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MISSOURI
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Article I
BILL OF RIGHTS
Source of political
power--origin, basis and aim of government.
Section 1. That all political power is
vested in and derived from the people; that all government of right
originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is
instituted solely for the good of the whole.
Source: Const. of 1875,
Art. II, § 1.
Promotion of general
welfare--natural rights of persons--equality under the law--purpose of
government.
Section 2. That all constitutional
government is intended to promote the general welfare of the people;
that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of
happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that all
persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and
opportunity under the law; that to give security to these things is the
principal office of government, and that when government does not confer
this security, it fails in its chief design.
Source: Const. of 1875,
Art. II, § 4.
(1952) Evidence as to
discrimination in the provision of school facilities for white and Negro
children reviewed and held not to show such discrimination as is
forbidden by state and federal constitutional provisions. State ex rel.
Hobby v. Disman (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 137.
(1952) Equal protection
provision does not require change of venue or right to disqualify judge
in a criminal contempt case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.),
250 S.W.2d 159.
(1955) Section 556.285
which makes person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of
grand larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against
challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto
provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.
(1960) Act providing for
the licensing of persons engaging in the business of selling checks,
drafts and money orders but excluding persons the major portion of whose
business consisted of sale of merchandise, held to be arbitrary and a
special law and therefore void under the federal and state
constitutional provisions. Petit v. Field (Mo.), 341 S.W.2d 106.
(1962) Act prohibiting
discriminatory practices in the sale of milk and prohibiting its sale at
less than cost held not violative of the equal rights and due process
provisions of the constitution. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353
S.W.2d 735.
(1962) Statute dividing
state into congressional districts upheld against charge that because of
the unequal apportionment the influence of individual's vote was not
equal to that of voters in other districts, thus depriving him of equal
protection of laws. Preisler v. Hearnes (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 552.
(1964) Sunday sales law
upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special
law, containing unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory
classifications in violation of plaintiff's right to equal rights and
opportunities under the law; and depriving plaintiffs of liberty and
property without due process of law. GEM Stores Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.),
374 S.W.2d 109.
(1964) Where taxable
property lying within the boundaries of a county library district was
incorporated by annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax
supported free public library, held that the property was subject to the
taxing power of both districts and such interpretation did not violate
Article X, § 3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of Missouri
Constitution, St. Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375
S.W.2d 71.
(1964) Picketing of
funeral home which was in part for the purpose of preventing owners from
personally doing any embalming in their own business was for an unlawful
purpose. Baue v. Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 (Mo.), 376
S.W.2d 230.
(1964) Validity of city
ordinance requiring licensing of television and radio servicemen upheld
against charges that it violated due process and equal protection
clauses of state and federal constitutions and the "special law"
prohibition of the state constitution. McClellan v.
Kansas City
(Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 500.
(1964) Failure to furnish
defendant in prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions
was not a violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon
(Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.
(1974) Held that
classification of marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative
of equal protection or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.),
514 S.W.2d 585.
(1978) Provision that all
persons shall have "the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry"
does not prohibit inclusion of compulsory union membership provision in
collective bargaining agreement. Independent Stave Company v. Higdon
(Mo.), 572 S.W.2d 424.
(1990) Where retirement
benefits from private nongovernmental employment were subject to income
tax and retirement benefits from governmental employment was exempt, tax
scheme did not violate principles of equal protection, the legislature's
classification of governmental and nongovernmental employees' retirement
benefits has a rational basis. Schnorbus v. Director of Revenue, 790
S.W.2d 241 (Mo. en banc).
(1994) Section 36.150,
RSMo, does not violate constitution, where state had legitimate interest
in maintaining public confidence in impartial civil service by
prohibiting merit employees from being candidates for any partisan
political office. Asher v. Lombardi, 877 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. en banc).
Powers of the
people over internal affairs, constitution and form of government.
Section 3. That the people of this state have the inherent, sole and
exclusive right to regulate the internal government and police thereof,
and to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government
whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and happiness,
provided such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 2.
Independence of
Missouri--submission of certain amendments to Constitution of the United
States.
Section 4. That Missouri is a free and independent state, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States; that all proposed
amendments to the Constitution of the United States qualifying or
affecting the individual liberties of the people or which in any wise
may impair the right of local self-government belonging to the people of
this state, should be submitted to conventions of the people.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 3.
Religious freedom--liberty of
conscience and belief--limitations.
Section 5. That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences;
that no human authority can control or interfere with the rights of
conscience; that no person shall, on account of his religious persuasion
or belief, be rendered ineligible to any public office or trust or
profit in this state, be disqualified from testifying or serving as a
juror, or be molested in his person or estate; but this section shall
not be construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of the
state, or with the rights of others.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 5.
(1953) Evidence reviewed and held to
establish that schools taught by nuns of religious order were not in
fact free public schools and therefore not entitled to support from
public funds. Berghorn v. Reorganized School Dist. No. 8, 364 Mo. 121,
260 S.W.2d 573.
(1973) Payment of taxes by parent who
sends his children to religiously oriented schools does not interfere
with his constitutional right to select such a school for his children.
McDonough v. Aylward (Mo.), 500 S.W.2d 721.
(1976) Denial to members of a religious
society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did
not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an
occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an
area zoned single family residential was not a denial of their
constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process
clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational
Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.
Practice and
support of religion not compulsory--contracts therefore enforceable.
Section 6. That no person can be compelled to erect, support or
attend any place or system of worship, or to maintain or support any
priest, minister, preacher or teacher of any sect, church, creed or
denomination of religion; but if any person shall voluntarily make a
contract for any such object, he shall be held to the performance of the
same.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 6.
(1974) Held, that portion of § 170.051
requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to teachers in
private schools violates Art. I, § 6, of the const. of Mo. which
prohibits the "support" of any "teacher of any sect". The provision
requiring textbooks to be provided to pupils attending private schools
violates Art. IX, § 8, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits payment from
a public fund in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian
purpose. Paster v. Tussey (Mo.), 512 S.W.2d 97.
Public aid for religious
purposes--preferences and discriminations on religious grounds.
Section 7. That no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or
denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or
teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor
any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion,
or any form of religious faith or worship.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 7.
(1961) Where property acquired by land
clearance for redevelopment authority of city was conveyed to university
controlled by religious denomination pursuant to a plan adopted by the
city in slum clearance project, and where the only bid received was from
the university, there was no subsidy of religion from public funds in
the absence of showing of fraud or arbitrary action. Kintzele v. City of
St. Louis (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 695.
(1973) The provisions of the state
constitution not withstanding, educationally deprived children attending
nonpublic schools are entitled to receive allocation of federal funds
for programs of special services comparable in quality, scope and
opportunity to children in public schools. Barrera v. Wheeler (CA Mo.),
475 F.2d 1388.
(1974) Held, that portion of § 170.051
requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to teachers in
private schools violates Art. I, § 6, of the const. of Mo. which
prohibits the "support" of any "teacher of any sect". The provision
requiring textbooks to be provided to pupils attending private schools
violates Art. IX, § 8, of the const. of Mo. which prohibits payment from
a public fund in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian
purpose. Paster v. Tussey (M0.), 512 S.W.2d 97.
(1978) Held, that no judicial officer
may determine child custody, based on approval or disapproval of the
beliefs, doctrines or tenets of the religion of either parent or their
interpretation thereof. Waits v. Waits (Mo.), 567 S.W.2d 326.
Freedom of speech--evidence of truth
in defamation actions--province of jury.
Section 8. That no law shall be passed impairing the freedom of
speech, no matter by what means communicated: that every person shall be
free to say, write or publish, or otherwise communicate whatever he will
on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that liberty; and
that in all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the truth
thereof may be given in evidence; and in suits and prosecutions for
libel the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the
law and the facts.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 14.
(1951) Where employees at election
under federal law had rejected union as their representative, picketing
of employer for purpose of coercing employer to recognize such union was
unlawful and consequently not within protection of free speech
provisions. Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 362 Mo. 375, 241 S.W.2d
886.
(1952) Picketing, for the purpose of
coercing employer to sign contract recognizing as exclusive collective
bargaining agent a labor organization of which only small minority of
employees of such employer were members, was for an unlawful purpose
under federal statute and therefore could be restrained without
violating free speech guarantees of constitution. Katz Drug Co. v.
Kavner (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 166.
