. State v. Laurisden (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 140.

(1958) Rule that supreme court will not assume jurisdiction on constitutional grounds when the identical question has been finally settled by prior decisions of the supreme court does not apply to appeals involving the question of unlawful search and seizure as every such appeal involves a construction of the constitution in the light of the facts in the particular case. State v. Harris (A.), 313 S.W.2d 219.

(1958) Where supreme court transferred cause to court of appeals which determined that evidence did not support circuit court's affirmance of board's grant of application to use vacant lots in residential zone for truck turn-around and driveway for bakery but respondents had contended that board's determination was final since appeal was not filed within thirty days, appellant's contention that § 89.110 was unconstitutional became an issue and necessitated retransfer of cause to supreme court. Cohen v. Ennis (A.), 314 S.W.2d 239.

(1958) Action for declaratory judgment to establish the general election laws control city primary elections and that action of party committee fixing hours of voting and number of polling places was void, did not present a constitutional question. Shaver v. Moyer (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 414.

(1959) Proceedings by municipalities against violators of ordinances are regarded as civil actions to recover a debt or penalty, so that a contention on appeal from a conviction of a violation of a city ordinance that the person was not afforded an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him does not raise a constitutional question within the jurisdiction of the supreme court. City of Webster Groves v. Quick (Mo.), 319 S.W.2d 543.

(1959) Where sole question in case was whether or not search of defendant's person was incident to a lawful arrest, it being conceded that if it was not unlawful, no constitutional question was involved. State v. Harris (Mo.), 321 S.W.2d 468.

(1959) Where points raised in brief to court did not specify any constitutional questions, such questions are deemed abandoned, and case does not involve such questions so as to give supreme court jurisdiction. State v. Brookshire (Mo.), 325 S.W.2d 497.

(1959) Where constitutional question as to right of jury trial was not raised until six months after motion for jury trial (which was waived by failure to comply with court rules) was denied, held not to involve constitutional question. Securities Acceptance Corp. v. Hill (Mo.), 326 S.W.2d 65.

(1959) Where declaratory judgment authorizing city to annex land was denied on ground land was not in "unincorporated area" since it was in county which had adopted a charter under § 18 of Article VI of Constitution, case involved construction of constitution. City of Olivette v. Graeler (A.), 329 S.W.2d 275.

(1960) Challenge to order of state Public Service Commission granting certificate of convenience, etc., to construct power line on ground order violated constitution held not to raise constitutional question where statutes under which order was admittedly made were not attacked. State ex rel. Harline v. Pub. Serv. Comm. (Mo.), 332 S.W.2d 940.

(1960) Where a case involving constitutional issues was originally appealed to the supreme court and the supreme court had jurisdiction because of the existence of constitutional questions, a subsequent motion to dissolve the injunction and vacate the judgment in the prior case was also in the jurisdiction of the supreme court notwithstanding no constitutional issues were involved in the motion. Adams Dairy Co. v. Dairy Employees Union, Local 207 (Mo.), 339 S.W.2d 811.

(1960) In action to review decision of industrial commission on unemployment compensation question, where petition for review did not raise constitutional question, nor was it raised in any motion or other pleading filed in the court, although argued in the trial court, it was not sufficiently preserved for review and therefore the supreme court had no jurisdiction. Record Newspaper Co. v. Industrial Commission (Mo.), 340 S.W.2d 613.

(1960) Where constitutional question which, if present at all, was present from outset was not raised until motion for new trial and was not adequately covered by brief of appellant on appeal, it was not properly presented and preserved so as to invoke exclusive jurisdiction of supreme court. Sheets v. Thomann (A.), 336 S.W.2d 701.

(1961) Where the application of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution rather than its construction is involved in a case, the supreme court does not have jurisdiction. Thus appeal from the judgment of the circuit court ruling invalid a judgment awarding alimony issued by a sister state and quashing execution issued under the uniform registration of foreign judgments law, would be transferred to the court of appeals. Roseberry v. Crump (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 117.

(1961) Supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from citation for contempt for violation of injunction where complaints of alleged constitutional violations were actually directed to the court's procedure and judgment and did not require construction of the constitution. State ex rel. Coates v. Parchman (Mo.), 346 S.W.2d 74.

(1961) Where judgment nisi purported to decide constitutional question, supreme court would have jurisdiction even though such question was beyond the issues submitted. Kansas City v. Hammer (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 865.