(1955) Petition in libel action is
subject to motion to dismiss but the function of the court is limited to
a determination of whether the alleged libelous matter set forth in
petition is capable of defamatory meaning. Coots v. Payton, 365 Mo. 180,
280 S.W.2d 47.
(1955) Where evidence disclosed no
reasonable objective of peaceful picketing other than to cause the
employer to violate its employees' rights by coercing them into union
membership it was unlawful and would be enjoined. Bellerive Country Club
v. McVey, 365 Mo. 477, 284 S.W.2d 492.
(1956) Where one union was certified by
federal authorities as bargaining representative of employees, another
union, its officers and a newspaper publisher, who circulated pamphlets
stating that members of the second union were not employed by the
employer and urging the public not to purchase the employer's products
for the purpose of preventing the sale of such products were engaging in
an unlawful boycott and such circulation may be enjoined. Adams Dairy,
Inc. v. Burke (Mo.), 293 S.W.2d 281.
(1960) Statutes providing for seizure
of obscene matter held not to violate free speech and press privileges
and immunities or due process provisions of state or federal
constitutions. In re Search Warrant of Property at 5 West 12th Street v.
Marcus (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 119.
(1961) City ordinance denouncing the
offense of selling, attempting to sell, or possessing with the intent to
sell, obscene literature held unconstitutional because it did not
require proof of knowledge of the person so possessing or selling such
matter as an element of the offense. City of St. Louis v. Williams
(Mo.), 343 S.W.2d 16. Reversed, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1708. (See also
Mo. L. Rev., Vol. XXVI, p. 501 for note.)
(1964) It is proper for the court to
instruct the jury to the general effect that even though the court has
instructed them on the question of libel or no libel the constitution
gives them the right to determine the law and the facts on that issue.
Dyer v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co. (Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 570.
(1969) Public employer could not lay
off or reduce pay of municipal employees to intimidate them for joining
labor organization. State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool (Mo.), 441 S.W.2d 35.
Rights of
peaceable assembly and petition.
Section 9. That the people have the right peaceably to assemble for
their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of
government for redress of grievances by petition or remonstrance.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 29.
Due process of law.
Section 10. That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 30.
In General
(1951) Provisions of 1875 constitution
requiring unanimous consent of stockholders for issuance of preferred
stock did not create vested right in stockholder so that action of
corporation created before adoption of corporation code in 1943 and
before adoption of 1945 constitution, which accepted corporation code
under § 351.025, in issuing preferred stock on vote of three-fourths of
stockholders, was not violative of due process provisions of
constitution. Midland Truck Lines v. Atwood, 362 Mo. 397, 241 S.W.2d
903.
(1952) Consent of the state to be sued
cannot be implied from this section. Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 247
S.W.2d 832.
(1953) Earnings tax imposed by city of
St. Louis under statutory authority held not violative of the due
process and uniform tax provisions of the constitution. Walters v. City
of St. Louis, 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377.
(1953) Since constitutional guarantees
of sections 10 and 22, Article I of the Constitution are for protection
against governmental action, and not applicable to acts of individuals
as between themselves, contention that labor union's action denied such
rights to one of its members does not raise a constitutional question so
as to give supreme court jurisdiction of cause. Junkins v. Local Union
No. 6313, etc. (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 337.
(1954) Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Law (RSMo, § 99.300 et seq.) does not contravene this provision of the
Constitution. State on Inf. Dalton v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth.,
364 Mo. 974, 270 S.W.2d 44.
(1957) The Uniform Support of
Dependents' Law is not violative of the due process or retrospective law
provisions of the constitution. Ivey v. Ayers (Mo.), 301 S.W.2d 790.
(1958) Where on review court of appeals
set aside suspension of real estate dealer's license for violation of
specific statutory provisions but remanded case to commission for the
assessment of penalty for violation of another provision, further notice
and hearing were unnecessary before penalty was assessed either under
due process requirement or under administrative procedure law. Dittmeier
v. Missouri Real Estate Comm. (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d 1; Cert. den. 358 U.S.
941, 79 S.Ct. 347.
(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's
daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of
remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will
executed in 1927 and where remainder vested in 1955 and such ruling did
not render acts passed subsequent to testator's death and prior to
vesting of remainder which qualified adopted daughter as lineal
descendant violative of §§ 10 and 13 of Art. I of the Constitution.
Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.
(1959) Juvenile Code 1957 sustained
against contention that it is so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to
make unascertainable the standards of conduct required and is thereby
violative of the due process provision of the constitution. Minor
Children of F.B. v. Caruthers (A.), 323 S.W.2d 397.
(1959) Exclusion of work done for levee
and drainage districts from operation of Prevailing Wage Act held not
unreasonable classification or special law. City of Joplin v. Industrial
Comm. (Mo.), 329 S.W.2d 687.
(1960) Where bridge over railroad
right-of-way was constructed under agreement between land developer and
railroad, then accepted as part of a county road and finally included
within a city, the Public Service Commission could order its
reconstruction and apportion the costs thereof between the railroad and
city without taking property without due process. State ex rel. C.B. &
Q. RR Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 54.
(1960) Since liquor business does not
stand on same plane as other commercial activities and is not lawful
except as authorized by statute, statute which does not require a
hearing before refusal to renew license for liquor business held valid.
Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Control (Mo.), 334 S.W.2d 20.
(1961) Proceedings under habitual
criminal law in prosecution for homicide committed prior to effective
date of amendment of the law did not result in violation of
constitutional provision against ex post facto laws, nor deny defendant
due process and equal protection of laws, or unconstitutionally deny him
right to trial by jury on fact question of previous conviction, sentence
and discharge there from. State v. Chamineak (Mo.), 343 S.W.2d 153.
(1961) Provision of use tax law
exempting use of merchandise not readily obtainable in Missouri held
void for indefiniteness and uncertainty. Missouri Pacific RR Co. v.
Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52.
(1961) The striking of the defendant's
pleadings in a divorce action because of his failure to pay alimony
pendente lite and suit money held to be denial of due process of law.
Richman v. Richman (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 733.
(1961) Ordinance adopted by county
operating under a constitutional charter which required the fluoridation
of the water supply to be used throughout the county held not violative
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution or this
due process provision. Readey v. St. Louis County Water Company (Mo.),
352 S.W.2d 622.
(1962) City zoning ordinance adopted
under §§ 89.010 to 89.140 held valid as against contention that it
constituted an unwarranted delegation of legislative discretion to an
administrative board without sufficient standards or guides. Porporis v.
City of Warson Woods (Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 605.
(1962) Ordinance of the City of St.
Louis which required any real estate agent when placing a "For Sale"
sign on any real estate to indicate on the sign the zoning area in which
the property was located held valid. City of St. Louis v. Green (Mo.),
353 S.W.2d 606.
(1962) Act prohibiting discriminatory
practices in the sale of milk and prohibiting its sale at less than cost
held not violative of the equal rights and due process provisions of the
constitution. Borden Company v. Thomason (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 735.
(1963) Provision excepting "provisions
or other articles of immediate necessity" from Sunday sales prohibition
held to render the statute so vague and indefinite that it is incapable
of rational enforcement and therefore void. Harvey v. Priest (Mo.), 366
S.W.2d 324.
(1963) Proviso of § 155.050 providing
for apportionment of assessed valuation of aircraft of airlines to city
owning and operating an airport outside its corporate limits in which
airlines had arrivals and departures, and city's attempted levy of
tangible personal property taxes on such apportioned valuation were
invalid and void as violation of due process clauses of state and
federal constitutions. American Airlines, Inc. v. City of St.Louis (Mo.), 368 S.W.2d 161.
(1963) Refusal to rezone vacant tract
classified as residential to commercial was unreasonable and arbitrary
and infringed plaintiff's rights under due process clause where
maintenance of residential zoning bore no substantial relationship to
public health, safety, morals or general welfare and where property was
three times more valuable as commercial property and was not suited to
residential development in view of adjacent commercial development and
traffic conditions. Huttig v. City of Richmond Heights (Mo.), 372 S.W.2d 833.
(1964) Sunday sales law upheld against
charge that it was unconstitutional as being a special law, containing
unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory classifications in violation
of plaintiffs' right to equal rights and opportunities under the law;
and depriving plaintiffs of liberty of property without due process of
law. GEM Stores, Inc. v. O'Brien (Mo.), 374 S.W.2d 109.
(1964) Where taxable property lying
within the boundaries of a county library district was incorporated by
annexation into the boundaries of a city which had a tax supported free
public library, held that the property was subject to the taxing power
of both districts and such interpretation did not violate Article X, §
3, and Article I, §§ 2, 10, 26 and 28 of the Missouri Constitution. St.
Louis County Library District v. Hopkins (Mo.), 375 S.W.2d 71.
(1964) Picketing of funeral home which
was in part for the purpose of preventing owners from personally doing
any embalming in their own business was for an unlawful purpose. Baue v.
Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 (Mo.), 376 S.W.2d 230.
(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday
Sales Act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite
that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to
the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution, and in
violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by
Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen
(Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.
(1964) Supreme Court did not have
jurisdiction of appeal from Public Service Commission's order directing
railroad to cancel tariff item on theory of issue requiring construction
of due process clause of constitution where actual question was whether
or not the commission exceeded its statutory authority. State ex rel.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission
(Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 459.
(1964) Validity of city ordinance
requiring licensing of television and radio servicemen upheld against
charges that it violated due process and equal protection clauses of
state and federal constitutions and the "special law" prohibition of the
state constitution. McClellan v.
Kansas City (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 500.
(1966) Fact that same agency, State
Board of Registration for Healing Arts, both prosecuted and decided the
case does not by itself deprive appellant of right of due process of
law. Rose v. State Board of Registration for Healing Arts (Mo.), 397
S.W.2d 570.
(1966) When the legislative body of a
city chooses to delegate to itself the discretionary power to enforce
its special permit regulation, it acts administratively in passing on
applications for such permits and is thus enforcing the legislation
previously enacted; and such discretion must be circumscribed by
sufficient standards to require it to be reasonably, not arbitrarily,
exercised. State v. City of Winchester (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 47.
(1972) City ordinance which prohibited
minors, with certain exceptions, entering premises where liquor was sold
by the drink except those premises where sales of prepared meals and
food totaled 50% of the gross income during the three calendar months
upheld against charge that it was unconstitutional in that it
unreasonably classified licensed establishments on a basis that had no
relation to any evil sought to be controlled. Waldrop v. Burge (Mo.),
476 S.W.2d 537.
(1972) The right of a party-litigant to
depose witnesses is an absolute right and act of trial court in divorce
action in quashing defendant's deposition subpoenas because he was
delinquent in paying pendente lite allowances was error as it deprived
him of that right and substantially limited the range of his defense.
Norkunas v. Norkunas (A.), 480 S.W.2d 92.
(1973) Ordinance making registered
owner liable for improper parking of vehicle does not result in failure
of due process. City of Kansas City v. Herty Corp. (Mo.), 499 S.W.2d
449.
(1974) Held that classification of
marijuana with more dangerous drugs is not violative of equal protection
or due process. State v. Burrow (Mo.), 514 S.W.2d 585.
(1976) Delay between commission of the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon and defendant's arrest thereon or
filing of information did not abridge defendant's right to speedy trial,
nor did it violate his right of due process since no prejudice was
demonstrated by the delay. State v. Odzark (A.), 532 S.W.2d 45.
(1976) Issuance of a repossessed title
by director of revenue pursuant to § 301.215, to secured creditor who
had repossessed automobile by self help under power granted in security
agreement did not constitute significant participation by state such as
to come within legal definition of "state action", thus due process was
not involved and statute was not unconstitutional. Smith v. Spradling
(Mo.), 532 S.W.2d 202.
(1976) Denial to members of a religious
society of whom only one was a priest and the others were laymen who did
not have the religious ministry as a primary and regular vocation, of an
occupancy permit to occupy an existing residence as their home in an
area zoned single family residential was not a denial of their
constitutional rights under the freedom-of-worship and due process
clauses of the Missouri Constitution. Association for Educational
Development v. Hayward (Mo.), 533 S.W.2d 579.
(2001) Statute of limitations in real
property inverse condemnation cases cannot be shorter than that required
for entity with power of eminent domain to obtain a prescriptive
easement on the property, which is ten years. Shade v. Missouri Highway
and Transportation Commission, 69 S.W.3d 503 (Mo.App. W.D.).
Police Power
(1952) Zoning ordinance prohibiting
construction of residences on tracts of not less than three acres and
forbidding institutional use except by special permit, where same is
necessary to conform to general zoning plan, is not invalid. Flora
Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771.
(1952) Procedure under § 375.560 taking
over insurance company by superintendent because of cessation of
business held not violative of due process provision of constitution.
Leggett v. Gen. Indem. Exch., 363 Mo. 273, 250 S.W.2d 710.
(1954) Order of state Public Service
Commission that railroad company contribute to installation of and
maintain flashing light signal at grade crossing found hazardous by such
commission does not deprive company of property without due process.
State ex rel. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Public Service Comm. (Mo.), 273
S.W.2d 334.
(1957) City ordinance prohibiting sale
of intoxicating liquors by wholesaler when retailer was delinquent in
his accounts to any wholesaler held not violative of due process.
Passler v. Johnson (Mo.), 304 S.W.2d 903.
(1958) Contention that statute
providing for apportionment of costs of construction, maintenance and
operation of crossing was violative of the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitution held without merit. State ex rel. State
Highway Comm. v. Conrad (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 871.
(1958) Zoning of area as local business
district and restricting use of owner's property as supper club was not
violation of this section as classification was reasonable when
considered as part of comprehensive zoning plan of the city and when, in
the district itself, there were thirty-five residences and only three or
four nonconforming uses. Downing v. City of Joplin (Mo.), 312 S.W.2d 81.
(1959) City ordinance regulating the
installation and repair of warm air furnaces held not to leave board
with uncontrolled discretion as to licensing or to deny due process.
Ross v. City of Kansas City (Mo.), 328 S.W.2d 610.
Notice
(1953) Where notice of organization of
drainage district to holder of easement required by §§ 242.020 and
242.030 was not given, the notice and opportunity for hearing on
commissioner's report afforded by § 242.270 was ineffectual to comply
with due process of law. Farmers Drainage Dist. v. Sinclair Refining Co.
(Mo.), 225 S.W.2d 745.
(1954) Act authorizing hospitalization
of mentally ill person (Laws 1953, p. 647) on application of third
person and certification of two physicians and also authorizing officer
to take such person into custody and to deliver him to hospital without
notice and opportunity to be heard denies due process. State ex rel.
Fuller v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72.
(1954) Insofar as paragraph 3 of §
537.020 provides for proceedings against personal representative of
deceased nonresident without adequate notice to him it denies due
process. Harris v. Bates (Mo.), 270 S.W.2d 763.
(1957) Service of process by
publication in class proceedings to escheat unclaimed excess insurance
premiums in registry of court met statutory requirements and did not
violate due process by not specifically advising defendants to file
answer. State v. Goodbar (Mo.), 297 S.W.2d 525.
(1957) Where after a number of
continuance cases was peremptorily set for trial on specified date, and
plaintiff's attorney withdrew before that date, due process required
that other attorneys could appear for plaintiff on the date peremptorily
set without agreeing to immediate trial. Dismissal for failure to
prosecute in such circumstances held improper. Magerstadt v. LaForge
(Mo.), 303 S.W.2d 130.
(1958) The provision of § 506.210
authorizing service upon the executor or administrator of a deceased
nonresident does not violate the due process provisions of the state or
federal constitutions. Brooks v. National Bank of
Topeka, 251 F.2d 37.
(1958) Section 506.210, amended in
1955, held not violative of due process provisions in conferring
jurisdiction on Missouri courts over administrators and executors of
estates of nonresidents. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Cross (Mo.), 314 S.W.2d 889.
(1979) Notice of foreclosure authorized
by municipal land reutilization law through publication, and a letter to
last known property owner of record is not violative of due process.
Collector of Revenue of the City of St. Louis v. Parcels of Land
Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens (Mo.), 585 S.W.2d 486.
Judicial Proceedings
(1956) Prohibition in the Supreme Court
is governed by the general law on the subject rather than by the civil
code. Where writ was directed to judge of multiple judge circuit who
made order which would result in excess of jurisdiction it bound all
judges of such circuit and afforded due process. State ex rel. Siegel v.
Strother, 365 Mo. 861, 289 S.W.2d 73.
(1959) Where attorney who was retained
by defendant in criminal case subsequently became prosecuting attorney,
and as such opposed continuance of case sought by defendant and prepared
instructions in case tried by assistant, the conviction of defendant
would be set aside as prejudicial. State v. Burns (Mo.), 322 S.W.2d 736.
Criminal Prosecutions
(1952) Due process does not require
change of venue or right to disqualify judge in a criminal contempt
case. Osborne v. Purdome (Mo.), 250 S.W.2d 159.
(1953) Where defendant of low-level
intelligence confessed guilt under circumstances indicating that
confession was coerced by inspired fear, a promise of protection and
daily interrogation over long period of detention, use of confession in
his trial was violative of due process clause of constitution. State v.