(1962) Supreme court had jurisdiction of appeal from judgment holding St. Louis County ordinance invalid as not having been enacted in conformity with statute where appellants contended the ordinance was adopted pursuant to procedure authorized by county charter which necessarily required construction of Section 18(c) of Art. VI. Casper v. Hetlage (Mo.), 359 S.W.2d 781.

(1962) Supreme court had jurisdiction of appeal from circuit court affirming conviction in city court of selling subscriptions to magazines door-to-door without a license as required by city ordinances, where defendant challenged constitutionality of ordinance under commerce clause of federal constitution. Village of Bel-Nor v. Barnett (Mo.), 358 S.W.2d 832.

(1963) When constitutional question was raised for the first time in defendant's motion for a new trial and assignment of brief did not specify section of constitution alleged to have been violated, constitutional question was not preserved for review. Barnes v. Anchor Temple Association (Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 192.

(1963) Supreme court had jurisdiction of appeal from dismissal of petition for review of driver's license revocation as director of revenue was a "contesting party" and decision involved construction of due process clause of constitution. Wilson v. Morris (Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 402.

(1963) Assuming that telephone company had certificate of convenience to serve a certain area, appeal from public service commission's order directing another company to provide service to the area did not require construction of due process and equal protection provisions of constitution and supreme court did not have jurisdiction of the appeal. State ex rel. Doniphan Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 572.

(1964) Court of appeals had jurisdiction of appeal even though material issue was as to whether or not plaintiff appellant was afforded due process when prior case was dismissed for failure to prosecute since plaintiff appellant specified no section or article of state or federal constitution as having been violated and briefed no constitutional question. W.M. Chrysler Co. v. Smith (A.), 377 S.W.2d 134.

(1964) Supreme court had jurisdiction of appeal from conviction on misdemeanor charge where defendant charged his constitutional rights had been infringed and due process violated whether the supreme court found it necessary to rule the constitutional issues or not. State v. Poelker (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 491.

(1964) Constitutional question was not presented for appellate review by mention only in the jurisdictional statement or by casual reference in argument portion of brief where not contained in points relied on nor timely presented to trial court. Pruellage v. DeSeaton Corporation (Mo.), 380 S.W.2d 403.

(1964) In proceedings to review order of board of zoning adjustment wherein appellants claimed constitutional questions were involved, but in reality issues only involved the application of undisputed constitutional principles and not the construction of the constitution, jurisdiction was in the court of appeals. Dunbar v. Board of Zoning Adjustment (Mo.), 380 S.W.2d 442.

(1965) Where trial court could have ruled on ground other than constitutional grounds and it does not affirmatively appear that ruling was on constitutional question, no constitutional question is preserved for review. Kersting v. City of Ferguson (Mo.), 388 S.W.2d 794.

(1966) Question of constitutionality of statute may not be presented for the first time by reply brief of appellant. In re Bierman's Estate (Mo.), 396 S.W.2d 545.

(1972) Contention that quashing of defendant's deposition subpoenas because he was delinquent in paying pendente late allowances deprived him of right to defend action did not require construction of the Constitution of the United States or of this state but merely raised the question of the application of the due process clauses to the factual situation involved. Norkunas v. Norkunas (A.), 480 S.W.2d 92.

(1986) An ordinance which removes the element of scienter from a crime raises a constitutional issue, giving the supreme court jurisdiction under this section. St. Louis Co. v. Glore, 715 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App. 1986).

State Officer as Party

(1951) State Board of Optometry is not a state officer but a legal entity within this section. State ex inf. Wallach v. Schneider's Credit Jewelers, Inc. (A.), 243 S.W.2d 125.

(1953) Appeal from judgment sustaining the decision of the workmen's compensation commission on a claim for workmen's compensation benefits where the state treasurer was made a party defendant in order to recover sum paid into second injury fund, was within the jurisdiction of the supreme court. Mossman v. St. Joseph Lead Co. (A.), 254 S.W.2d 241.

(1957) Industrial Commission of Missouri is not a state officer in constitutional sense. E.B. Jones Motor Co. v. Indust. Comm. (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 407.

(1957) Supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from order overruling motion by municipality to intervene in condemnation action by state highway commission as state highway department was not a state officer or political subdivision, title to real estate was not involved and municipal corporation was not a political subdivision within the meaning of this provision. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Hudspeth (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 510.

(1963) On appeal from a judgment in action for certiorari to review the action of the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, the board rather than its individual members was the real party in interest and the fact that its component members were named parties did not vest the Supreme Court with jurisdiction even though such members are state officers. State ex rel. Gibson v. Missouri Board of Chiropractic Examiners (A.), 365 S.W.2d 773.