Bradford (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 584.
(1955) Section 556.285, which makes
person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand
larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against
challenger based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto
provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.
(1955) Supreme Court Rule No. 27.26 is
similar to § 2255, 28 U.S.C.A., and, in accordance with judicial
construction of that section, a motion alleging that individual was
convicted by perjured testimony knowingly procured by the prosecution,
stated facts showing denial of due process and, therefore, sufficient to
require hearing. State v. Eaton (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 63.
(1960) In prosecution for rape where
defendant entered into an agreement approved by the court by which he
was to be relieved of being tried on two other rape charges by accepting
the decision of his counsel not to appeal from his conviction on the
charge tried, he had no valid claim of lack of due process or equal
protection of the laws. State v. Johnson (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 668.
(1961) Where search warrants for
obscene matter were in the language of the statute, specified no
publications and left to the individual judgment of the police officer
the selection of what he regarded as obscene publications, they failed
to provide due process and were invalid. Marcus v. Search Warrants of
Property, etc., 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708.
(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in
prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a
violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381
S.W.2d 807.
(1964) Refusal by court to require
production of police report and statement made to warrant officer by
police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's
constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or
statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be
fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.
(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to
represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not
guilty held not to deprive him of due process of law nor equal
protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.
(1966) As there is no constitutional
requirement that there be a transcript of the testimony in a preliminary
hearing, nor even a constitutional requirement that a preliminary
hearing be held, defendant had no constitutional right to have a
transcript of preliminary hearing. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.
(1966) Defendant in criminal case has
no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of
complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.
(1967) Court's compelling defendant of
limited education to go on trial for felony without counsel immediately
upon the withdrawal without notice of his employed counsel resulted in a
denial of due process of law. State v. Martin (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 215.
(1967) If one confession statement or
admission is simply part of one continuous process in which several
confessions are obtained, all are invalid. State v. Linder (Mo.), 412
S.W.2d 412.
(1971) Where police station
identification, following warning, occurred within 45 minutes after
purse snatching and on-scene identification, following warning, and
nothing took place at police station that had not already occurred at
on-scene identification, the in-court identification could not be found
to have been tainted by illegal extrajudicial identification at police
station. State v. Grayson (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 891.
(1972) There was no denial of due
process based on alleged unfairness of one-to-one confrontation between
accused and identifying witness shortly after commission of crime where
identification was not used at trial; nor was there denial of due
process based on police station lineups without the suspect being
informed that their purpose was possible identification or that he was
entitled to have counsel present or without obtaining a waiver of his
right to counsel when lineups occurred shortly after crime and long
before information was filed. Robinson v. State (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 492.
(1973) Defendant denied due process
when sole prosecution witness had answered in effect that he had
received no inducement to testify when in fact murder charge against him
had been dismissed immediately prior to trial. State v. McClain (Mo.),
498 S.W.2d 798.
Regulation
(1967) The Public Service Commission is
without power to order a telephone company to provide services in an
area in which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to provide
service because such compulsion would be tantamount to an appropriation
of the telephone company's property to a public service to which it has
not dedicated such property, a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416
S.W.2d 109.
(1967) Attempt by public service
commission to order a telephone company to provide services in an area
which it has not offered, proffered or undertaken to serve is tantamount
to an appropriation of private property for public use without just
compensation. State v. Public Service Commission (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 109.
Personal Rights
(1968) Held that use of jury forms with
variance in type, size, and style for guilty form and not guilty form
did not constitute a comment on the evidence or a denial of due process
or equal protection. State v. Dennison (Mo.), 428 S.W.2d 573.
Imprisonment for
debt.
Section 11. That no person shall be imprisoned for debt, except for
nonpayment of fines and penalties imposed by law.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 16.
(1951) Section 462.430, authorizing
attachment for contempt for failure to surrender assets to estate, held
not unconstitutional as against contention it authorizes imprisonment
for debt. Zeitinger v. Mitchell (Mo.), 244 S.W.2d 91.
(1976) Held that imprisonment for
contempt is proper remedy for failure to comply with court order for
maintenance and child support when person disobeying order has
intentionally placed himself in a position which made compliance
impossible. State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt overruling Coughlin v.
Ehlert, 39 Mo. 285 (1866). State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt (Mo.), 533
S.W.2d 567.
Habeas corpus.
Section 12. That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
never be suspended.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 26.
Ex post facto
laws--impairment of contracts--irrevocable privileges.
Section 13. That no ex post facto law, nor law impairing the
obligation of contracts, or retrospective in its operation, or making
any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be
enacted.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art II, § 15.
(1953) Relation between Public School
Retirement System of St. Louis and its members is contractual and §
169.515 of 1953 Act (H.B. 164) which required transfer of certain funds
thereof to special fund to be used in making contributions to Federal
Old Age and Survivors Insurance System for certain members thereof, held
invalid as impairing the obligations of contract. Dictum: Section
169.510 of 1953 Act also void for same reason. State ex rel. Phillip v.
Public School Retirement System, 364 Mo. 395, 262 S.W.2d 569.
(1955) Section 556.285 which makes
person convicted more than three times of larceny guilty of grand
larceny on conviction of a subsequent larceny held valid against
challenge based on the due process, equal protection and ex post facto
provisions of the constitution. State v. King (Mo.), 275 S.W.2d 310.
(1956) Where attorney's contract with
insurance superintendent contemplated his payment out of funds recovered
by litigation contrary to statute for payment of such compensation, a
statute authorizing escheat of such recovered funds was, therefore, not
violative of obligation of contract. Jacobs v. Leggett (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d
825.
(1956) Provision authorizing pledge of
on-street parking meter receipts for payment of revenue bonds issued to
enable city to acquire off-street parking facilities held
constitutional. Petition of City of Liberty (Mo.), 296 S.W.2d 117.
(1958) Where definition of "habitual
violator of traffic laws" authorizing suspension of driver's license was
changed so as to include one convicted four times in two years rather
than those convicted five times in one year, it applied to one convicted
three times before the change was made and one time thereafter, and was
not retrospective in violation of the constitution. Barbieri v. Morris
(Mo.), 315 S.W.2d 711.
(1958) Daughter adopted by testator's
daughter in 1909 held to be entitled to share in distribution of
remainder of trust estate to "lineal descendants" of testator under will
executed in 1927 and where remainder which qualified adopted daughter as
lineal descendant violative of §§ 10 and 13 of Art. I of the
Constitution. Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed (Mo.), 318 S.W.2d 289.
(1960) Provision of 1959 act
authorizing the judge of the court to fix the punishment rather than a
jury, upon establishment of prior offenses, held not to violate
provision of Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws. State v.
Morton (Mo.), 338 S.W.2d 858.
(1961) Proceedings under habitual
criminal law in prosecution for homicide committed prior to effective
date of amendment of the law did not result in violation of
constitutional provision against ex post facto laws, nor deny defendant,
due process and equal protection of laws, unconstitutionally deny him
right to trial by jury on fact question of previous convictions,
sentence and discharge there from. State v. Chamineak (Mo.), 343 S.W.2d
153.
(1961) The rule of immunity of
charities from suits for torts held not to be an irrevocable grant of
special privileges or immunities for the reason that the grant of
privileges prohibited are those granted to individuals and not to
charities as a class. Schulte v. Missionaries of LaSalette Corp. of Mo.
(Mo.), 352 S.W.2d 636.
(1961) Fact that habitual criminal act
was amended in 1959 would not make it inapplicable to an act committed
prior to the effective date of that act or make it an ex post facto law
within the meaning of the constitution. State v. Donnell (Mo.), 351
S.W.2d 775.
(1962) Increase of benefits to
previously retired members of State Employees Retirement System held
void as an impairment of contract as to members not yet retired and as
being retrospective as it affects retired members. State v. Missouri
State Employees Retirement System (Mo.), 362 S.W.2d 571.
(1971) Mandamus lay, under subsection 3
of § 206.120, to compel county court judges to dissolve a hospital
district established in 1963 where no successful election on proposition
to borrow money for any purpose had been conducted in the district
within five years from its establishment although action was begun less
than five years after the effective date of subsection 3 of § 206.120.
State ex rel. Meyer v. Cobb (Mo.), 467 S.W.2d 854.
(1986) Application of §§ 610.100 to
610.120, RSMo, to records kept before September 28, 1973, does not
violate ban on ex post facto or retroactive law. Martin v. Schmalz, 713
S.W.2d 22 (Mo.App. 1986).
(1993) Where § 370.362, RSMo, may
impair contractual obligations of parties and is retrospective in
operation, statute does not violate this constitution's or federal
constitution's contract clause because it has significant and legitimate
public purpose to remedy broad general, social or economic problem and
enactment of section was proper exercise of inherent police power of
state. Educational Employees Credit Union v. Mutual Guaranty
Corporation, 821 F.Supp. 1294 (E.D. Mo.).
(1993) Expiration of statutes of
limitation for tort actions created vested right in favor of defendants
to be free from suit; therefore, to extent that § 537.046, RSMo,
authorizes causes of action that would have been barred under statutes
of limitation in effect prior to effective date of § 537.600, RSMo,
statute contravenes constitutional prohibition against retrospective
laws. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. en banc).
Open
courts--certain remedies--justice without sale, denial or delay.
Section 14. That the courts of justice shall be open to every person,
and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or
character, and that right and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial or delay.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II § 10.
(1954) This section is not applicable
to authorize action against charitable institution for tort of its
servant even though liability insurance is carried by the institution.
Kreuger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S.W.2d 311.
(1956) Where service of summons was had
in the state on president of defendant, a foreign corporation which was
not doing business in this state, the court had no right to assume
jurisdiction over the defendant, and the constitutional provision had no
application. Collar v. Peninsular Gas Co. (Mo.), 295 S.W.2d 88.
(1958) Validity of doctrine of forum
non conveniens discussed and held not to apply to tort action brought by
resident of Wyandotte County, Kansas, against resident of Johnson
County, Kansas, in Kansas City, Missouri, since there was no
clear showing of inconvenience of forum nor that the ends of justice
required it. Loftus v. Lee (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 654.
(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in
prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a
violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381
S.W.2d 807.
(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to
represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not
guilty held not to deprive him of due process of law nor equal
protection of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.
(1979) Held, chapter 538 violates Art.
I, § 14 of the constitution of Missouri and must be held invalid
for that reason. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for
Children v. Gaertner (Mo.), 583 S.W.2d 107.
(1993) Criminal prosecution for
statements made in civil pleading does not violate constitution. Right
of access to courts does not include right to make death threats in
pleadings. Alexander v. State, 864 S.W.2d 354 (Mo. App. W.D.).
(2000) Provisions of Missouri's dram
shop law (section 537.053, RSMo) that impose liability only upon
conviction of sale of liquor to a person under age or to an obviously
intoxicated person are an unconstitutional violation of the state's open
courts provision, because access to the courts is conditioned upon a
prosecutor's decision to bring the case. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo.banc).
Unreasonable search and seizure
prohibited--contents and basis of warrants.
Section 15. That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers,
homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no
warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue
without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to
be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported by
written oath or affirmation.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 11.
(1951) Application for and acceptance
of license as transporter of intoxicating liquor under § 311.420
constitutes waiver of right to object to inspection of cargo by
enforcement officers. State v. Ward, 361 Mo. 1236, 239 S.W.2d 313.
(1952) Where there was no evidence that
defendants had committed crime, that officers had any suspicion that
they had committed felony nor that officers had warrants for arrest of
defendants, their arrest was illegal and subsequent search of
defendant's automobile in which two guns were found was an unreasonable
search and seizure prohibited by § 15, Art. I of the constitution. State
v. Cuezze (Mo.), 249 S.W.2d 373.
(1952) Whether relevant and competent
evidence was obtained by unlawful search or seizure will not be
determined unless defendant previously moved for suppression of such
evidence or possibly where he was surprised by its introduction. State
v. O'Brien (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 357.
(1953) Where incriminating letter which
was strongly corroborative of state witness' testimony was found in
unlawful search of appellant's house its admission in evidence over
objection and after motion to suppress held error and not harmless as
merely cumulative. State v. Clark (Mo.), 259 S.W.2d 813.
(1953) If party to action for
forfeiture does not establish that he is the owner of or has an interest
in seized whiskey he cannot question the legality of the search and
seizure. State v. Rodgers, 364 Mo. 247, S.W.2d 736.
(1953) Subpoena issued by court at
request of prosecuting attorney, requiring production of records before
grand jury and returnable at time grand jury was not in session and at
time when matters affected by such records were not under grand jury
investigation, was void both under the statutes and constitution of this
state. State ex rel. Burke v. Scott, 364 Mo. 420, 263 S.W.2d 614.
(1954) Where police officers heard
shots and saw defendant place unidentified object in his pocket and then
flee, their search of him after overtaking him and finding loaded
revolver from which one shot had been fired in his pocket was not
unreasonable. State v. Charles (Mo.), 268 S.W.2d 830.
(1954) Where defendant in prosecution
for illegal sale of liquor failed to object to introduction of whiskey
in evidence on grounds of unlawful search and seizure, the objection was
waived even though motion to suppress the whiskey had been filed and
overruled. State v. Egan (A.), 272 S.W.2d 719.
(1954) Where customer placed groceries
and illegally purchased whiskey in his car which was parked on driveway
of grocery store, a search of his car cannot be objected to by store
owner on prosecution for illegal sale of liquor. State v. Egan (A.), 272
S.W.2d 719.
(1955) Where police watched house for
half hour, saw persons enter a room therein and through tear in window
shade saw defendant and others with policy book and other paraphernalia
and when defendant and another were arrested policy result drawings were
taken from him, search and seizure not violative of constitutional
provisions as to search and seizure or as to self-incrimination. State
v. Hardy (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 90.
(1955) Where defendant voluntarily
testifying, admitted possession of stolen property, she could not
complain of prior denial of motion to suppress evidence and admission of
evidence obtained by allegedly illegal search. State v. Bray (A.), 278
S.W.2d 49.
(1955) Testimony of witnesses who
accompanied police officers on unlawful search and testimony of others
identifying articles seized in such search held inadmissible in
prosecution for receiving stolen property. State v. Hunt (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 37.
(1955) Where highway patrol officer
stopped car because lighted firecrackers were being thrown from windows,
and observed suspicious merchandise in the car, there was no search.
State v. Harre (Mo.), 280 S.W.2d 41.
(1956) Police officers, dispatched to
investigate report that burglar alarm in store building was sounding,
arrested individuals in truck which was being operated at high speed at
night and which turned on its lights on approaching city limits. Arrest
of operator held lawful and search of vehicle held proper. State v.
Brown (Mo.), 291 S.W.2d 615.
(1956) Where person in control of
automobile consented to its search, a passenger in the automobile who
was arrested with such person could not object to a search of the auto
or of wardrobe bag found in the auto. State v. Green (Mo.), 292 S.W.2d
283.
(1958) Where officer was authorized to
arrest a person on suspicion after seeing loaded rifle in back seat of
car, a search of the car was lawful and stolen property therein found
held admissible. State v. Cantrell (Mo.), 310 S.W.2d 866.
(1958) In prosecution for narcotic
violation, on motion to suppress evidence on ground evidence was
obtained by unlawful arrest and search, trial court had discretion to
require or not to require arresting officer to disclose name of person
who gave him information on which arrest was based. State v. Edwards
(Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 441.
(1960) Where policeman had stopped car
and arrested driver for running red light and through window saw rifles
and guns partially covered with blankets and noticed rear end of
automobile sagging and asked driver to unlock trunk disclosing
merchandise, there was no unreasonable search and seizure and such items
were admissible in evidence in burglary prosecution. State v. Mallory
(Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 383; Cert. den. 364 U.S. 852, 81 S.Ct. 99, 5 L.Ed.2d
75.
(1960) Where defendant was issued a
certificate of occupancy by the department of public safety of the city
for occupancy of property to be used as a rooming house and where the
defendant applied for permit to operate a rooming house and was actually
operating a rooming house, his refusal to permit the inspection of the
premises by city inspector constituted resisting officers. The ordinance
authorizing the inspection did not constitute unreasonable search and
seizure nor did it require self-incrimination. City of
St. Louis v. Evans (Mo.), 337
S.W.2d 948.
(1961) Where police and firemen
lawfully entered building after fire, their search of the premises was
lawful and not unreasonable. State v. Cohn (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 691.
(1961) Accused could not complain of
alleged unlawful search of vehicle which was owned by his codefendant.
State v. Martin (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 680.
(1962) Neither the federal nor state
constitution nor any of our statutes requires the magistrate to appoint
counsel for the accused in a preliminary examination and accordingly the
failure of the record to show such appointment is not ground for setting
aside a subsequent conviction based upon an information in the circuit
court during the trial of which appellant had counsel. State v. Turner
(Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 602.