(1963) Supreme court did not have jurisdiction of appeal from judgment reversing decision of director of department of public health and welfare denying application for old age assistance on the theory that director was a "state officer". Dunnegan v. Gallop (Mo.), 369 S.W.2d 206.

(1963) A "state officer" within the meaning of this constitutional provision is one who exercises a portion of the sovereign power of government independently and without control of a superior power other than the law and therefore the supervisor of the safety responsibility unit and the supervisor of driver's license registration of the department of revenue did not come within the meaning of that term. Neither was the department of revenue nor the safety responsibility unit a state officer. Sheperd v. Department of Revenue (Mo.), 370 S.W.2d 381.

(1966) Warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary is not a "state officer" as that term is used in this section. Pollard v. Swenson (Mo.), 403 S.W.2d 601.

(1970) The Division of Employment Security is not a state officer within the meaning of the Constitution. Swafford v. Industrial Commission (Mo.), 452 S.W.2d 801.

Title to Office

(1954) Appeal from proceeding to contest election of ward committeewoman in city of St. Louis is within jurisdiction of supreme court because it involves title to public office. Noonan v. Walsh, 364 Mo. 1169, 273 S.W.2d 195.

(1954) Quo warranto to oust city alderman is not action involving "title to any office under this state" and appeal therein is not within jurisdiction of supreme court. State at Inf. Dalton v. Mattingly (Mo.), 268 S.W.2d 868.

(1960) Where record in lower court showed no claim that any constitutional right of defendant had been infringed, the court of appeals had jurisdiction of appeal. City of St. Louis v. Stenson (A.), 333 S.W.2d 529.

(1960) Case involving title to offices of mayor and alderman of city held not within jurisdiction of supreme court. Felker v. City of Sikeston (A.), 334 S.W.2d 754.

(1960) Action to remove president of board of education for gross misconduct was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court as there was no dispute as to respondent having title to the office. Antoine v. McCaffery (A.), 335 S.W.2d 474.

(1963) The supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final judgment in an action to contest the election of a school director because such action involves title to an "office under this state". New v. Corrough (Mo.), 370 S.W.2d 323.

(1964) Appeal from action to contest election of county superintendent is within jurisdiction of supreme court as case involves title to an "office under this state". Easten v. Guth (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 110.

(1972) Supreme court had exclusive jurisdiction over appeal from quo warranto proceeding to oust appellants from office of building commission of Jefferson county since office was one to which officer was elected or apponted under authority of law and the authority and duties thereof were prescribed by law. State ex rel. Donald v. Leonard (A.), 480 S.W.2d 71.

Construction of Revenue Laws

(1954) Where appeal required construction of county budget law it involved construction of revenue law and so was within jurisdiction of supreme court. State ex rel. Strong v. Cribb, 364 Mo. 1122, 273 S.W.2d 246.

(1955) Suit to enjoin assessment, extension and collection of property taxes on alleged exempt property involved construction of revenue laws of state. St. Louis Gospel Center v. Prose (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 827.

(1957) Employment Security Law is not a revenue law so as to give supreme court jurisdiction involving its construction. E.B. Jones Motor Co. v. Indust. Comm. (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 407.

(1958) Appeal from action to recover maintenance taxes levied by drainage district and impose a lien on realty of defendant did not involve construction of revenue laws nor title to realty within the meaning of this section. Fort Osage Drainage District of Jackson County v. Foley (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 144.

(1959) Supreme court had jurisdiction of appeal from judgment dismissing petition in action against state tax commission, insofar as it purported to be suit in equity to relieve against illegal and excessive assessment of property where construction of the state revenue laws was involved. Drey v. State Tax Commission (Mo.), 323 S.W.2d 719.

(1959) Proceeding to review decision of state tax commission with respect to an assessment of property where it was contended that decision was not supported by evidence and that it was discriminatory involved construction of revenue laws. Cupples Hesse Corp. v. State Tax Comm. (Mo.), 329 S.W.2d 696.

(1963) Quo warranto proceeding to try right of respondent to office of alderman in city of fourth class did not involve "title to any office under this state" so as to vest jurisdiction of appeal in the Supreme Court. State ex rel. McNutt v. Northrup (Mo.), 367 S.W.2d 512.

(1972) Supreme court had jurisdiction of action by railroad companies against county collector for refunds of alleged excess school tax payments as the case involved construction of the state revenue law. Mo. Pacific Rd. Co. v. Kuehle (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 505.

Offenses Punishable by Life Imprisonment or Death