(1962) Where officer late at night
arrested individual for speeding and driving without lights and upon
such arrest discovered a metal cash box containing checks payable to an
insurance company in the car it was not unlawful thereafter for the
officer to search the trunk of the car where he found certain adding
machines and calculating machines stolen from an insurance company.
State v. Camper (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 676.
(1962) Where the defendant on trial for
the sale of narcotics testified on direct examination that after he was
arrested the contents of his stomach were removed and also that the
police officers kept the contents and checked it, it was not error for
the court to permit the prosecution then to show the results of the
check which was to the effect that heroin was found in the defendant's
stomach. State v. Odom (Mo.), 353 S.W.2d 708.
(1962) Evidence sufficient to establish
that officers had, prior to arrest of defendant, reasonable cause to
suspect defendant was guilty of first degree robbery by means of
dangerous and deadly weapon and search of closet opening off room in
residence where defendant was arrested was reasonable. State v. Redding
(Mo.), 357 S.W.2d 103.
(1962) Policeman who heard burglar
alarm go off in dry goods store about 8:00 p.m. and found front door locked and defendant standing inside framework of
open rear door had reasonable ground to believe defendant had committed
or attempted to commit a felony. Arrest and search of defendant's person
was lawful and apparatus for use of narcotic drugs found on defendant
were properly admitted in prosecution for possession of apparatus for
unauthorized use of narcotic drugs. State v.
Davenport (Mo.), 360 S.W.2d 710.
(1963) Where officers returned the day
following defendant's arrest to search the premises a second time, the
second search was not an incident of the arrest and was illegal and
admission of defendant's shirt, seized during second search, over
defendant's objection was reversible error. State v. Sprout (Mo.), 365
S.W.2d 572.
(1964) Defendant's constitutional
rights were not violated by seizure by police of articles lying on
dresser in plain sight in motel room where officers obtained key from
person in charge of motel, defendant was in flight at the time and there
was no showing or contention that motel room was defendant's abode.
State v. Enberg (Mo.), 377 S.W.2d 282.
(1964) Search of defendant's automobile
without warrant after it was taken to the police department garage
following defendant's arrest in motel was too remote in time or place to
have been made as incidental to arrest and evidence obtained as result
of search was inadmissible. State v. Edmondson (Mo.), 379 S.W.2d 486.
(1964) Evidence obtained from search of
premises where defendant's mother resided was properly admitted since
constitutional guarantee is a personal one and affords no protection
from search to a person who is not the owner of or in possession of the
premises and where defendant was not present at time search was made.
State v. Anderson (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 591.
(1967) Where defendant was arrested at
scene of accident for driving while intoxicated and taken to police
station, search made an hour and a half later at police headquarters was
incident to arrest and was not unreasonable. State v. Darabcsek (Mo.),
412 S.W.2d 97.
(1968) Search warrant describing
premises to be searched as 310 North Hocker was defective when premises
actually searched were at 314 North Hocker. Front yard of premises was
within "curtilage" and even though evidence seized was in plain sight it
was still subject to suppression in view of improper search warrant.
State v. Buchanan (Mo.), 432 S.W.2d 342.
(1971) Where defendant had entered plea
of guilty to charge of operating vehicle without consent of owner,
contention of defendant in proceeding under court rule 27.26 that trial
court should have set aside conviction because based upon unlawful
arrest, illegal search, and a confession obtained without presence of
counsel was properly overruled since no contention was made that alleged
preliminary defects induced the plea of guilty and voluntary plea of
guilty precluded relief on such grounds. Rew v. State (Mo.), 472 S.W.2d
611.
(1971) Search of farmhouse kitchen not
unreasonable when upon arrest of appellant and other boys present they
were lined up against kitchen wall, personally searched, then a search
of the kitchen only was conducted. Items received in evidence were found
in the kitchen where they were either in plain view or on appellant's
person, and officers had seen one of the boys throw something behind
stove so it was reasonable to move stove to discover evidence. State v.
Erwin (Mo.), 473 S.W.2d 394.
(1972) Admissions contained in letter
written while defendant was in jail awaiting trial were not obtained by
unconstitutional search because defendant knew his letters would be read
by jailers prior to mailing under jail security regulations. State v.
Johnson (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 516.
(1972) Where officer was on his way to
burglary and stopped to look in car parked in vicinity and was later
informed by radio that items of general description of those he saw in
plain sight through car window were taken in the burglary and burglars
had not been apprehended, officer had probable cause to search car
without search warrant. State v. Brown (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 519.
(1972) State was not obligated to hold
a lineup prior to preliminary hearing and fact that eye witnesses to
robbery saw defendant when they appeared at preliminary hearing which
defendant waived was not so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification that his motion to suppress their
in-court identification should have been sustained. State v. Hazelhorst
(Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 543.
(1972) Where officer while shining
flashlight on sticker on windshield of car to obtain city license number
for citation for illegal parking saw hand-rolled cigarette on front seat
of car which he believed to contain marijuana and arrested defendant for
possession thereof, search of vehicle and defendant, who was standing
outside of car, subsequent to arrest and seizure of marijuana revealed
thereby was legal. State v. Hawkins (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 477.
(1974) Held seizure of marijuana was
unreasonable search and seizure. See this case for in depth discussion
of "search and seizure". Kansas City v. Butters (A.), 507 S.W.2d 49.
(1974) For discussion of law of search
and seizure as related to automobiles, see State v. Achter (A.), 512
S.W.2d 894.
(1975) Where allegedly obscene film is
being shown in a commercial theater the risk of loss of evidence is not
so great so as to authorize seizure without procuring a warrant based on
prior judicial determination of probable cause. State v. McMillan (Mo.),
520 S.W.2d 26.
(1975) Warrantless search upheld on
"exigent doctrine". State v. Wiley (Mo.), 522 S.W.2d 281.
(1975) Evidence seized at time of
warrantless arrest where probable cause for arrest was not shown by
state was inadmissible as was gun residue test made later. State v.
Howell (Mo.), 524 S.W.2d 11.
(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are
unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States
Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).
Grand
juries--composition--jurisdiction to convene--powers.
Section 16. That a grand jury shall consist of twelve citizens, any
nine of whom concurring may find an indictment or a true bill: Provided,
that no grand jury shall be convened except upon an order of a judge of
a court having the power to try and determine felonies; but when so
assembled such grand jury shall have power to investigate and return
indictments for all character and grades of crime; and that the power of
grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public
officers, and to find indictments in connection therewith, shall never
be suspended.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 28 (as amended Nov. 6, 1900).
(1977) Grand jury cannot report its
findings after investigation of a named public official except by
indictment. If no indictment is found, an interim "report" should be
expunged from the record. Matter of Interim Report of Grand Jury (Mo.),
553 S.W.2d 479.
(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are
unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States
Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).
Indictments and
information in criminal cases--exceptions.
Section 17. That no person shall be prosecuted criminally for felony
or misdemeanor otherwise than by indictment or information, which shall
be concurrent remedies, but this shall not be applied to cases arising
in the land or naval forces or in the militia when in actual service in
time of war or public danger, nor to prevent arrests and preliminary
examination in any criminal case.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 12 (as amended Nov. 6, 1900), and Sch. of 1875 and § 17.
(1961) Provision authorizing
prosecution of felony in state courts by information or indictment is
not violative of Amendments V and XIV of the Federal Constitution. State
v. Cooper (Mo.), 344 S.W.2d 72; Cert. denied 368 U.S. 855, 82 S.Ct. 91.
(1964) Failure to furnish defendant in
prosecution for first degree robbery with free depositions was not a
violation of his constitutional rights. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381
S.W.2d 807.
(1964) Refusal by court to require
production of police report and statement made to warrant office by
police officer was not abuse of discretion and violation of defendant's
constitutional rights where there was no showing that report or
statement was of such nature that without it defendant's trial would be
fundamentally unfair. State v. Aubuchon (Mo.), 381 S.W.2d 807.
(1964) The constitutional limitations
upon search and seizure apply only to the owner or one in possession of
the premises and defendant could not raise the question of an illegal
search of someone else's property. State v. Worley (Mo.), 383 S.W.2d
529.
(1967) Provisions of the fifth
amendment to the federal constitution that no person shall be held to
answer for a capital crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury does not apply to state procedure, and prosecution may be
either by indictment or information. State v. Crump (Mo.), 412 S.W.2d
490.
(1999) Sections 15-19 of Article I are
unconstitutional by violating Articles I and V of the United States
Constitution. Gralike v. Cook, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir.).
Rights of accused
in criminal prosecutions.
Section 18(a). That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel; to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against him
face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
county.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 22.
Generally
(1952) Where defendant was released
from imprisonment in penitentiary on habeas corpus over nineteen years
after original commitment because failure to have been provided counsel,
his subsequent trial on same charge did not offend against
constitutional guaranty of speedy trial. State v. Hadley (Mo.), 249
S.W.2d 857.
(1952) Where defendant announced that
he understood the charge against him and that he would represent himself
and when court later requested an attorney to sit in and assist
defendant, defendant stated he still did not think he needed a lawyer, a
contention that defendant was not accorded counsel and that counsel was
not given an opportunity to prepare defense, was overruled. State v.
Hurley (Mo.), 251 S.W.2d 617.
(1953) Where accused was arrested at
midnight, arraigned at 9:00 a.m. the following morning and pleaded guilty without record showing
opportunity to consult with counsel, he should be released from
incarceration under sentence but should be rearranged on charge. Ex
parte Stone (A.), 255 S.W.2d 155.
(1954) Where defendant's counsel
withdrew after verdict and defendant had no attorney to file a motion
for a new trial, it could not be said his constitutional rights were
violated in absence of showing of error in trial. State v. Mischanko
(Mo.), 272 S.W.2d 210.
(1955) Admission of prosecutor's
testimony as to what he did after he questioned alleged coconspirator in
robbery prosecution and its emphasis in argument by prosecutor to jury
held prejudicially erroneous as involving the denial of accuser’s right
to meet witnesses against him face to face. State v. Chernick (Mo.), 280
S.W.2d 56.
(1956) Defendant is not entitled to
more than one court appointed attorney and trial court has discretion as
to whether more than one shall be appointed. State v. Lord (Mo.), 286
S.W.2d 737.
(1958) In prosecution for stealing
under habitual criminal law, where certified record of the state
penitentiary contained notations of defendant's imprisonment in two
other states and also that defendant was wanted by police, it was error
to admit in evidence the part containing such notations. State v. Dunn
(Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 643.
(1958) Indictment charging defendant
with "feloniously and fraudulently" buying and receiving certain stolen
property was insufficient as quoted words are not of similar import to
"intent to defraud" and not sufficiently definite and certain to satisfy
constitutional and statutory requirements. State v. Harris (Mo.), 313
S.W.2d 664.
(1958) Defendant of a mental age of
twelve years was told at a coroner's inquest to which he had been
subpoenaed that under the constitution he was not obligated to testify.
He replied that he understood that and wanted to tell all he knew. His
statements were held to be admissible. State v. Mayabb (Mo.), 316 S.W.2d
609.
(1958) Defendant held to have waived
right to be represented by counsel and to have been capable of doing so.
State v. Glenn (Mo.), 317 S.W.2d 403; Cert. den. 358 U.S. 942, 79 S.Ct.
348.
(1959) This section applies to crimes
against the state and does not apply to proceedings by municipalities
for violation of municipal police regulations. City of Webster Groves v.
Quick (Mo.), 319 S.W.2d 543.
(1959) Where defendant had refused
service of public defender and dismissed two court-appointed attorneys,
one of whom he had requested by name, and insisted up to trial date that
he wanted to represent himself, but the court, over defendant's
objection, provided him with counsel, defendant was not denied due
process of law. State v. Warren (Mo.), 321 S.W.2d 705.
(1961) Where defendant refused the
offer of the court to appoint counsel for him, the court's finding that
the defendant was mentally able and sufficiently informed to decide his
need for counsel was supported by the evidence. State v. Slicker (Mo.),
342 S.W.2d 946.
(1961) Defendant was not deprived of
constitutional right to appear and defend in person where he was
represented by competent counsel throughout all stages of trial and was
personally present at all times except when voluntarily absent for short
time during proceedings in chambers when record of prior convictions was
presented to judge under second offender law. State v. Colbert (Mo.),
344 S.W.2d 115.
(1961) A proceeding under Rule 27.26 to
vacate a judgment and sentence is not a step in the criminal proceedings
entitling the defendant to "appear and defend, in person" under the
constitution of Missouri. State v. Hurst (Mo.), 347 S.W.2d 177.
(1963) Failure of trial court to grant
defendant's application for subpoenas for witnesses which was not
specifically ruled on and not pursued when adequate opportunity to do so
existed, could not, after verdict, form basis of prejudicial error when
defendant had announced ready for trial and proceeded with no request
for attendance of any witnesses and made no offer of proof as to
expected testimony of desired witnesses. State v. Chapman (Mo.), 365
S.W.2d 551.
(1964) Constitutionality of Sunday
sales act upheld against the charge that it is so vague and indefinite
that citizens cannot ascertain or be informed of its meaning contrary to
the due process provision of Art. I, § 10 of the constitution, and in
violation of the right of a person accused in a criminal proceeding to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him as provided by
Art. I, § 18(a) of the constitution. State ex rel. Eagleton v. McQueen
(Mo.), 378 S.W.2d 449.
(1964) Judge's statement to jury in
answer to their question about sentence to be imposed, after submission
of cause to jury and in absence of defense counsel, that the jury should
refer to instructions and the three forms of verdict given them and that
the court would have no objection to jury using form of verdict that did
not refer to the prior conviction if they felt it appropriate was not
such a denial of defendant's rights as to make judgment subject to
collateral attack nor would it have afforded defendant any basis for
relief had his counsel been aware of the occurrence so that the matter
could have been raised on appeal. State v. Baugh (Mo.), 382 S.W.2d 608.
(1964) Failure to appoint counsel to
represent defendant at preliminary examination where he pleaded not
guilty held not to deprive him due process of law nor equal protection
of the law. State v. Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.
(1966) As there is no constitutional
requirement that there be a transcript of the testimony in a preliminary
hearing, nor even a constitutional requirement that a preliminary
hearing be held, defendant had no constitutional right to have a
transcript of preliminary hearing. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.
(1966) Defendant in criminal case has
no constitutional right to examine the police record, if any, of
complaining witness. State v. Maxwell (Mo.), 400 S.W.2d 156.
(1966) Allegations framed in the
language of the statute held sufficient to satisfy constitutional
requirements. State v. Tandy (Mo.), 401 S.W.2d 409.
(1966) Defendant who sought or by his
own conduct caused continuance cannot complain that right to speedy
trial was violated. State v. Barrett (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 602.
(1967) Court's compelling defendant of
limited education to go on trial for felony without counsel immediately
upon the withdrawal without notice of his employed counsel resulted in a
denial of due process of law. State v. Martin (Mo.), 411 S.W.2d 215.
(1967) The appointment of counsel for
an accused at a preliminary examination is not required by either the
federal or state constitution or by statutes of this state. State v.
Benison (Mo.), 415 S.W.2d 773.
(1967) The decision of United States
Supreme Court in Douglas v. California that an indigent defendant is
entitled to appointed counsel on state appeal applied retrospectively to
the case of an indigent prisoner whose conviction was affirmed when he
was not represented by counsel. Swenson v. Donnell (C.A.
Mo.), 382 F.2d 248.
(1968) Denial of counsel in preliminary
hearing is not a constitutional infirmity where defendant pleaded not
guilty and was otherwise not shown to have been prejudiced. Pope v.
Swenson (A.), 395 F.2d 321.
(1968) Failure to furnish counsel to
accused during interrogation before confession at a time before decision
in Escobedo case was not so prejudicial as to infect the subsequent
trial with an absence of fundamental fairness. Howard v. Swenson (A.),
404 F.2d 469.
(1971) Jury trial, in juvenile
proceedings where child is alleged to have committed an act which would
be a felony if committed by an adult, is not required by Art. I, § 18(a)
of Missouri Constitution. In re Fisher (Mo.), 468 S.W.2d 198.
(1974) Held that failure of counsel to
interview state's witnesses amounted to ineffective counsel. McQueen v.
Swenson (C.A. Mo.), 498 F.2d 207.
(1975) Held that admission of evidence
through closed circuit television was proper in a prosecution for
violation of a city ordinance. The question was raised under the
provision of the United States Const. and was not questioned under Art.
I, § 18(a), const. of Mo. A four to three decision. Kansas City v. McCoy
(Mo.), 525 S.W.2d 336.
Right to be Present to Defend
(1967) Accuser’s presence is not
necessary during proceedings which are not part of the trial, such as
preliminary or formal proceedings or motions which do not affect his
guilt or innocence. State v. Durham (Mo.), 416 S.W.2d 79.
(1973) Right to be present to defend
request for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum made one day before
motion for new trial was to be heard when counsel had known of date of
hearing for some time was not timely made and constitutional right to
appear and defend in person was not denied. State v. Bizzle (A.), 500
S.W.2d 259.
Speedy Trial by Impartial Jury of
County
(1968) Held that in the absence of
apparent abuse continuances granted at request of defendant's counsel,
even though made without knowledge and consent of defendant, would not
constitute a denial of right to speedy trial. State v. Holmes (Mo.), 428
S.W.2d 571.
(1972) Although information was filed
during September 1968 term and trial began during September 1969 term
after elapse of four terms of court, since defendant took no action at
any time to secure a trial until he filed motion for discharge at May
1969 term defendant was not entitled to discharge. Failure to take
affirmative action seeking a speedy trial constitutes waiver of that
right. State v. Wright (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 581.
(1972) Where appellant had escaped from
custody before arraignment set for March 31, 1966, and was convicted of
crime in California and on June 10, 1970, was paroled from California
sentence and returned for trial in Missouri, there was no denial of
constitutional right to speedy trial since defendant showed no prejudice
except his assertions that each year made it more difficult to find
witnesses and that the Missouri detainer precluded him from California
rehabilitation programs. State v. Endres (Mo.), 842 S.W.2d 480.
(1974) Right to a speedy trial arises
only after the information was filed. A complaint represents only a
possiblity that a criminal indictment or information will be filed.
Trial within eight days after filing of information held not failure to
have speedy trial. State v. York (Mo.), 511 S.W.2d 758.
(1976) Delay between commission of the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon and defendant's arrest thereon or
filing of information did not abridge defendant's right to speedy trial,
nor did it violate his right of due process since no prejudice was
demonstrated by the delay. State v. Odzark (A.), 532 S.W.2d 45.
(1986) Whether a person's right to a
speedy trial has been violated depends upon four factors: (1) The length
of the delay, (2) The reason for the delay, (3) The defendant's
assertion to his right to a speedy trial, and (4) The prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay. State v. Kirksey, 713 S.W.2d 841 (Mo.App.
1986).
Depositions in felony cases.
Section 18(b). Upon a hearing and finding by the circuit court in any
case wherein the accused is charged with a felony, that it is necessary
to take the deposition of any witness within the state, other than
defendant and spouse, in order to preserve the testimony, and on
condition that the court make such orders as will fully protect the
rights of personal confrontation and cross-examination of the witness by
defendant, the state may take the deposition of such witness and either
party may use the same at the trial, as in civil cases, provided there
has been substantial compliance with such orders. The reasonable
personal and traveling expenses of defendant and his counsel shall be
paid by the state or county as provided by law.
Source: Const. of
1945.
(1973) Where state used deposition of
witness taken by defendant's counsel alone, held that adequate
satisfaction of both the right of confrontation and of cross examination
cannot be accomplished by either the defendant or his counsel alone, and
it was error to permit the use of this constitutionally and basically
unacceptable deposition by the sate. State v. Jackson (A.) 495 S.W.2d
80.
Self-incrimination and double jeopardy.
Section 19. That no person shall be compelled to testify against
himself in a criminal cause, nor shall any person be put again in
jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense, after being once
acquitted by a jury; but if the jury fail to render a verdict the court
may, in its discretion, discharge the jury and commit or bail the
prisoner for trial at the same or next term of court; and if judgment be
arrested after a verdict of guilty on a defective indictment or
information, or if judgment on a verdict of guilty be reversed for error
in law, the prisoner may be tried anew on a proper indictment or
information, or according to the law.
Source: Const. of
1875, Art. II, § 23.
(1952) Habitual criminal statute goes
only to the punishment, not the guilt or innocence of the accused on
trial, and under it no punishment is imposed for the prior offense.
Proceedings under it, therefore, do not violate double jeopardy or other
provisions of constitution. State v. O'Brien (Mo.), 252 S.W.2d 357.
(1952) Where defendant is convicted of
common assault in prosecution for felonious assault with intent to
ravish and thereafter new trial is granted, cause stands as though there
had been no trial at all and defendant may be tried for the felony
charged in the indictment. State v. Higgins (A.), 252 S.W.2d 641.
(1953) Where defendant of low-level
intelligence confessed guilt under circumstances indicating that
confession was coerced by inspired fear, a promise of protection and
daily interrogation over long period of detention, use of confession in
his trial was violative of due process clause of constitution. State v.
Bradford (Mo.), 262 S.W.2d 584.
(1954) Plea in abatement in criminal
prosecution based on stated conclusions that defendant had been
compelled to testify before the grand jury which was investigating
offense with which defendant was later charged held properly overruled
where testimony required was not shown either in verified plea or by
evidence. State v. Bright, 269 S.W.2d 615.
(1955) Where police watched house for
half hour, saw persons enter a room therein and through tear in window
shade saw defendant and others with policy book and other paraphernalia
and when defendant and another were arrested policy result drawings were
taken from him, search and seizure not violative of constitutional
provisions as to search and seizure or as to self-incrimination. State
v. Hardy (Mo.), 276 S.W.2d 90.
(1955) Conviction of defendant of
robbery does not bar his prosecution for assault with intent to kill
where such assault was committed in progress of robbery or as part of
the same transaction. State v. Chernick (Mo.), 278 S.W.2d 741.
(1956) Where defendant charged with
first degree murder was at liberty on bond and jury was discharged on
its failure to reach a verdict during his voluntary, although
inadvertent, absence from courtroom, his retrial did not constitute
double jeopardy. State v. McCrary, 365 Mo. 799, 287 S.W.2d 785.
(1957) Where trial on murder charge
resulted in "hung jury", and case was continued for some time and nolle
prosequi was entered after jury had been called and qualified but not
sworn, defendant was not placed in jeopardy and could be again charged
with the offense even though nolle prosequi judgment recited that
defendant was "acquitted". State v. Berry (Mo.), 298 S.W.2d 429.
(1957) Common assault charge did not
merge in peace disturbance charge upon the street even though the
disturbance was "by fighting" and so acquittal of peace disturbance
charge did not bar prosecution for common assault. State v. Brooks (A.),
298 S.W.2d 511.
(1958) Where motion for new trial of
accused is sustained on ground evidence was insufficient and the
conviction is set aside, accused is estopped to plead the former
conviction as a bar to another trial on the same or a new indictment.
State v. Patton (Mo.), 308 S.W.2d 641.
(1959) Where defendant was discharged
from conviction by circuit court on ground information on which he was
convicted was defective, his subsequent trial for same offense on valid
information did not constitute double jeopardy. U.S. ex rel. Jones v.
Nash, 264 F.2d 610.
(1959) Where confession appears to be
entirely voluntary, the failure of the officers taking it to warn
accused of constitutional right to remain silent or to have counsel
present, would not make it admissible. State v. Laspy (Mo.), 323 S.W.2d
713.
(1959) When a defendant (in a criminal
case) put his sanity in issue, he waives all privilege either under the
physician privilege statute or under the self-incrimination section, to
exclude testimony of any doctors who have examined him for this purpose.
State v. Swinburne (Mo.), 324 S.W.2d 746.
(1959) Section 491.080 is not as broad
as the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination and so does
not authorize compulsory testimony in examination of judgment debtor
when constitutional privilege is claimed. State ex rel. North v. Kirtley
(Mo.), 327 S.W.2d 166.
(1960) Where defendant was issued a
certificate of occupancy by the department of public safety of the city
for occupancy of property to be used as a rooming house and where the
defendant applied for permit to operate a rooming house and was actually
operating a rooming house, his refusal to permit the inspection of the
premises by city inspectors constituted resisting officers. The
ordinance authorizing the inspection did not constitute unreasonable
search and seizure nor did it require self-incrimination. City of St.
Louis v. Evans (Mo.), 337 S.W.2d 948.
(1961) Refusal of grand jury witness to
answer questions as to when he sold business, whether he had interest in
certain real estate and as to whether he knew certain individuals, on
ground of self- incrimination, held not basis for commitment for
contempt. In re Presta v. Owsley (A.), 345 S.W.2d 649.
(1961) Where accused was charged with
robbing several persons at the same place, the acquittal of robbing one
of such persons would not bar a prosecution for the robbery of another
of such persons. State v. Ashe (Mo.), 350 S.W.2d 768.
(1964) Held prejudicial error to admit
testimony of police officer that defendant remained silent and refused
to answer questions while under arrest and in custody especially since
in view of defendant's condition there was some question as to whether
defendant heard or understood what was being asked of him. State v.
Phelps (Mo.), 384 S.W.2d 616.
(1967) Breath test authorized under
this section does not violate due process of law. Blydenburg v. David
(Mo.), 413 S.W.2d 284.
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